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## WAR FOR PEACE.

ON the morning of Saturday, March 4th, 1916, the thirteenth day of the battle of Verdun, I stood with others on a low spur to the north-west of the town and heard rather than watched the preparation of the second German attack upon the village of Douaumont. A few hundred yards below us French batteries were snapping out defiance at the invisible German guns across the Meuse and beyond the nearest heights. Quick jets of flame would spurt from unexpected positions, huge shells would drone across the valley and burst with terrific clatter into cloudlets of dirty black-grey smoke; but even the stray gleams of anæmic sunshine that broke through the curtain of mist and sleet revealed little of the grim work in progress. Here and there the slaughter could indeed be seen, or guessed. Yet the uppermost feeling, at the moment and on the spot, was one of impatience at being merely a listening spectator, not a combatant. Only on returning westwards and seeing fresh reserves of sturdy humanity rushing towards the shambles in huge motor lorries did reflection overcome the lingering thrill of the distant strife, and the question arise insistently, "Why? Why?"

Little by little the question transformed itself into a hard resolve, into a determination not consciously formed but elementary, like hunger or thirst: "Never again! Never again shall those who let loose this orgy of wickedness upon the world be permitted to hold mankind to ransom, and to measure the freedom of free peoples by the might of their own scientific savagery."

Hard upon the "Why?", with its attendant resolve, followed the "How?"; and before a clear notion as to ways and means could delineate itself in the mind came an angry wish that every Minister and diplomatist, politician and publicist, whose voice might be heard or whose influence be felt in the making of peace should see what we had seen, hear what we had heard, feel what we had felt. A period of compulsory presence on or near a battlefield, of salutary

exposure to shellfire, of obligatory visits to ruined towns and villages should be an indispensable qualification for every man who aspires, or may be in a position, to influence conditions of peace. How many suave soothsayers would find their words die on their lips, how many political pontiffs would doubt their own infallibility, how many "pacifists" would feel their blood tingle with an unwonted intensity of purpose, could they have direct experience of what war means, and realise the positive criminality of any failure to make it impossible in future!

These were the feelings with which I left the battlefield of Verdun. They are my feelings to-day, though I understand that in this war we may all be "at the front." They moved me then to draft "A Programme for Peace" which, even now, I am not ashamed of having written. Its first point was that the Allies should win the war so thoroughly as to avoid any inconclusive peace; and its second was that "as a preliminary step to the winning of the war the British people entrust its management to a few men determined to conquer, literally at all costs." Many details of this "programme" were realised in 1919, though some had been rendered obsolete by the course of the war. But I was taken to task in 1916 for having ventured in the midst of war to forecast terms of peace. In reply I wrote:

The war may still last many months, perhaps years. The longer it lasts the more exhausted will all the belligerents become, and the more eager will be sections of public opinion in the allied countries to secure a rapid settlement without overmuch haggling as to terms. Fatigue, masquerading as generosity, and unavowed pro-Germanism whispering "Let bygones be bygones," might become serious political factors unless the allied peoples were agreed in advance upon a minimum peace programme. The tendency to compromise upon essential points might become too strong for any allied Government to withstand. The best means of guarding against this danger is to frame a clear-cut minimum programme which must be accepted by the enemy before any armistice can be conceded. The programme must include the giving of guarantees for its execution pending negotiation upon points of detail.

In some ways the position to-day is not unlike that of 1916. Though, on land, the war in the west has hardly begun, German armies in the east have devastated Poland, and we

have already been confronted with a "peace offensive" which has not been without its effect upon certain sections of public opinion. It may not be generally known that this peace offensive formed a definite part of Hitler's policy before his onslaught on Poland began. Early last summer a Nazi representative in a neutral country divulged the main lines of this policy to a citizen of that country whom he may have hoped to influence. But so taken aback was the neutral citizen that he challenged the accuracy of the Nazi representative's information. In the heated discussion which followed the Nazi may have said more than he had intended to say. Upon what he did say the neutral citizen promptly wrote a report; and, as good fortune would have it, a copy of this report came into my hands at the end of June. I took care that an accurate digest of it should reach certain important Ministers and leading members of the Opposition without delay. In view of Hitler's "peace offer" in his Reichstag speech of October 6th its substance is still of interest, allowance being made for Hitler's change of tone towards Russia after the Soviet-German agreement of August 24th and for the Russian interpretation of that agreement.

The report declared that the ultimate aim of Nazi policy is to create a Germanic World Empire of unassailable strength without the risks of a world war. In 1938 its immediate aim was to subjugate Czechoslovakia. In 1939 its immediate aim is to subjugate Poland without war or, at worst, after a short localised war. Germany does not yet feel strong enough to face any long war. But Hitler is anxious to carry through speedily another stage of his programme by the subjugation of Poland and, thereafter, of the Baltic and Danubian States. When this has been done there will be a prospect of comparative tranquillity while Germany organises the territories between her own borders and those of Russia. Then Hitler will seek either to undermine, disintegrate and revolutionise Soviet Russia, or to link the Russian "space" with the "imperial space" of the German World Empire, or to win a war against the Western Powers should they resist him. Hitler is now seeking good relations with Moscow in the hope of localising or isolating his conflict with Poland, not because his "imperial aims" in the east have changed.

Up to the end of 1938 Hitler believed that his eastern policy could be carried through with Polish help. He hoped, too, that this policy would be tolerated by Great Britain and France while Rumania was also being brought, with Polish co-operation, into

the German sphere of influence. A basis for the disintegration of the Russian Ukraine would thus have been assured. Only then would the Polish Ukraine have been "liberated" in its turn, and the full German claims enforced upon Poland.

These plans were thwarted by the Polish alliances with Great Britain and France. Should the Western Powers attempt, with or without Russian help, to block Hitler's road to the east, he would treat Poland as his most dangerous foe. Poland must, therefore, be forced out of the anti-German coalition by any and every means. Before the union of Danzig with Germany is proclaimed, the main strength of the German army will be concentrated on the borders of Poland, while the Siegfried Line will be defensively held in the west. German strategy will aim at crushing the Polish army in the region between Bromberg and Posen, a "lightning" occupation of Upper Silesia being carried out simultaneously so as to cut away the chief centre of Polish industry. This, Hitler thinks, could be done in a few weeks.

Though Hitler still hopes that the Western Powers will be militarily inactive at the beginning of a German-Polish war, he feels the urgency of ending such a war quickly so as to leave the Western Powers no opening for intervention in the east. In the event of a French attack on Germany its chances of success would be belittled. In the west, Germany does not expect Great Britain and France to favour an aggressive war against her, especially if their hopes of Russian help prove illusory. Should the Western Powers nevertheless attack, Germany's western army will stand on the defensive until the Polish army has been crushed. Then the main German forces would be switched over to the west, though there would be no air raids on England or France as long as these two countries should refrain from aerial attack upon Germany. Concurrently with her military concentration on the west, Germany would begin a propaganda peace-offensive in which she and the Rome-Berlin Axis would offer immediate peace to the Western Powers who, if they rejected the offer, would be made responsible for the devastation that would ensue. Special appeals would be issued to the Governments and peoples of Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. Hitler believes that the success of this peace offensive would cause him to be acclaimed as the saviour of the peace of the world.

The "combined strategy" of this method is based on the assumption that the German forces in the west could hold up a French attack long enough for the Polish army to be crushed and the main German forces to be switched over to the west. During this period Italy would remain neutral. There would be no counter-attack by the Axis in the west until the whole German army and air force had been concentrated against Great Britain

and France. Germany assumes further that Russia will remain neutral until the Western Powers and the Axis are at death grips in a long struggle. But Germany is not yet prepared to face a long struggle. Her aim is "World Empire without a world war." With this Empire the Western Powers could make peace on condition that they give up all idea of political co-operation with Eastern Europe, including Russia. As compensation, Germany would be prepared to "guarantee" the British and French Empires.

This is the substance of the report. If Hitler's search for "good relations with Moscow" has taken a turn less favourable to his designs than he anticipated, the launching of his "peace offensive" on October 6th, while his troops were being switched over to the West, serves to show the general accuracy of this forecast of his intentions. It shows, too, that extreme care is needed in Great Britain and France not to countenance, directly or indirectly, his proposals for "peace" in the West while he consolidates his gains in the East. The Western Powers are fighting—alone, for the moment—a war for the freedom and future peace of Europe. Without a free Europe there can be no true peace or, indeed, security in freedom for Great Britain and France. As for the smaller neutrals, they too understand that liberty and independence will be vain words unless the British and French democracies destroy not only "Hitlerism" but help to free the German mind from the noxious infections of which "Hitlerism" is compounded. This time "*Es geht ums Ganze*," as the Germans say; it is truly a fight "For all we have and are." To think of a patched-up "peace" with the foes of everything that makes the life of free peoples worth living would be so heinous a betrayal of our whole heritage that no upright mind can be guilty of it.

It has been said that we have no quarrel with "the German people." However true this may be in the abstract, it assumes in practice that "the German people" do not support Hitlerism to any serious extent, and that they would repudiate it and all that it implies if they could. We need to be very careful before we accept this assumption as altogether valid. Who are, actually and prospectively, "the German people"? None can say, for nobody knows. Since Bismarck turned Austria out of Germany "with blood and iron" in 1866, and especially since he founded German unity on Prusso-German

victories over France in 1870-1, "the German people" have passively accepted the mastery of Prussia over them. To them it meant prosperous invincibility. Can this mastery be broken? Do "the German people" wish to break it? How much political reality lies behind the alleged "otherness" of Bavarians, Saxons, Württembergers or Rhinelanders? The "spiritual home" of Nazism has always been in Bavaria, at Munich, while Nuremberg is its holy city. Hitler himself is an Austrian. He has forced his native land, by murder, terror and aggression, into his Third Reich. Many Austrians writhe under his heel. Yet, in 1918, when the Hapsburg Monarchy and the Austrian Empire exploded from within, the Austrian Republican Government proclaimed union with Germany.

So "the German people" are a riddle hard to read. Certain only is it, in the light of history, that any attempt to dis-integrate Germany from without and by force would end in fostering another, and probably irresistible, movement for unity. I am convinced that whatever changes may be brought about in the political structure of German lands and tribes must be mainly the work of Germans themselves, however sympathetically foreign well-wishers of "the German people" may regard the dislike of Prussianism which many Germans feel. No reasonable European can deny that 75 or 80 millions of Germans in the centre of Europe are entitled to, and will inevitably, play a leading part in the affairs of the Continent. All who have the peace and welfare of Europe at heart must desire to see the Germans hold their rightful place, as equals, in a European family of nations. But no good European—and aviation has henceforth made Great Britain indissolubly a part of Europe—can tolerate the idea that the other European nations should be compelled perpetually to defend themselves in arms against German military aggression.

It is in these terms that the future of "the German people" has to be considered, and the problem of recurrent German aggression to be solved. To conceive this problem as being merely that of overthrowing Hitlerism is woefully to misunderstand its nature; and to ignore the formidable body of politico-philosophical doctrine that has developed in Germany during the past 150 years in justification of German hegemony in Europe, if not in the world, is at once futile and self-deceptive. From Fichte to Hitler the line of this doctrine runs

straight. From 1895 onwards it took shape in a definite programme of territorial pan-Germanism. Without dwelling upon the well-known contributions to it of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, it is significant that this doctrine affected more than one apparently liberal German writer. Those who wish to study its later developments cannot do better than read Aurel Kolnai's compendium of Nazi thought in his book, *The War Against the West*, to which should be added (for readers of French) Professor Edmond Vermeil's analytical masterpiece, *Doctrinaires de la Révolution Allemande, 1918-1938*. Whoever studies these works will shake his head over the assertion that the Western allies have no quarrel with "the German people."

The sad truth is that we do not understand the German people, nor do they understand us. It is doubtful whether they understand themselves. This is not a matter of language. It goes far deeper than forms of speech. It may be a matter of temperament, upbringing and outlook. Whatever it is, we are now faced with a militant "German people" in the form of Hitler's system and armies. They are the concrete expression of "Hitlerism," the embodiment of its doctrine. As regards its spirit Hermann Goering is no mean authority. In the spring of 1933, soon after Hitler had come to power, Goering answered certain criticisms by saying: "As for me, I am *subjective*; I commit myself to *my people* and acknowledge nothing else on earth. I thank my Maker for having created me without what they call a 'sense of objectivity.'"

It would be difficult to express the essence of Hitlerism more succinctly. It is tribal egoism in the fullest sense. To Goering's statement may be compared that of Dr. Frank, the Nazi Minister of Justice, two and a half years later: "We are under the great obligation of recognising as a holy work of our Folk-spirit the laws signed with Adolf Hitler's name. Hitler has received his authority from God. Therefore he is a champion, sent by God, for German Right in the world." We need to recognise that German "Right," thus conceived, stands in absolute and conscious antagonism to Western liberal civilisation, and inspires a creed of unbridled power and territorial expansion. What is more: Since 1923 this creed has been instilled into the German people by Hitler and his associates; while since 1933 "the German people" have been allowed to hear and to read little else.

These are some of the factors which render the German problem so formidable. We in the Western world, who live in more or less constant touch with the thoughts and deeds of other peoples, cannot easily imagine the cramping and dwarfing influence upon a nation's mind of intellectual and political segregation. The war of 1914-18 lasted four and a half years. At its close Dr. Beneš, the Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, who had lived and worked in the West from 1915 onwards, met at Geneva a delegation of his fellow countrymen who had come from Prague after the declaration of Czechoslovak independence. Its members were men who had all worked, inside Austria, for the same ideal of national freedom as had inspired Dr. Beneš and Professor Masaryk. Yet Dr. Beneš could hardly understand them. The Czechs from Prague had received their impressions of the war and of its meaning through the medium of German and Austrian official distortions, whereas Dr. Beneš had lived in a freer atmosphere and in contact with reality. Months passed before these equally patriotic Czechs could co-ordinate and, to some extent, harmonise their ideas. In the light of this precedent we may well ask how long it will be before the Western Allies, having overthrown Hitlerism, will be able to reach a common basis of understanding with "the German people" or their representatives? We cannot guess; but there is no room for hasty optimism. In any event we shall need, as interpreters and intermediaries, many of the Germans whom Hitlerism has driven into exile—and whom our blundering authorities and those of France have thought well to treat as "enemy aliens" or to intern in concentration camps. These men should be allowed and encouraged to get together, to consult each other freely, and to consult with us, so that the hour of decision, when it comes, may not find us unprepared or our minds filled with perilous illusions.

The hour of decision may strike soon, or it may be deferred for months or years. We cannot tell what turn events will finally take. In the first few weeks of war there have been so many unforeseen developments that it would be idle to forecast what even the near future may hold in store. Soon after his first great triumph in the German general election of September 1930, Hitler declared at Frankfurt that there were only two possibilities of saving Germany—National

Socialism on the one hand or Bolshevism on the other. And on November 8th, 1930, he wrote in the *Illustrierten Beobachter* that it was his "hard will to lead Germany either to National Socialism or to Bolshevism." As we have had cause to learn, Hitler's words may mean little though his deeds may mean much; and his deed in concluding his agreement with Soviet Russia last August has given the present war a complexion which few thought it likely to take on.

In my own belief this new complexion involves for Great Britain and France a danger more immediate than that of any eventual "Bolshevisation" of Germany. Quite apart from Russian action in taking time by the forelock in the Baltic, and the heavy blow which this represents to Nazi hopes of expansion in that region, Hitler's association with Stalin may cost him dear within Germany herself. The conduct of Russia is not surprising. We have given her as yet no proof that we mean business in withstanding German aggression. Rather the contrary. One cannot assume that Hitler's intention (mentioned in the Report summarised on earlier pages) "either to undermine, disintegrate and revolutionise Soviet Russia, or to link the Russian 'space' with the 'imperial space' of the German World Empire" will have been a secret to the Intelligence Service of Moscow. So Stalin may have thought it well to make hay while the sun shone, and to seize other "guarantees" than Hitler's word against any German attempt to "Nazify" Russia. On the other hand the spectacle of Russo-German collusion and co-operation has undoubtedly moved many minds in Western countries to wonder whether it would be wise for Great Britain and France to wage war against Germany so vigorously as to inflict total defeat upon her, or whether it would not be more prudent to cultivate an understanding with "Conservative" elements, in the Reichswehr and elsewhere, so that with their help "Hitlerism" might be discomfited and a new order set up in Germany that would be proof against Bolshevik blandishments. Such notions have been and are making a certain headway even in British and French quarters which proclaim their resolve to fight the war through, for three years or longer, until freedom and respect for law shall again reign over Europe.

My own conviction is that notions like these are temptations

of the devil. We have one task in hand—to vanquish Nazi Germany. Without military victory over Nazi Germany we shall not destroy the false legend of German military invincibility from which Hitlerism originally drew much of its strength. Nor shall we convince “the German people” that pan-German militarism spells disaster to them, whether under a Prussian Hohenzollern or under a Third Nazi Reich. Efforts to cast out Satan in the name of Beelzebub are not to be recommended. The immediate foe is Hitlerism. When we have dealt faithfully with it we shall be able to face Bolshevism with clear consciences and firm hands. Were we to trifle with our task, to seek to dodge the major issue in the hope of escaping what may be an ultimate but is still a minor danger, we should stand discredited as poltroons and fools.

We are at war for peace. There can be no peace worth having without freedom. Upon us has devolved the stern duty and the high honour of being the champions of freedom. If we be worthy champions the friends of freedom everywhere will rally round us. We may be able to unite them, under Franco-British leadership, with the moral support at least of the United States, and to restore hope to a bewildered world. Unless I err, even Russia would not fail to be affected by this example. Moscow has been deeply impressed during recent years by proofs of Hitlerite purposefulness and strength, and has been scornful of Western pusillanimity and weakness. Our strength lies in the nobility of our cause. If we are true to that cause, come what may, its strength will prevail even against Bolshevism; and a liberated Europe will find the path to creative peace. If we are faithless, if we timorously toy with or adopt half-measures, we and our cause will be worsted. Darkness may then brood over the peoples of Europe for many a day and year.

So I am persuaded now, as I was at Verdun in 1916, that we need a clear-cut programme for peace, and that one of the first and most essential conditions for getting such a programme is that the British people should entrust the management of the war to a few open-eyed and high-hearted men determined to win it, literally at all costs. Our present “War Cabinet” contains few such men. The deliberate reply given on October 12th by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons to Hitler’s “peace offensive” speech of October 6th

breathed a spirit that must inspire his every act and those of his colleagues. As time goes on we shall need more specific "war aims." Meanwhile it is good for the world to be told that we shall not recognise or tolerate the fruits of Hitlerite aggression, and that when Hitlerism shall have disappeared we shall do our utmost to help a new Germany find for herself a worthy place in a Europe set for peace. In order to make such a Europe we may have to give up as much of our own national sovereignty as is necessary to secure effective union with other free nations for lasting peace.

The thought of this peace must ever be in our minds. To allow victory to fall short of it would be to betray at once the men who fought the first "war to end war," those who are fighting this war, and the freedom of future generations from the recurrent scourge of lawless, predatory might.

WICKHAM STEED.

## WAR AIMS AND PEACE TERMS.

“*Si vis pacem, para bellum*” is a maxim of limited validity, and the history of defensive armaments might appear almost to invalidate it completely. It is truer, and at present more pertinent, to insist that if you want to restore peace you should prepare for it, and that the continuation of that policy to advance which you had resort to war requires you to define that policy with the maximum degree of precision—not merely in terms which will fill in a peroration or furnish a slogan.

Even at this date, when the war is only a few weeks old and the issue has hardly been joined on the Western front, there is more than one reason which should be sufficient to compel us critically to examine our war aims and peace terms. In the first place, prudent though it undoubtedly is to be prepared for a long struggle, there is good ground for hoping, and even some for believing, that this war will be a short one—barring such major surprises as limitless military co-operation between Germany and Russia. Hitler and even Hitlerism may disappear overnight and leave us facing the problem what we are prepared to offer to or accept from a converted Germany. The outbreak or threat of peace might represent almost as grave a crisis as the prospect of war.

Secondly, although in practice the length of the war and its vicissitudes will inevitably have an effect on the eventual settlement (roughly speaking the longer the war the worse the peace treaty which will end it), we ought in theory to be prepared to make peace on terms which are not substantially varied by the extent of our military success. In other words, there are certain minimum terms which we should be determined to demand before we lay down our arms ; the cleanness of our crusade depends not less on our unwillingness to raise those demands than on our unreadiness to abate them. We can, therefore, profitably discuss the nature of our terms before we are in a position to impose or negotiate them.

Thirdly, our existing war aims, as officially declared, are dangerously vague ; this point will be further discussed in a minute. Suffice it to say at this point that they perilously resemble form without content, and that it is highly desirable that the minds of both sets of belligerents and of neutrals should be clarified at the earliest moment. This consideration,

it must frankly be said, is reinforced in the minds of millions here and abroad by a distrust, engendered by the experiences of the last six or seven years of international history, of the British Government's foresight and ability and a haunting fear that the making of the peace, like the conduct of diplomatic negotiations since the departure of Mr. Eden until the outbreak of war, may be carried out by the personal and quasi-dictatorial methods of a Prime Minister backed by a Cabinet as docile as the German people.

It is true that only the Government, with its command of and access to all sources of information, a knowledge of which is necessary to decide on what Leibniz called "compossibles," can formulate in detail the kind of settlement which we would like to see negotiated (incidentally negotiation and the avoidance of any appearance of imposition are obviously essential), but principles are matters which can up to a point be considered without close regard to their translation into the clauses of a treaty. It is of overwhelming importance that those principles should be the subject of public discussion, that every effort should be made to form and to inform public opinion, and that national unity should endure beyond the armistice, or if that is impossible that the purposes to attain which we are at the moment united shall not be betrayed or compromised by weakness, shortsightedness or greed.

Popularly, if indeed not officially, this is a war to end Hitlerism. Is Hitlerism embodied in Hitler, or is Hitler merely the symbol of a doctrine or way of life, a *Weltanschauung* or ideology which must be extirpated or rendered harmless if the world is to be delivered from the nightmare oppression of the last few years? Plainly the end of Hitlerism involves the fall of Hitler and of Hitler's henchmen, including, it may be hoped, such figures as Goering, who has succeeded by *fausse bonhomie* in creating a legend of his own relative moderation. And as we are presumably not going to duplicate our "Hang the Kaiser" ineptitude we must leave it to the German people, or the German army, to deliver themselves from bondage.

But are we really to distinguish between Hitlerism and Nazi-ism—the doctrine of which he has been the prophet and high priest, and of which he will assuredly prove the martyr—a martyr whose blood, for which thousands of victims cry to Heaven, will be the seed of a Nazi church unless the post-war

settlement is reasonable? Are we much clearer in our own minds when we say that we shall fight until we can negotiate with someone, who will presumably have renounced the devil and all his works, in whose word we can trust? We thought, or our elected rulers thought, that they could trust Hitler in face of all evidence to the contrary; trust in his successor or successors must be conditional.

What reason is there, again, to induce us to distinguish between Hitlerism and Mussolini-ism, or Hitlerism and Stalinism? By their works ye shall know them, and Abyssinia and Albania are the equivalent of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, while in the destruction of the latter Russia has participated, just as to-day's victim was present in the rôle of jackal at the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia a year ago. The parallelism at least suggests that there can never be anything better than an armed truce so long as dictators rule over important states of Europe and the supreme issues of war and peace are in the uneasy custody of one man. Perhaps after all it is specious to say that there is no necessary conflict between the democratic and the totalitarian powers. Can we make a real peace with a German Government which is not in some way based on democratic principles?

The official formulation of our war aims in more general terms is not much richer in content: "to redeem Europe from the perpetual and recurring fear of German aggression and enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties." These words might cover almost anything from the mere elimination of Hitler to the establishment of our old friend collective security. It is as a formula worse in one way than the vaguer "anti-Hitlerism," because it might be twisted by casuistry into one more attempt to render Germany "harmless" and keep her in subjection for generations. We may safely be considered as debarred from adopting any such policy by our assurances to the German people, reiterated in the air by radio and aeroplane, that we are not at war with them but with a system which we believe millions of them to abhor and despise as completely as ourselves. But there is a by no means negligible minority, as can be seen from the correspondence columns of the daily press, who quite honestly—and on a short view reasonably—believe that the war is the final proof of the thesis which can be summarised as "Germans will always be

Germans." It is a thesis which ignores, or is ignorant of, our own measure of responsibility for Hitler—and in particular our readiness to surrender to Hitler's violence what we would not concede to his more democratic predecessors.

The French will be more readily excused for adopting such a standpoint than ourselves, and we may have difficulty in persuading them that the Germans are not, to use Professor Bonn's phrase, a people afflicted with a double dose of original sin. That there are still some who regard the history of the last twenty years as a proof that the Treaty of Versailles and our subsequent administration of it erred only in not being sufficiently harsh, makes it the more urgent that we should know and declare what sort of a world order we would desire to establish after the war, to take the place of the international anarchy which enabled it to break out, and above all to give the German people a worthy place in a Europe with the interests and prosperity of which they can identify themselves wholeheartedly.

The Government, after all, must have its own ideas regarding the measures required to determine this anarchy. Almost up to the last minute before war broke out they emphasised their willingness to consider all outstanding problems with the German Government, if only the latter would forswear aggression and take to negotiation. What were the problems and what were the solutions envisaged by the British Government? Scepticism as to our state of preparedness for a pre-war peace congress is perhaps permissible, and in any case the kind of settlement which reasonable people would have been ready to make with Hitler must in many respects differ from the courageous solutions which will now be required. We cannot go into a peace conference in the frame of mind which quarrels with the manner of Hitler's procedure in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, but is inclined to condone the substance of his actions by some travesty of such a principle as self-determination. Let us assume that Hitlerism having been overthrown we can treat with a German Government which represents the German people and can command the conditional respect and trust of the civilised world, and examine in the brief outline which space permits the nature of the problems which will confront European statesmanship.

A profitable approach may be to consider the main divisions of the Treaty of Versailles, examine how far its imperfections

are responsible for to-day's catastrophe, and how far amendment is possible. We should be on our guard against the impression which has been subtly produced by German propaganda that the Treaty is the *fons et origo* of European maladies—until appeasement has come to be identified in many minds with the abandonment of the good as well as the bad features of that settlement. In considering the problems involved under three main aspects, political or administrative, territorial, and financial and economic, we must never lose sight of the fact that a peace settlement is an integral whole; the best possible arrangement of territories will be vain if it is accompanied by economic provisions which make existence in those territories a constant struggle against a falling standard of life; the best possible political arrangements for the prevention of war will be vain if there is no attempt to deal with the causes of war or to provide for peaceful change in a dynamic world.

1. The political clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were, in their widest scope, predestined to failure by the defection of the U.S.A. That defection aggravated the effects of the initial error of leaving Germany out in the cold for a period of probation, and hardened the French in their inclination to regard the League as an instrument for the maintenance of the *status quo*. The League failed to protect minorities adequately, to adjust real grievances, or to avert wars. The fault lay with Governments and their representatives rather than with the League system, and it would be defeatism to abandon the high ideals which the Covenant expressed, but for the realisation of which proper machinery was not provided.

Nothing in the history of the last twenty years can logically serve to weaken belief in the indivisibility of peace or the necessity of disarmament, but it should have taught us several lessons which those who have not lost faith in the ultimate reasonableness of human nature would be well to bear in mind when considering peace terms.

Firstly, it goes without saying that disarmament must be general, and proceed *pari passu* with the restoration of confidence; the shadow of Russo-German co-operation should be enough to dispel any idea of one-sided disarmament. Secondly, we shall make no progress unless all Powers, great and small, are prepared to make some sacrifice of sovereignty, and recognise that not a few subjects generally accepted as

within the sole competence of nations, such as tariffs, are potential causes of war. Thirdly, we must construct more effective machinery for the settlement of grievances, be they political or economic. Fourthly and most importantly, we had better conclude that we were too ambitious in 1919, and that we shall fare better if we concentrate on establishing a real League of European nations, without excluding any who wish to share in the benefits of union. If we can unite most of the nations of Europe in some form of federation, however loose, and thus break down the exclusiveness entailed by a multitude of currencies, armies and customs barriers, we shall have gone far to banish the spectre of war from Europe. And if Europe is at peace and prosperous the rest of the world can be trusted to follow the good, as it has followed the bad, example of Western civilisation.

2. The territorial provisions of the Treaty, as Professor Seton-Watson has convincingly argued, were on the whole defensible; they were at any rate based on a principle, and not merely on greed or dynastic aggrandisement. The attempt to make frontier lines correspond roughly with linguistic and racial distribution was honest, and would not improbably have been successful had the Treaty as a whole produced conditions of relative contentment and prosperity. Some compromise with the principle was undoubtedly necessary; it had to be tempered by economic requirements, as in the provision of access to the sea for Poland, and strategic needs, as in the assignment of the Sudetenland to Czecho-Slovakia, or the South Tyrol to Italy. And in a continent where there are innumerable racial and linguistic pockets scattered on both sides of any possible boundaries the principle must be applied with common sense; it is not open to any and every racial minority, any more than it has been to a political minority, to destroy the organic structure of a state by secession. Still less is it open to any nation to claim that it is entitled to incorporate willy-nilly all who speak the same tongue or have some racial affinity.

We must have the courage to apply the same principles again so far as we have the power. We cannot in honour recognise the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia or the partition of Poland, and we should not hesitate in view of recent experience to ensure the political and economic independence of these peoples by assigning them frontiers which do not

strictly correspond with linguistic differences. The Munich "settlement" has been proved impossible. Any hardships involved can be substantially mitigated by a method to which Hitler has subscribed in a much more doubtful case—the transfer of populations, with full compensation for any immovable property.

We cannot honourably take from Germany any part of her own territory, and any underground encouragement of disruptive or separatist movements would lay up a legacy of hatred. But plainly Austria must be given an opportunity to determine, free from any coercion, her relationship to an after-war Germany. Her choice will depend to a great extent on the non-territorial provisions of the new peace Treaty, but by and large there should be two alternatives before her—incorporation in or federation with Germany or independent membership of a wider federation.

3. It is arguable that the economic and financial chapters of the Treaty, both by what they contained and what they omitted, have been mainly responsible for the renewal of European war. The dismemberment of Austro-Hungary cannot be laid at our charge, for it was in fact consummated even before the armistice. We could and should, however, have prevented the Balkanisation of Central Europe by securing, as a condition of recognition, an economic federation of the succession states. In default of that it was mere cruelty and ultimate madness to use our political power to prevent Austria from seeking the next best solution by forming a close association with Germany. Given economic prosperity in the Danube basin, political jealousies and old resentments would have faded into insignificance, and Germany would have been powerless to exact unfair economic terms from her neighbours.

Few will be found in this year of grace to defend the reparation chapter of the Treaty of Versailles, but it may be suspected that there are many who do not yet realise the very real connection between that chapter and Hitlerism. The sense of frustration which Hitler was enabled to exploit was not due to the war guilt clause, nor to the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, nor to the loss of territory, nor to the danger of communism, which competent observers have always dated from the advent of Hitler to power, but to the great depression of 1929 and the following years, and its effect on German economy. That depression was the fairly direct result of

exaggerated reparation claims, of the unwillingness of the world in general and of the U.S.A. and France in particular to allow the payment of political debts by the only possible means, the ready acceptance of exports from the debtor, and finally of the crazily top-heavy structure of international indebtedness and the concentration of gold which inevitably resulted. A hair of the dog that bit them was the only remedy which the statesmen of the civilised world could prescribe—and let it be added the remedy for which labour and industrial interests clamoured. A Pelion was piled on an Ossa of trade restrictions, currency manipulations, quotas and prohibitions. Economic particularism lowered the standard of life in a dozen countries and exacerbated international differences; these differences in their turn promoted a desire for more and more self-sufficiency with a view to security in war, and ever since the vicious circle has continued to turn at an accelerating rate.

We are hardly likely to repeat the grosser errors of that Treaty and make impossible demands on Germany's terribly debilitated economic structure; the rest of the world must, indeed, be prepared to help Germany once again as it did after the Dawes Committee, but this time without taking away with one hand what was given with the other. This does not necessarily debar us from imposing on Germany the duty of making good damage wantonly perpetrated in Poland; it does mean that Poland must accept, as France was unwilling to accept, reparation in German materials and German labour. And it should not debar us from exacting a substantial contribution to the solution of the refugee problem created by Germany, and the maximum of redress for such refugees as have been corruptly despoiled for the enrichment of individuals.

We cannot, however, be content to avoid the repetition of errors committed; we must reconstruct the economic unity of Europe. Those who preached appeasement will have to face its cost—not the cession of gobbets and snippets of our own or other peoples' territory but the reopening of markets and channels of trade, with all the temporary dislocation and sacrifice of vested interests entailed. If we as a people are not ready to make our contribution, by re-establishing the open door in our colonies and consenting to a systematic reduction of tariffs with a view to their ultimate abolition, then we must at least refrain from discouraging the rest of Europe from

treading the path of sanity ; we cannot and ought not to plead the sanctity of the most-favoured-nation clause to frustrate regional and group free trade movements which are as logically defensible as Ottawa.

Are we prepared to make our economic contribution at the peace conference to the prevention of a resurgent Hitlerism, and to the peaceful evolution of the other -isms by encouraging the federation of Europe ? If not, have we prepared ourselves, as we must eventually, to withdraw from Europe and have no responsibility for or share in its prosperity ? Will we admit the possibility that Hitler's violent economic integration of Central Europe, carried out by foul methods and for unworthy purposes, might yet in the long run have achieved something without which anarchy will persist ?

Somewhere in Herodotus it is observed that the tragedy of war is that it calls upon fathers to bury their sons. Sons will fall in this war whose fathers have lain for twenty years in the fields of Flanders. They died to make the world safe for democracy ; can we, the men of fifty to seventy, claim with a clear conscience to have kept faith with those who died ? " To make the world safe for democracy," to wage " a war to end war," or " to enable the peoples of Europe to preserve their independence and their liberties " are noble tasks, but their accomplishment depends on the vision, imagination and liberalism of those who survive the ordeal of war to make and administer the peace.

ANDREW MCFADYEAN.

## THE WAR BUDGET.

**P**ROSPECTS of peace were dwindling fast and expenditure on Defence was mounting rapidly when Sir John Simon opened his Budget at the end of April. I described that Budget, with its unparalleled deficit and its unparalleled expenditure on armaments, as a Defence Budget of such magnitude that, unless a peaceful solution of the European crisis can be found, British capital and labour will before long be conscripted in peace time, "and all our ideas about standards of living and comforts of life will have to be revised downwards." Since then we have had military and civil conscription, compulsory billeting on private houses, a new D.O.R.A., a new bureaucracy and a War Budget.

But even after the war broke out few men guessed what sacrifices would be called for at its very commencement. On September 27th, as I entered the inner Lobby of the House of Commons before taking my seat in the Gallery, I met a veteran M.P. who murmured in my ear: "I suppose it will be sixpence on the income tax." I replied: "It ought to be eighteenpence." It proved to be more. After hearing the Financial Statement and returning to the Lobby I came across an ex-Minister. We agreed that it was a first-rate Budget, simply framed and plainly stated, skilfully devised, fairly apportioned as regards burdens imposed and highly effective as an instrument of revenue.

I am under no illusions as to the nature and extent of the financial and economic disasters in which our country and the British Commonwealth of Nations may be involved by this second war with Germany. Indeed if it were to take three or four years to achieve a victory as overwhelming as that of 1918, I cannot doubt that all large fortunes would be confiscated, that most of the small savings of the people would disappear and that the social services would be wrecked. We have not come to that yet, and there is good reason for thinking that in a war of exhaustion Germany will be the first to go down, possibly in a red revolution like that which took Russia out of the war in 1917. But whatever our views on the probable length of the war, we ought to hail this first war Budget as an invaluable contribution not only to the urgent needs of the Treasury but to a sober understanding of realities and to a nation-wide recognition

that all public waste, central and local, should be cut down.

During the Budget debates a private member of the House congratulated the Chancellor "on the clarity of his Budget statement" and also on his "courage and boldness," especially "in the extra taxation which he is very rightly asking the country to bear." No public man in my time has equalled Sir John Simon in the art of exposition. It comes naturally to him. As I listened to his Financial Statement, I called to mind how we sat together long ago at the Scholars' table in the hall of Wadham College, with F. E. Smith and C. B. Fry, and how in the debates of the Union Society my old friend developed that wonderful power of clear, orderly and logical argument with which Parliament is now familiar. If on that afternoon in September he had not made the needs of the Treasury and the vastness of the expenditure quite plain before presenting his scheme of taxation, he might not have been able to carry the House with him. Here in a condensed form is his preliminary survey :

In the April Budget, he told us, the total estimated expenditure for the current financial year was £1,322 millions, of which £630 millions, rather less than half, was to be spent on Defence. The Chancellor expected to raise £942 millions by taxation and £380 millions by borrowing. But the cost of armaments went on increasing until, towards the end of July, when the Finance Act incorporating the Budget was passed, another £100 millions had been added to the estimated expenditure on armaments, and the amount to be borrowed in order to cover the deficit between revenue and expenditure rose consequently to £480 millions, or, as he thought likely, to a round figure of £500 millions. When Parliament rose in August, the total expenditure authorised for the year was actually £1,453 millions, of which £502 millions were to be borrowed. That, of course, was on the theory that we should remain at peace throughout the year.

"But on September 3rd we found ourselves at war, and a Vote of Credit for an additional 500 millions was promptly proposed and adopted. I must tell the Committee that I cannot guarantee that this first Vote of Credit will be sufficient to cover all our requirements up to March 31st; but even if it is sufficient, the need for a further Budget, as promptly as possible, is self evident since we shall be facing in this financial year a total outlay of nearly 2,000 millions."

Further, as a result of war, the revenue from existing taxes

would be diminished and the April estimate must be revised downwards from 942 millions to 890 millions. These were the main features of revenue and expenditure on which he had framed his proposals for additional taxation. Thus of this year's total estimated expenditure of 2,000 millions, 1,230 millions are to be spent on war and armaments (including all the extravagances of the A.R.P.) and 770 millions on debt charges, social services and the various civil departments of Government.

Before coming to his actual proposals, the Chancellor paused to dwell on the frightful scale of destructiveness which makes modern war "the most potent instrument for the destruction of human wealth." Even since the end of the Great War the increase of mechanisation has added enormously to the cost. The modern types of aeroplanes, for example, are incomparably more complex and costly than those which were being manufactured in 1918. "Broadly speaking a modern aircraft costs from three to seven times more than a comparable type in 1918, and of course maintenance and replacement costs have increased in proportion." Then as regards the army a division in the field now costs nearly twice as much to equip and maintain as it did then, while in the case of the navy, owing to their much more complicated equipment "ships of comparable tonnage now cost two or three times as much as they did in 1914."

Milton in one of his finest sonnets praises Sir Henry Vane because, though young in years, he knew not only civil wisdom, but also :

how war may best be upheld  
Mann'd by her two main nerves, iron and gold,  
In all her equipage.

Sir John Simon said in prose : "Finance, as has been sometimes said, is the fourth arm of Defence—no less than the other three ; for if finance failed, then the prop that sustains the whole of our war effort would collapse." He took the right view of finance as covering the whole political economy of war. It includes the problem of maintaining national production for the export trade as well as for the home market. Upon this the national income, the national revenue, the value of our currency and our very existence depend.

In these circumstances it was evident—so the Chancellor proceeded—that the largest possible amount of revenue

from new taxes must be gathered in by an Emergency Budget which would "call for severe sacrifices." Starting with the income tax at the standard rate of 5s. 6d. in the pound, with allowances and abatements at the lower end of the scale and a graduated surtax at the other end, he proposed "a new curve (based on a standard rate of 7s. 6d.) which would secure increasing contributions from direct taxation all along the line." This steadily ascending curve starts by taking a tiny proportion from the smallest of the incomes which are subjected to income tax. Our income tax code makes the actual rate of charge on the total incomes of individuals—distinguishing earned from unearned incomes—mount in a steadily ascending curve until it takes by far the greater proportion of the largest incomes.

It may be said that the tax-gatherer cannot take more than one's income; and if all incomes could be taxed directly in proportion to ability, a Chancellor of the Exchequer might be content with this single tax. But the cost and difficulty of taxing people with an income of two pounds a week or less (unless it is derived from investments which are taxed at the source) have always been regarded as prohibitive. Two further considerations have guided our public finance. The first was, and is, that certain luxuries should be taxed by means of Customs and Excise Duties. Those on intoxicating liquors and tobacco have always yielded a large proportion of the revenue, and have invariably been raised in war time. The other consideration is that a graduated tax on estates passing at death may fairly be levied as a complement to the income tax. The Death Duties were introduced by Sir William Harcourt for that purpose in Gladstone's last Administration. Harcourt once told me that in his judgment the income tax was our main reserve against war and ought therefore to be at a low rate in time of peace. He regretted having raised it as high as 8d. in the pound; it was to avoid a higher rate that he had introduced the Death Duties to finance a battleship programme.

When the Great War broke out, the standard rate of income tax was 1s. 3d. in the pound and a small super-tax had already been introduced on large incomes. After the war the rate was 6s. It was slowly reduced to 4s., but it was Sir John Simon's misfortune that he had to set out from a standard rate of 5s. 6d., rising to nearly 14s. on the

highest incomes. With such a scale, or rather with such a curve to start from, it would not have been surprising if he had been content to raise the standard rate to the highest point it had ever reached before, namely, 6s. in the pound. But with the national debt higher than it stood at the end of the last war and the possibility of a three years' war in prospect, he proposed a standard rate of 7s. for the current year and of 7s. 6d. for next year. But as the war, the war controls and the black-out have ruined thousands of business and professional men besides reducing the incomes of thousands more, the Chancellor is mitigating the severity of the increased tax in such cases by providing that anyone whose income has fallen off by 20 per cent. may substitute this year's actual income for last year's as the basis. Those who pay less than the standard rate will have to contribute more through a reduction in earned income allowance, in marriage allowance and in the allowance for children. On the upper reaches the war Budget imposes new surtax scales rising from 1s. 3d. at £2,000 to 9s. 6d. for slices of income over £30,000. So that on these slices of income millionaires will pay over 16s. in the pound.\*

These, as he said, are "fierce" increases; but the estimates of increased revenue are more than satisfactory; for the changes in income tax are expected to yield 70 millions this year and 146 millions in a full year, while the addition to surtax is to yield 5 millions this year and 8 millions in a full year. An addition of 10 per cent. to the Death Duties on all estates exceeding £10,000 is estimated to yield £1,500,000 this year and 6 millions in a full year. The last of the additions to direct taxation is to be an excess profits tax of 60 per cent. "on any excess of the profits of any trades or businesses

\* Though the additions to income tax and surtax are very severe I do not want readers of this article to derive the impression that our financial reserve of income tax is exhausted by a 7s. 6d. rate. If one looks at the official tables one sees that a bachelor who gets all his income from investments does not pay the full 7s. 6d. rate until his income reaches £3,000. If his income is £1,000 a year and it is all earned, he pays less than 5s., and if it all comes from investments he pays just over 6s. This is because no tax is levied on the first £120 of incomes. Again, a man with £500 a year drawn entirely from earnings, who is married and has two children, is only paying 5½d. in the pound this year, and will only be paying 1s. 1d. in the pound next year, though if his income of £500 is all from investments he has to pay 1s. 6½d. this year and 2s. 3½d. next year. Finally one may take the case of a millionaire who has to pay not only the 7s. 6d. standard rate of income tax but also the 9s. 6d. surtax charge. Even he will pay next year not 17s. but 16s. 5½d. in the pound. The surtax charge is applied in "slices." Only the slice above £30,000 pays 9s. 6d.

since March 31st over their profits for a pre-war standard." As it will take time to get the machinery of assessment and collection into order this tax is not likely to produce much revenue in the current year. The question whether additions to the capital wealth of individuals during the war can be taxed by a levy is also being studied—and rightly; for at the end of the last war many new fortunes had been made, reaped as it were from the losses and miseries of the nation. No one ought to be richer after a war than when it began.

In regard to indirect taxation the difficulty of getting more revenue is also much greater than it was in the last war, owing to the law of diminishing returns for taxes on consumption. Nevertheless more is to be extracted :

An addition to the beer duty, equivalent to another 1d. per pint, is expected to yield 11 millions this year and 27 millions in a full year, while an increase of 10s. per proof gallon to spirits is to yield 2 millions this year and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions in a full year. An addition of 2s. per gallon on imported light wines and British wines and 4s. per gallon on imported heavy wines is to yield a million this year and about 2 millions in a full year.

It has been necessary to get the consent of the French Government to agree to the additional duties on champagne and brandy. What a pity that this opportunity was not seized to introduce reciprocity if not free trade in the necessities and conveniences of life such as coal, fruit, vegetables and clothing with our neighbours and allies across the Channel! Such an arrangement would have given a powerful stimulus to our export trade. In the last war we had the great advantage of starting on a free trade basis; it was only by degrees that controls or restrictions stifled and smothered (as they are now doing) our overseas commerce.

The tobacco duty was raised in April from 9s. 6d. to 11s. 6d. per lb., which represents, I dare say, on an average, four times the market price of tobacco. The war Budget raises this by another 2s. per lb., or  $1\frac{1}{2}$ d. per oz. The additional yield from the tobacco duty is estimated at 8 millions for the current year and 16 millions in a full year.

As those who do not smoke or touch intoxicants and pay no income tax would not contribute to the war Budget, the Chancellor made one more addition to indirect taxation by adding 1d. per lb. to the sugar duty, which addition is estimated to bring in about £8,500,000 this year and 18

millions in a full year. Though the addition to the sugar duty was opposed by the Labour Party and is certainly open to strong objections, as it raises the price of an essential food and an important raw material, the Government carried the day, and the whole Budget has been put through in its entirety—a wonderful triumph for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a remarkable tribute to the determination of the House of Commons.

In his concluding observations the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that his Budget would demonstrate to the country the “gravity of the financial and industrial problem involved in the waging of the war”; but he found some comfort by comparing the infinitely greater financial problem that confronts Germany. Of this he gave one illustration. The pound sterling remains an accepted medium of international trade, and the official rates of exchange with neutral countries are published daily. But even before the war the official rates of exchange for the German mark meant nothing. There were over fifty different kinds of marks with differing degrees of depreciation. At present, he said, “the German mark has no position as an international currency and is likely to lose rapidly its value as an internal currency.”

If the tax proposals of the Budget were received with the resigned satisfaction that attends sacrifices in the performance of a patriotic duty, there was unanimous approval (at any rate on the ministerial benches) at the announcement that the additional revenue to be derived from taxes is to be accompanied by retrenchment of unnecessary expenditure:

“I do not feel that I should be at all completing the discharge of my duty as Chancellor of the Exchequer if on this occasion I limited myself to proposing greatly increased burdens on my fellow countrymen. It is equally my duty to call for the most determined efforts alike in public and private expenditure to search out means to avoid wasteful outlay. . . . In the various public departments—in public expenditure here at the centre and in local government expenditure too—while we are waging war against the enemy abroad let us also wage war against waste at home.”

Special appointments have been made to prevent waste by the Air Ministry and by the Ministry of Supply which furnishes the Army. It is also the Government's intention, said the Chancellor, to reconsider and review the expenditure of the A.R.P. including

that of local authorities. Moreover "the Treasury is sending special and stringent instructions to all Departments to avoid unnecessary expenditure in every sphere. . . . Any well supported complaint of waste or unnecessary expenditure will be promptly investigated and dealt with."

One is glad to hear that the Government is paying attention to the monstrous staffs of the new bureaucracy, whose mushroom growth has caused general disgust and dismay. Here again I would refer to the Budget statement :

Throughout the war we must bend our energies to the utmost to promote our export trade. Its maintenance and extension are vital to the successful prosecution of the war in order that we may earn the means to purchase across the seas those essential materials and goods, including foodstuffs, which we cannot produce or make ourselves.

But many of the controls have played havoc with trade, and the Ministers responsible, who have signed the decrees creating them, seem slow to recognise the mischief that has been done and the need for a reversal of this policy if our exports to neutral countries are to be maintained, much less extended. The case of the Fish Controller, appointed by Mr. W. S. Morrison, provides a startling example. He began by closing the Billingsgate Market. Having thus thrown the whole distribution of fish into confusion, causing the loss of many thousands of pounds and great quantities of food, he retreated with his staff to Oxford and quartered himself in St. John's College, which has been nicknamed "Fish and Chips," as the Potato Controller is also snugly entrenched there! The Fish Control has been disestablished and disendowed ; Billingsgate has been reopened, and fish is again reasonably cheap and plentiful. But will this glaring case be taken to heart by the Cabinet ?

Wool control has been established in what a Yorkshire newspaper has described as a "sylvan retreat," whence it dictates to merchants, woolcombers, spinners and manufacturers. Artificial prices have created chaos, and up to the time of writing export licences have been subjected to grievous delays. Apparently the experience of the last war has served not as a warning but as an encouragement to Totalitarianism.

F. W. HIRST.

## THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF GERMANY.

IT is easier to forecast Germany's economic future than to guess at the kind of government which could replace Nazism. For the economic structure of a country survives political revolutions and does not disappear completely in a revolutionary social upheaval. The economic structure of Nazi Germany is the fairly logical development of pre-Nazi economic trends. Capitalism (in the Western sense of the term) never dominated in Germany; such as it was it died from the combined shock of the war, inflation and the great depression—notwithstanding an interlude of big business domination; planning and planned economy originated in Germany at the close of the war—not in Soviet Russia. It might best be described in racing parlance as an off-spring of Karl Marx out of Dora, whilst the social system prevailing in Germany at the outbreak of the present war might be called “barrack-room socialism.”

The Nazi economic programme combined middle-class resentment against “big money” with emotional collectivism. It declaimed against “trusts,” big estates and department stores; it glorified physical labour and decried intellectualism. It expressed the genuine sentiments of divergent groups, very skilfully blended for propaganda purposes. For Hitler, who in those days described himself as a mere drummer, was not interested in economic realities apart from propaganda value. For this reason he readily fell in with Gottfried Feder's distinction between creative and acquisitive capital, the former being exclusively Nordic, the latter mainly non-Aryan. But economics frankly bored him, for he and his immediate entourage were mainly politically minded: those who held power, namely could shoot their adversaries, could always get cash, those who held cash might be able to buy power, if power did not prefer to despoil them first. Big business and the landed interest who put Nazism into office were slow to learn the truth of these primitive but very practical conceptions; for they retained economic control. No prominent Nazi got a key position in economic administration, with the exception perhaps of agriculture, and the party's socialist programme was held in abeyance; no confiscation took place, except of Jewish property, and even here it was camouflaged. For quite a considerable period

business, big and small, made large profits, as usually happens in the earlier phases of a huge credit expansion ; even Jewish concerns prospered. The large estates were not touched, not because the Nazis sympathised with the Junkers, but because their agrarian policy was based on rather romantic conceptions of the sanctity of real estate property. Farmers' freeholds were to be transformed into a kind of peasants' entails, which could neither be sold nor mortgaged nor divided among several heirs, provided their owners could prove Aryan descent. The splitting up of large estates was planned and the work of the Weimar Republic in cutting them up was continued. But land purchase for close settlement was purely voluntary, and the total amount secured was very modest. Grandiose schemes for the plantation of German farmers' families were advertised, for brothers and sisters of the newly created hereditary holders had either to become their servants or migrate to the towns, or look out for new holdings, to be carved from the large estates in the comparatively "empty East." Their owners were to be compensated by land grants across the borders in the Slav countries, where they were to lord it over their newly conquered subjects—especially in the Ukraine—and slowly lead them in the ways of cultured German efficiency. But these schemes remained schemes. The large estates produced the surplus needed by the towns and the army, and the settlement of a free yeomanry would be a costly affair which could not yet be indulged in by an impecunious government, spending all surplus reserves for military preparations. Private property, so it seemed, was secure. The Nazis after all posed as the defenders of the West against Communism. Notwithstanding its apparent disinclination for open socialisation, Nazism thoroughly collectivised German economics.

Nazism had taken over from its predecessors a system of exchange control, the main object of which had been the maintenance of the internal stability of the German mark. Germany could not discharge her heavy foreign debts and pay for her imports except by devaluation or wholesale bankruptcy. Devaluation would merely have increased her burdens, for most of the  $1\frac{1}{4}$  milliard sterling foreign debts were in foreign currencies ; it would have involved internal inflation, which no German régime dared to face. Exchange control provided a convenient cloak for bankruptcy by

avoiding downright repudiation. For debtors paid in full in their national currency which was not depreciated at home, but which could not be transferred abroad except under such a heavy discount that creditors might prefer to re-loan their assets rather than have them transmitted. Exchange control provided Germany with forced loans at the expense of her foreign creditors. But it did very much more : it enabled her government to control the entry and the exit of all goods, services and claims, and to develop by and by a complete system of supervision of all business, which was in any way directly or indirectly connected with foreign countries. It isolated Germany and the German price level from external markets and foreign price levels, whilst her government could at the same time keep up such contacts abroad as it considered desirable. It secured foreign markets for it by the sale of blocked marks, which were of little value in international trade, but retained their full purchasing power in the German markets ; many countries were compelled to become Germany's unwilling creditors, since their claims could not be settled except by the purchase of German goods whenever they were available. Exchange control served the double purpose a planned economy must aim at : isolation from foreign price levels and manipulation of home production and internal prices. Under its sway Nazi Germany managed to undergo a huge credit expansion, which had little influence on the price levels.

An even more powerful agent for collectivisation was the Nazi government's policy of public works. It came in just after the bottom of the great depression had been reached ; in fact the up-swing would have started earlier had not the uncertainties of impending revolution held it back. It resolutely tackled the problem of unemployment by a policy of spending on public works. It copied and very skilfully refined the methods by which Imperial Germany had financed the war : i.e. the issue of treasury bills which were taken up by the banks and could be rediscounted by the central bank, which used them as note cover. From time to time these outstanding bills were converted into funded loans, whenever credit expansion had served its purpose and had inflated monetary incomes. The Nazis employed idle hands and idle plants on unproductive public works ; they raised a floating debt by a well-designed system of faked commercial bills, which were regularly

converted into funded loans. Pre-Nazi Germany had had a small internal public debt ; it now rapidly increased. But the large spendings made the national money income rise proportionately faster than the annual national debt charge. The Nazis assumed that the country could easily bear a dead-weight debt of 100 milliard marks ; if they could but inflate national income from 40 milliards to, let us say, 80 milliards, the deduction of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  milliards annual interest payments from these 80 milliards would still leave them with 35 milliards to the good.

These financial operations made the State the central purchaser, directly or indirectly, of the nation's output, and enabled it to eliminate undesirable concerns—Jewish firms for example—and to direct capital investments. It was faced with one great problem : it must control prices, otherwise the fear of inflation might be aroused. Minimum prices were established to protect farmers from world competition ; in various industries rationalisation was banned, in order to stop a decline of prices.

By and by maximum prices became far more important. The resumption of armaments speeded up expenditure on a colossal scale. They represent an ideal type of public works. They are non-competitive, thoroughly unproductive and quickly obsolescent. There is no limit to their expansion—except the strain on public finance. Under their pressure the demands on the German productive apparatus increased enormously. It had to provide an export surplus for payment of indispensable imports and to provide at the same time a surplus beyond current home consumption ; from this the huge plants were constructed, the produce of which was to make Germany self-sufficient. Since Germany's costs of production were high, exports had to be subsidised at the expense of home consumers ; autarchy raised such costs considerably, for it implied an increased production of national goods under most unfavourable conditions. Armaments and autarchy would have given an upward swing to the price level even if credit expansion had not been at work. In order to stop it, capital remuneration, fixed interest as well as dividends, was cut down. Since the accumulation and the direction of investments was regulated and capital flight was punished as high treason, evasion was difficult. Similarly wages were fixed and not allowed to rise. When certain raw

materials became scarce, rationing, permits and priorities were introduced and the flow of industrial life was manipulated. Middlemen's profits were eliminated, small traders and artisans were deliberately squeezed out and forced to enter the labour market—the class which had formed the main support of the Nazi régime was sacrificed to military exigencies. Though money wages remained stable, real wages declined, not so much on account of rising costs of living, but through the deterioration of quality (substitutes), the non-delivery of rationed goods and an extension of the working day. Even before the outbreak of hostilities German economy was a war economy. The government regulated production, directly or indirectly; it divided consumption into four parts: export, military needs, civil needs, reserve stocks. Land and capital remained private property, but their use, their remuneration and the spending of that remuneration were controlled. Labour was no longer free; it could be removed at the will of the authorities. The outbreak of war has increased demand and with it the strain on supply, especially on man-power, which neither labour conscription nor (unwilling) prisoners of war can completely satisfy; the repatriation of the Baltic Germans may perhaps ease it, though few of them are manual workers. Rationing has become universal and financing must be reckless. Germany has become one huge barrack, in which all activities, civil as well as military, are regimented.

It is impossible to foretell the economic outcome of the war, but certain features are by now quite clear.

1. The war is sure to deplete Germany's physical resources. Neither accumulated reserves nor current production will suffice for it; it can only be carried on by omitting replacement of wastage, by picking the eyes of mines, by exhausting soils, by neglecting repairs—even now the railways have been allowed to run down below their proper standards. If the war lasts long enough, Germany's physical plant will be greatly deteriorated, and the efficiency of her man-power will suffer. Recovery is only possible by maintaining for a lengthy period a very low standard of living, so as to secure a surplus for home investments or for exports.

2. The war will have to be financed by a system of requisitioning, which is more or less carefully camouflaged by an intricate system of borrowing. Most of it will have to be done

by some sort of treasury bills, which may or may not be converted into funded loans. Finally the government will be heavily indebted to those individuals and institutions who hold its long-term or short-term obligations or its banknotes. It has either to devalue these loans or make its taxpayers responsible for them. There will be some inflation, but not enough to wipe out this debt. Recourse will have to be had to some sort of a capital levy. Small holders of government bonds and of other forms of property may be let off easily, the richer ones will have to pay heavily. Roughly speaking a debt of 100 milliard marks might be cut down to 50 milliards by a 50 per cent. capital levy on it; the remaining 50 milliards could be wiped out by a capital levy on other personal and real estates. Bondholders might be asked to hand over a large percentage of their holdings. The inflated value of real estate and of equities due to inflation will be confiscated, as well as the profits made by debtors at the expense of their creditors. Government moreover will requisition a part of the share capital and have mortgages registered in its favour on lands and other property to about 50 per cent. of their value. Instead of sharing the nation's income through taxation, it will socialise its capital and become the owner of half of its property. Plans of this sort were outlined at the beginning of the Weimar Republic; they were never carried out; big business was very powerful in those days and inflation had not yet been tried. Given the tendencies prevailing in Nazi Germany a huge capital confiscation seems inevitable, and with it another step towards collectivism.

3. Whilst devaluation of some sort cannot be avoided, it will not suffice to help Germany to get access to the world markets. She has deliberately created an economic system, in agriculture and in many key industries, which is top-heavy; it is based on the utilisation of extremely expensive national factors of production, such as poor soils and poor ores. Even cheap labour will not allow her to produce cheaply since expenditure for replacing her worn-out plants must be very great. This will of necessity make for continued control and regimentation. As capital can only be accumulated quickly by keeping down consumption, labour will be required to work overtime, but the state, not private *entrepreneurs*, will benefit from its exploitation. Since the number of small *entrepreneurs*

has been greatly diminished by Nazi policy, the support for a system of private capitalism is reduced.

4. Germany's desire for autarchy has failed : she depends on foreign supplies to a very considerable degree. She can only get them by export, for she has neither negotiable foreign assets nor can she get substantial loans. Even if she were to get some from Russia this would merely imply the obligation to furnish later on certain quantities of goods, not mere money payments, without return payments, on which default is not easy. Germany needs additional protected markets where she can exchange the high-cost products of her over-expanded industries against additional raw materials.

5. The territorial expansion which she desired is not likely to take place. Even if she were not defeated, Russia blocks the way to the Balkans and the Baltic. If she were allowed to keep Western Poland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, none of her fundamental problems would be solved ; though the former province of Posnan is rich in agricultural products and Upper Silesia in minerals. The incorporation of 30 million Slavs within the German economic body might provide cheap labour ; but as Nazi imperialism is exclusive and cannot assimilate alien populations it might merely reduce standards of living. Repatriation is expensive, it does moreover not increase Germany's natural territorial resources. A Central European Customs Union, which should have been the aim of constructive German policy, cannot be achieved by ruthless subjugation ; "Mittel-Europa" cannot be accomplished by Nazi methods.

6. Whether Germany will stick to barrack-room socialism or turn communist will depend on her agrarian structure. The majority of her 5 million freehold farmers are hard-boiled individualists and not prepared to accept "collectivisation" of farms. The old generation of German working men, who had saved the Republic several times from Bolshevism long before the advent of Hitler, may still hold to their faith. But a long war is sure to proletarianise the masses, and to speed up the general levelling-down which Nazism has already accomplished. The vicinity of Russia to the thinly settled agrarian German East with its semi-feudal conditions may open the door to Bolshevism. There may no longer be an opportunity for settling large estates with German hereditary freeholders, for compensation in the

Ukraine and elsewhere is no longer to be had. And an impoverished Germany can scarcely pay compensation in good cash and defray the heavy expenses of close settlement on a large scale. It is far cheaper to confiscate the land and run it by labour gangs as collectives. The Bolshevisation of Soviet-Poland is bound to affect Western Poland and the neighbouring districts of East Prussia. Were the Nazi régime to survive the war it might be inclined to imitate its new-found Russian friend and settle a problem at the cost of a class it never liked. Its disappearance on the other hand will leave a *damnosa hereditas*. Its successors may be unable to repopulate the rural areas—over 700,000 people have left them since Nazism came in. It has not spread German land ownership into the Ukraine, it was filling up the vacuum on the German great estates with Czechs and Polish labourers. It is not germanising the Slavic East, but slavicising Eastern Germany, as repatriation schemes are one-sided withdrawals, not reciprocal exchanges. It has led to a revival of Pan-Slavism, streaked with Bolshevik doctrines.

The social structure of other parts of Germany may be solid enough to withstand the Bolshevik impact. German capitalism is however doomed. It was always semi-feudal and semi-collectivist. Many years ago I concluded a study of its particular features with the words: "Truly the fate of German capitalism lies in feeble hands." They helped to deliver the country to Nazism, but they will not be strong enough to liquidate it and to revive anything resembling a free economic system. If the war does not end in a murderous social revolution the future structure of Germany will at best be a kind of regimented socialism, such as Fichte, who was half a Nazi, outlined it in his *Closed Commercial State* over a hundred years ago.

M. J. BONN.

## ITALY AND THE WAR.

WHATEVER interpretation be given to the declaration of neutrality made by the Fascist Government on the outbreak of war, it has been received with keen satisfaction in Italy and outside her borders. To be sure, the neutrality of a State in time of war is primarily shaped by the State in question, and may admit of various degrees and many *sous-entendus*. What counts is that a neutral State as such takes no direct part in the war, either with its armed forces or with its money or by supplying armaments. As for political favours or indirect aids to one or other of the belligerents, or even to both in varying measure, it is not easy to define the limits of neutrality, and this may lead to disputes between belligerents and neutrals.

The Italian neutrality, like that of other countries, must stand this test of the assent or tolerance of the warring States. Facts will show how far the conduct of Italy may deserve criticism or appreciation on the part of the Allies. At bottom what matters to-day is not the petty detail of a neutrality holding more or less a middle course between Anglo-French and Germans, but the ulterior decision whether to enter the war and on which side or to remain neutral till the end of the present conflict.

Only a few days after the outbreak of war, *Regime Fascista*, one of the extremist papers favourable to Germany, wrote as follows :

Italy will keep faith with her engagements, naturally, in the measure of her interests, which are above any other consideration and on which the Government keeps its eyes fixed as on a polar star, on the basis of which it firmly holds the helm of the national ship.

This affirmation has been several times repeated by the various papers and by the Government itself, and up till now it seems the guiding line of Fascist policy. Mussolini in his speech of September 23rd declared :

Our policy was fixed by the declaration of September 1st, and there is no reason to make any change. It corresponds to our national interest, our agreements and our political pacts as well as to the desire of all nations, including Germany, who aimed at localising the conflict.

This does not mean that the Italy of 1939 is in the same position as the Italy of 1914 and of Salandra's "sacred egoism." Then, in the period of her neutrality, the Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet was negotiating with Vienna over the unredeemed territories, offering the continuation of neutrality, and it was negotiating with London to the same end, offering Italy's entry into war. This was then possible because Italy had declared that the treaty of the Triple Alliance bound her to go to war only in the case of a war of defence and could not oblige her to enter a war of offence such as that of Austria against Serbia.

To-day Italy's position is very different. The Pact of Milan has not been repudiated and her neutrality was requested (or permitted) by Berlin before it was declared by Rome. If there is a significance in the neutrality of 1939 it is the opposite of that of 1914. Then it was a neutrality through which Italy resumed her freedom, and to-day this is not the case. Then it was a neutrality favourable to the Entente, which would have remained so even if an agreement had been reached with Vienna over the provinces of Trente and Trieste, whereas to-day neutrality in respect of the Allies is temporary and at a given moment might end, to their injury. Moreover, Italy to-day is in a condition to make her intervention or her demands carry weight in a far more tangible manner than the Italy of 1915. This is the sense of the expression: "*Italian interests are above any other consideration.*"

To the present writer, who then had no liking for the phrase "sacred egoism,"\* this slogan of "interests above any other consideration" is equally unattractive. In the life of a man as in the life of a people there are certain moral values above "egoisms" and "interests"—justice, freedom, peace (the triad invoked by the Pope), must always take priority as permanent moral values. We cannot approve those who disparage or belittle them, and would unmask those others who exploit such noble ideals as a cloak for egoisms and interests. Indeed, between the two we prefer the frankness of the first to the hypocrisy of the second. At the same time we should not fail to examine the practical problems of the real interests of States and peoples. These, too, are worthy of consideration and safeguard when they are legitimate and in conformity with the higher principles which must

\* See L. Sturzo: *Italy and Fascismo*, p. 37.

rule mankind and especially the peoples of Christian civilisation.

Without wishing to set ourselves against or above the Government responsible, let us, for the purposes of study, consider the real interests of Italy in the present situation. This war, like all wars, will sooner or later come to its conclusion—a conclusion either wholly favourable to the Allies, as we hope, or wholly favourable to Germany, or a solution the result of exhaustion and compromise. Let us get rid of the third hypothesis, which would become possible only in so far as Italy remained neutral, waiting for those adjustments to be sought from one side or the other, on terms of mutual advantage, by bringing to bear her intact military position. The hypothesis does not seem to us probable, but it throws a light on the waiting position which Italy might adopt, seeking a compromise between the pacts of the Axis, her own interests, and the justice of the cause of the Allies.

The word justice, in this contest, may annoy those who do not believe in the justice of any cause, still less in that of the Allies, or who believe it not worth while to trouble about justice. But we cannot omit to speak of it, in view of the treacherous aggression against Poland and her occupation by hostile armies, German and Russian. Who can think that Italy, for whom a love of Poland finds place in her noblest and oldest traditions, now that that unfortunate country is overrun, would prepare to sanction its renewed disappearance from the map of Europe, and to draw profit from such a crime ?\*

The other hypothesis is still graver, implying an Italy on the side of Germany (and also of Russia) against the Allies. The Fascist Government would not take such a step save in the certainty of a complete victory for the three totalitarian Dictatorships over Western Democracies. But although in such an event Italy would have her share of booty in the Mediterranean and in the colonies, she would not be able to compete with Germany, nor with Russia. The former would become the one true hegemonic power in Europe and beyond. Russia would have her advantages in Asia and in the Balkans

\* The sentence in Mussolini's speech of September 23rd in regard to the "liquidation" of Poland does not correspond to the feeling of the Italians or to their traditions. The Pope's words to the Poles on September 30th interpreted the deep feelings of the Italians and of Catholics throughout the world.

(besides those already gained in Poland and the Baltic States), and Italy would be left to play second fiddle, her whole policy, foreign, domestic, colonial, financial and cultural, subservient to the German conqueror. Can anyone doubt that this would be the outcome? No one but the ignorant or the deluded; never a man of foresight or even of intellectual integrity.

If this is a pleasing prospect, another problem would present itself—that of a servitude deliberately accepted, in contrast to the case of Poland and other defeated countries on which servitude has been imposed. The latter alone will allow the ripening of the great and generous revolts, the restoration of free and independent countries; the other servitude would mean an abasement of spirit and a betrayal of the true interests of the country. And hence we refuse to think that responsible men could accept such a prospect as favourable to Italy.

There is the third hypothesis, which to us is far more probable: an Anglo-Franco-Polish victory. Italy will then be able to choose either a friendship re-welded by her conduct during the war, or the mistrust created by an ambiguous attitude, doubled by a political system opposed to that of the victorious countries. This dilemma is bound up with a vision of post-war times, which cannot be fixed at this juncture but of which, in general lines, we must catch at least a glimpse and which must enter into war plans and be placed in the scales of the future. Those who envisage the fates of peoples in function of their material power, forgetting or minimising the weight of moral values, must not deceive themselves. Such values in the end decide the issue. Material power moves ponderously and is still more ponderous to move; there must always be a spiritual impulse. If this impulse is based on falsehood it will fail at the test; if it is based on truth it will achieve its effect.

Two tragic experiences of totalitarianism weigh upon the peoples, the Nazi and the Bolshevik. It was an illusion into which many fell to see in Nazism a lightning conductor against Bolshevism. One is as bad as the other in the oppression of individual rights, of the freedom of peoples, of the Christian faith, and in the enslavement of all human activities to the ends of the State Moloch. We have seen to-day what the Anti-Comintern Pact and the world campaign against Bolshevism were worth. But even if Russia and Germany had not signed the *pactum sceleris*, the experience of over

twenty years made plain what were the aims and methods of Moscow and how closely they resembled Nazism. The idea of a Bolshevism the paradise of labour is as false as that of a Nazism as the guarantee of capital. The Western democracies fell into this error, and to-day they are paying dearly for it.

But it is for this reason that the more far-seeing feel the urgent need of combining the war of arms with a war of ideas, establishing that the war is being fought not for material dominion but for moral values that must be safeguarded and brought to realisation when the war is over—respect for human personality, individual and collective, defence of freedom, the guarantee of the independence of those States that are small, weak or exposed to the oppression of others, the protection of labour and of its social value against all forms of exploitation, economic and political. The intention to remake European unity with a strong and permanent organisation must be placed above the egoisms which have betrayed the Europe of the last twenty years. In 1914 it was said that the war was fought to end war. To-day it should be said that the war is being fought for European Federation. The international problem of Europe is the issue at stake: either federation, or else the hegemony of Nazism allied with Bolshevism.

Will Italy after the victory of the Allies be able to oppose a refusal to the reconstruction of Europe based on the principles of freedom and justice? Will she perchance be able to hinder a revival of the moral and political values of the best European and Christian tradition? Assuredly not. If she is not involved with Hitler (as we hope) she would have to co-operate with all her efficacy in the restoration of Europe. It is impossible to say now what will be the Italian position when that time comes, but there must be no illusions. The repercussion of an allied victory will be immense throughout the world, and Italy will not be able to escape the fascination of such an event. From all the battlefields will arise the colossal forces of a humanity rent by long war, and from all the corners of the earth the immortal principles of justice, freedom and peace will be proclaimed.

Within this idealistic vision practical post-war problems will present themselves to all. Let us see what might be those of Italy in the hypothesis of an allied victory. It is certain that no victory can change physical geography, still less

economic geography, and when political geography is at the expense of real interests it collapses. The problems of the Italy of to-morrow will be more or less the same as those of yesterday, the problem of the Danube and the Balkans, the problem of the Mediterranean and Africa.

After the Great War, the present writer in the name of the Italian Popular Party upheld the thesis that Italy, having achieved her aspirations with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, should become the bulwark of the system represented by the succession States, promoting an economic union and political understandings both in the Danube basin and among the Balkans.\* The difficulties in the way of the realisation of such a plan came from various sides, through incomprehensions, political jealousies, uncertain economic situations, till on Mussolini's advent to power he directed his policy against Yugo-Slavia for the sake of Fiume, against the Little Entente for the sake of his policy with Austria and Hungary, finally abandoning the field to Hitler in the whole Danube zone, without any serious gains in the Balkans. To-day that Italy is obliged to review her policy in view of the war and in view still more of what will come after, she must examine the very problem of twenty years ago and decide whether there will be room for her on the Danube and in the Balkans. Certainly in a post-war reconstruction of Europe, Poland, Bohemia, Austria, Hungary, the Balkans, will have to come to an agreement; what will be lacking in homogeneity will have to be supplied by organisation, discipline and community of interests. Italy would here find a field of activity and a need for her effective co-partnership.

Up till to-day a pro-Hitler Italy has preferred the Mediterranean. To what end? To oppose England? To wrest Tunis from France? To bring herself into collision with Turkey and Greece? Assuredly no one can deny that Italy has grave interests in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea, but a policy of understanding and friendship with co-interested parties is one thing, and a policy of conflict with the most powerful of them is another. A Mediterranean hegemony could be sought only by a country in a predominant position, colonially and economically, in Asia and Africa. For Italy to achieve such a position not only would Great Britain and France have to be hopelessly defeated but also Germany and

\* See L. Sturzo: *Italy and Fascismo* (1926) and *Politique* (September 1933).

Russia made to moderate their world aspirations. All this would not happen, even in the case of a Hitler victory, apart from the fact that post-war reconstruction cannot be in view of another war but in view of a long peace. Italy would need to be able to guarantee her Mediterranean position and her colonies by treaties and understandings aiming at peace, not at war, nor at threats of war to wring precarious concessions of doubtful utility.

This brings us to the crucial point. What is Italy going to do, to-day or to-morrow, during the war? Will she decide for France and Great Britain, with the prospect of a peace in which she will have her part, or else for Germany, with Russia, to overthrow the order of the world? For the moment, her position of neutrality gives her time to consider the problems of to-day and to-morrow, with calm, serenity and shrewdness. Let us hope that she will not fail in the great destiny of civilisation and peace that should be hers.

LUIGI STURZO.

*Postscriptum.* It is interesting to note the various reactions of the Fascist press (which, as everyone knows, is in the dependence of the Government) to the events of the day. On the one hand, the papers ridicule "the Russian peril" of which the Allies' papers speak, and "the Bolshevik infection," which is the theme of the Catholic press all over the world. On the other hand they give special attention to the Balkan problem, from a standpoint that is not at all a Russian one. Most significant of all, while the Fascist press supports the peace offensive (making play with the names of Bernard Shaw and Lloyd George), it concerns itself with the future of Europe from a standpoint not at all that of Hitler. *Lavoro Fascista* writes: "It is a case of returning to the fusion of a Europe in which the greater civilisations, the Italian, the Anglo-Saxon, the French, the German and the Spanish, will be reconciled in an established order with fruitful interchanges." (No Russians and even no Poles!) *La Tribuna* speaks of "reciprocal security" (a slight variant of the late "collective security") as the corrective of "nationalism and imperialism." Whose? It must be either that of Berlin or that of Moscow. In this future Europe founded on "reciprocal security," Rome must have its say.

It has been stated that the new Italian ambassador has not brought proposals, but merely offers the offices of Italy for peace. The Italian press has recently been insistent on the subject of peace, and has begun to attack Great Britain rather than France.

L. S.

October 19th, 1939.

## RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC.

RUSSIA'S present dynamic policy in the Baltic is not new. It marks her return to traditional power politics. For nine centuries she has been striving towards the sea. As early as 1030 under Tsar Yaroslav and 1106 under Vseslav she made the first attempts to reach it through the land of the independent Latvian tribes. Fierce resistance forced her back. By the end of the Middle Ages she had consolidated her territorial unity and formed a strong government. The invading Mongols had been repelled and vast territories with immense riches acquired. But still the vital link with the sea and the outer world was missing. The Black Sea was held by the Turks. The White Sea was unknown. The Baltic was the only hope. But the German Hansa ruled its waves, monopolising traffic and trade, while in Estonia and Latvia the Teutonic Order blocked Russian expansion.

In 1492 Muscovy erected the huge fortress of Ivangorod, which still dominates the Bay of Narva. This was the first step towards the sea, which Ivan the Terrible expected "to bring his people something of that civilisation which made the European states so strong." The great tyrant was a brilliant statesman. He knew that the Western Powers had an interest in keeping Russia in her semi-barbaric isolation. But he wanted her to have artisans, artists, teachers, and most of all that devilish invention, gunpowder, without which victory was no longer possible. Like Stalin to-day, Ivan seized his opportunity when he saw the German power, which stood in his way, preoccupied in other directions and weakened by political machinations. He demanded commercial liberties for his subjects in the Baltic, the cancellation of the Teutonic Order's defensive treaty with Poland, and the dismissal of the *Landsknechte* who "protected" Latvia and Estonia. A big delegation went to Moscow, bargained desperately and gave in. This increased Ivan's appetite. He now desired a port of his own. It was not lust of conquest. This had already been satisfied in the East. It was the grim realisation that Russia needed immediate contact with the West. With a ruthlessness that justified his name, he invaded the Baltic lands. The port of Narva was soon in his hands. Latvia and Estonia were placed under his sovereignty.

Europe seemed open. But the Swedes blockaded Narva and combined with the Poles to drive him out of the coast lands. Once again the Russian giant was forced back into his boundless plains. Fifty years of war and diplomatic gamble had been in vain. The sea was as far away as before.

A century of darkness followed. Muscovy had long to wait for the man to break a window in the wall of isolation. The pull of the sea, of distant lands and foreign culture, was an obsession with Peter the Great. First he thought only of Carelia or Ingermanland to build a port. In 1700 he marched against Narva, the old object of Russian desire, but was crushed by the Swedes. Not a gun, not a soldier was left. In a cold fury he began new preparations. Two years later he broke out again. He took one town after the other. Narva fell; at the mouth of the Neva he laid the foundations of St. Petersburg, the first Russian port. But still not sure of himself and his people, he stopped. To buy peace, to consolidate what he had achieved, he was prepared to return the Baltic territories to Sweden. All he wanted was the mouth of the Neva, where his cherished city grew, and a part of Ingermanland for which he even offered to pay an indemnity. Charles XII proudly refused. The war went on. The Russians took the rest of the Baltic States in 1710. And Muscovy who, according to Voltaire, had not had a barque of her own twenty years before, became master of the sea.

Now there was no stopping her. Catherine the Great did not hesitate to partition Poland with the Germans. In addition, she got Lithuania and the Duchy of Courland. Her empire stretched to the Prussian border. Russia grew into a European Great Power. Guns were mounted in all the Latvian and Estonian ports she had acquired, and in 1780 she induced Sweden, Denmark and Prussia to sign a convention excluding foreign warships from the Baltic. In 1857 this neutralisation act was repealed. But Russia has been trying ever since to re-establish her domination, and in 1907 Nicholas II at Swinemünde attempted to persuade the Kaiser to agree to the closure of the sea to all war vessels whose home ports were elsewhere.

It was a useless precaution. The enemy was already there. The Reich lived for nothing but expansion to the East. The first stage was the transformation of the Baltic into a German lake. A powerful fleet developed. The Kiel Canal was built,

and systematically William II prepared the invasion of the Baltic provinces. Their conquest was to give him not only control of Russia's main outlets and her trade with the West, but also an ideal jumping-off ground for further aggression. This was a deadly threat to Russia's very existence and one of the main reasons for her entry into the World War. Even the Provisional Republican Government of 1917 realised the enormous strategic importance of the Baltic territories, and when they agreed to Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian autonomy, there was no question of detaching them from the Empire. When the Germans saw they could not keep the Baltic provinces, which they had occupied meanwhile, they sent Lenin and Trotzky into Russia. They hoped that the Communist revolution would so upset their Slav adversary as to play into their hand. This calculation was right. Russia radically changed her whole foreign policy.

Dreaming of world revolution which would make national interests meaningless, the Soviet at once openly repudiated imperialism, power politics and secret diplomacy and proclaimed the principle of self-determination of all peoples formerly oppressed by the Tsars. This was the signal for the Baltic States. When Germany after the armistice had to relinquish the conquered lands in the East, they established full independence. So once again, after 200 years of unhindered access to the sea, Russia was barred from it. Only a narrow door was left to her, Leningrad, a door easily blocked from outside. The work of Peter the Great was undone.

Did the Soviet really mean it? Could they leave it at that, if Russia was to continue as a European Power? In drastically changing Russia's foreign policy they were, of course, faithful to their doctrine. As long as there was hope for world revolution, the old conceptions did not seem to matter. At the same time one cannot help wondering whether these were the only considerations which made Lenin and Trotzky give up the Baltic. Did the state of affairs in Russia not force them to transform necessity into a virtue? The Russian army in 1917 and 1918 was completely disintegrated; the huge country had been bled white by the war; powerful anti-revolutionary forces operated in various centres against the Soviet. It was only wise to eliminate further trouble by ceding recalcitrant provinces to the aggressive and much stronger enemy at Brest-Litovsk. But it is known that even

Lenin was unwilling to part with the Baltic lands ; and it was more than significant that, as soon as vanquished Germany was forced to withdraw from the Baltic, Soviet forces overran the newly constituted states in a desperate attempt to regain the old " keys of the West."

Only when this invasion was finally repelled by Latvia and Estonia in 1920 and their existence insured with Allied help, did Moscow accept the changed position. Faced with the gigantic task of building a new social order in a semi-asiatic empire, and hard pressed by enemy armies on their soil, Trotzky persuaded Lenin that it was best to consolidate their Western border. The peace treaties they concluded with the Baltic States in the same year are appropriately described by the Royal Institute of International Affairs as " models of restraint and even generosity." Their main item was the recognition of complete Baltic independence by the Soviet and the renunciation of all former rights of sovereignty. This was also confirmed by the Western Powers. By 1920 it seemed that Russia had definitely given up the Baltic.

That impression, however, was soon to be corrected. By intensive Communist propaganda carried out in all the three small states, the Russians tried to regain by revolutionary methods what they had lost in the field of foreign policy. Though the Soviet Government disclaimed all responsibility, the Third International actively supported local Communist groups operating on Baltic territories for the overthrow of the young governments. The motives were not only ideological. They were inspired by the hope that under a Communist régime the Baltic States would freely join the Soviet Union, thus bringing Russia again into direct touch with the sea. The climax of these activities was the big *putsch* of 1924 in Estonia, but its speedy suppression by the authorities and the failure of similar movements elsewhere proved that the Baltic soil was less susceptible to Communism than Russia.

The standard of living of the Baltic masses had always been higher than that of the Russian proletariat. Though oppressed by the barons, they were in contact with Western progress, whilst their neighbour in the East was shut off in misery and ignorance. The revolution in Russia was a logical sequence of centuries of appalling injustice. It was a social revolution. The struggle for freedom in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania however, though interspersed with left wing tendencies, was

mainly a national movement. In Russia the millions of peasants and workers backed the Soviet against the White armies who fought for the restoration of the old privileges. In the Baltic States, on the other hand, the leaders, though anti-communist, were also against the nobility. There was a large landless proletariat in the three new states, amongst whom the Soviet looked for support. But the Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian nationalists themselves expropriated the big estates and shared them out among the proletariat, thus turning it into a proprietary and conservative element. It was this element that resisted communist infiltration most strongly and, by establishing dictatorships, finally outlawed it.

The Russian Government carefully abstained from counter-measures. With the advance of general stabilisation in Europe, their policy became one of correct co-operation with their neighbours. The Baltic States breathed more freely. Mutual confidence was gradually established, extensive commercial treaties were concluded, and various diplomatic conventions entered into, aiming at the preservation of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. Foremost among the latter were the Non-Aggression Pacts of 1932.

This friendly co-operation was of course based on one essential condition, Russia's unhampered access to the sea. Nine hundred years of history had proved that she could not exist without it. Now more than ever the huge empire, labouring under a new social and economic effort, needed the Latvian and Estonian ports which had been long connected by rail and waterway with her main centres of production. It was obvious that, in the long run, Latvia's and Estonia's independence depended on their willingness to satisfy Russia's needs in this respect. The Baltic States fully appreciated this. They granted the Soviet every possible facility on their railways and ports, preferential tariffs and free zones. And though the Russians never fully exploited these facilities, the scheme worked for years to mutual satisfaction.

It was the disastrous course of Nazi policy that forced the Soviet to a sudden change of attitude. In the golden days of Geneva, when collective security and international equity seemed to be building a new Europe, they had realised that their interests, too, were best served by these principles. The dream of world revolution was gone. Concerned most of all

with internal recovery, Russia wanted nothing but peace and stability. As long as these prevailed, her interests on her Western border were fully met by the existence of independent, neutral and friendly states who kept Europe's door open to her. But again, as in the Middle Ages and in 1914, an aggressive and dangerous Power has risen against her. Nazi expansion was from the outset openly directed towards the East. For that reason Moscow grew anxious lest Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, whose small but well-organised German minorities were the strongest outposts of Hitlerism, should be too weak to withstand Berlin's pressure. To allow the three small states to succumb to it would have been suicidal.

Russia was undeniably in a weaker position than Germany. Leningrad, her only port, was far from the big routes, closed by ice in winter, and the naval base of Kronstad could be easily paralysed by the power controlling the Gulf of Finland. Germany, on the other hand, dominated the whole sea. Her influence was very strong in the Baltic capitals whose governments, seeing her brutal acts of aggression succeed unpunished elsewhere, could do nothing but submit. As long as the Reich limited itself to Central Europe, Russia could rest. But when it showed the irrevocable decision to march into Poland—the first real step eastward—Russia took action. Whether it was arranged beforehand by Molotov and Ribbentrop or not, the fact is that she invaded Eastern Poland to forestall the Germans there.

Even the Soviet-Nazi Agreement cannot obscure the fact that the Reich, if it follows its historic course, must eventually push east. To withstand this, Russia's only solution is to unfold her complete power in the Baltic. Her interests demand convenient air and naval bases and security in the countries behind. That is precisely what she is now working for. It is idle to speculate whether in the long run she would have contented herself with the *status quo* up to 1939. But it is a fact that her present return to a dynamic and nationalistic foreign policy is the direct result of the collapse of international good faith and morality brought about by Hitlerism. It is outside the scope of this survey to dwell on the tragedy of the small states whose young integrity has had to succumb to these power politics.

WOLFRAM GOTTLIEB.

## RECONCILIATION AND NEUTRALITY IN YUGOSLAVIA.

**I**T is a curious fact that the national independence of the Serb, Croat and Slovene state which was made possible by the war of 1914-18 did not receive any real measure of consolidation until Europe stood on the brink of the next war. A week before the second conflict broke out the political order of the Yugoslav kingdom received a radical transformation, it may be said in the nick of time, for had Yugoslavia faced the crisis in her former divided state, her destiny would in all probability have been to see herself swept into existence by one war and swept out of it again by the next.

The first title of the new state—the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—gives a clue to the nature of Yugoslavia's problem. The Allied victory in 1918 made possible the union into one political community of the three divided branches of the South Slav race, and the Italian invasion of Slovenia which followed hard on the heels of the Armistice drove the three peoples together with almost unseemly haste. What should have been a considered entry into union with fundamental agreement on the main principles was transformed into a stampede of Croats and Slovenes into the protective custody of their Serb brethren. No preliminary discussion prefaced the act of union of December 1918. The state came together as it could with all its problems unsettled and the whole of its political structure still to be worked out. It is no exaggeration to say that the South Slavs have been endeavouring to solve these problems ever since.

The Slovenes have not constituted the main difficulty. This people, barely two million strong, have sided in the last twenty years both with the Serb government and the Croat opposition. In speech, religion and culture, they tend to align themselves with the Croats. As a prosperous agricultural community where the rise of industry is beginning to make itself felt, their economic interests lie with the central government. Under their leader, Father Korosetz, they have on the whole exercised a moderating influence on whichever side the fortunes of the moment happened to place them. At any rate, the Serb government has had their unequivocal support since 1935. The reef on which the young ship of state nearly foundered was the problem of incorporating Croatia into a

unified body politic along with Serbia. For two decades it seemed as though no political structure could possibly stand the strain of housing these two dissident brothers under a single roof. First of all, their origins lay in two different civilisations. Until the decay of the Ottoman Empire and the incorporation of its successor states piecemeal into the expanding Western Society, Serbia belonged to the Orthodox civilisation of Eastern Europe, first under the domination of Byzance, later of the Turks. Her alphabet is Greek, her religion Orthodox and autocephalous and a deep and permanent strain in the Serb character is a distrust of that aspect of western culture which is incorporated in the œcumenical claims of the Catholic Church. On the contrary the Croats were converted by Latin missionaries, their brief emergence as a separate sovereign entity received the express sanction of the Holy See, and when this independence was extinguished a century or so later, it was at the hands of Catholicised Magyars. Croatia entered Hungary and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a subject but autonomous member of a powerful Western community, Western in its catholicism, its alphabet, its entire cultural tradition.

This deep cleavage in religion and culture lying at the very roots of the two peoples' ethos is repeated at more superficial levels, for example in their completely different historical traditions. Serbia achieved a flourishing state at the turn of the thirteenth century only to be extinguished for 400 years under the overwhelming and petrifying weight of the Ottoman conquest. The slow decay of the Empire and the repercussions of the Western era of enlightenment culminating in the French Revolution combined to produce a Serbian independence movement at the opening of the nineteenth century under Kara Georg, the peasant father of the present dynasty. From the beginning the movement swelled throughout the nineteenth century—the century of national independence *par excellence*—until it came into violent collision with Austria-Hungary, partly as a barrier to the Empire's expansive ambitions in the Balkans, partly as a danger to the very integrity of the Habsburg realm, since "liberated" South Slavs in sovereign, independent Serbia came to exercise a magnetic influence on their "enslaved" brethren within the Empire, until there came a point at which this magnetism was judged by the Habsburgs to be incompatible with the security

of their state and the Great War began with the Austrian onslaught on Serbia, a war out of which Serbia, as an Allied Power, emerged triumphant. Certain marked psychological traits follow upon this history. The Serbs built up their independent state in a long struggle and were somewhat naturally determined to be masters in the house which they had built with so much labour and at such cost. Up to 1918 all increases in Serbia's girth—and she had grown steadily—had taken place by total absorption and the new territories were fully subject to the sovereign Serbs. The Serbs had thus no experience in sharing an authority so painfully achieved. The experiment of 1918 found them—psychologically—totally unprepared.

Nor were the difficulties less on the Croat side. It is true that Croatia had known no long struggle for independence. Since the extinction of Tomislav's kingdom, the Croats had remained for over five hundred years under the political domination of the Magyars. But their captivity bore no resemblance to that of Serbia under the Turks. Far from being crushed out, their autonomy and ancient privileges were strictly preserved and although they never achieved complete independence, their national assembly—the Sabor—enjoyed wide legislative powers, their language was respected, and not till the close of the nineteenth century did the yoke of Austria-Hungary begin to feel oppressive. Now this secular position as subject but independent minority within a great state had in its turn marked effects on the Croat spirit. They had saved themselves from absorption by holding fiercely to their constitutional rights and privileges. This *tour de force* tended to make them incapable of compromise and much wedded to form. It made them, too, highly conscious of their rights as a minority and resolutely determined to resist the *Gleichschaltung* which Hungary could always hold over their heads. This bred a spirit of opposition, a tendency to look at every political problem first of all from a negative and obstructive standpoint. It bred, too, a tendency to suspicion, a tendency to see a threat to their liberties where none was intended. The result of bringing together two peoples, one psychologically incapable of sharing power, the other morbidly sensitive to the possibility of subjection, aggravated by the haste with which the transaction took place, is quite enough to

account for the stormy history of Yugoslavia's first twenty years.

The unbridged gulf between Serb and Croat is the *leitmotif* of the young state's turbulent politics. Until 1929 an attempt was made to run the country along orthodox democratic lines. But the secret of democracy lies above all in compromise or co-operation, and for these neither Serb nor Croat had the least aptitude. The Serbs, led by their veteran Premier, Pasić, made it clear from the start that their conception of the new state was that of a unified centralised community under the political domination of the Serbs. But the Croats had not carried on their secular struggle against the Magyars for nothing. Long ago they had worked out obstruction and sabotage to a fine art. Now they applied their technique to the working of their new country. In 1921 the Croat leader Radić refused co-operation and the Constitution was passed without Croat consent. In 1923 and 1924 Radić was abroad appealing for help against the Serbs. In 1924, after a period of imprisonment, he apparently suffered a change of heart and for a few brief months sent his Croats to Belgrade and co-operated with the Ministry. Then followed a period of even more intransigent opposition which ended in 1928 with the shooting affray in the Skuptšina as a result of which Radić lost his life. Soon after King Alexander took the matter into his own hands and announced a personal dictatorship.

Alexander fared no better than his former ministers. The new Constitution of 1931 contained all the features most obnoxious to the Croats, preservation of Serb dominance, centralisation, the wiping out of regional differences and complete failure to return to the promised democratic system. The Croats remained unappeased and a violent terrorist movement, the Ustasi, began (with foreign help) to attempt by violence what the more moderate Maček party could not bring about by constitutional methods. In 1934 the King fell a victim to an Ustasi *attentat* at Marseilles. It was hoped that the Regency might take advantage of the universal horror roused in Yugoslavia by the crime to affect a reconciliation, but the opportunity was apparently allowed to pass. In 1935 elections on the 1931 model were held and the Croats after obtaining their usual 45 to 50 per cent. of the votes, refused to co-operate, maintaining their steady opposition to

the unified Serb state and to its undemocratic constitution. For the following three years their attitude remained unchanged.

During these three years the Yugoslav Premier, Stoyadinović, appeared to be exercising sovereign powers and he was generally included in the picture gallery of European dictators. A rigid Pan-Serb, he continued with a will the centralising dictatorial policy of Alexander and as his tenure of office lengthened he began to adopt the allure of a personal dictator. Membership of his Radical Union tended to become a *sine qua non* of office. His voting expedients were increasingly open to criticism. He conducted the affairs of state as though he could command the Hitlerian 98 per cent. when in fact a good 50 per cent. of the population opposed him. In 1938 other and more sinister signs appeared. He began to cause himself to be referred to as "*Vodja*" (leader), a salute was introduced, and shortly afterwards he instituted a personal and green-shirted bodyguard. His relations with the Dictators gave rise to grave anxiety in the West and among the democratic Croats. The date of Yugoslavia's adhesion to the Axis was a matter of open speculation. Then, at the height of his apparent power after the reaffirmation of his mandate at the elections of November 1938, he was quietly dismissed in the following January and disappeared without disturbance and without clamour below the political horizon. His successor, Tsetković, a relative nonentity, came to office with the express mandate of putting to an end the breach between Croat and Serb and constructing a new Constitution in which the unitary principle should give way to the federal and under which more democratic forms were to be introduced. Negotiations opened late in March, a preliminary agreement was initialled in April and after further delays a new constitution was promulgated on August 27th, whereby Croatia became an independent Banovina under a Croat *Ban* (or Governor), all Croats were included within the new frontiers giving Croatia nearly 30 per cent. of the total population, and the Sabor was reconstituted and given wide legislative powers over local matters. Pending new elections five Croats, including Dr. Maček, entered the central government for the first time in fourteen years. It was this government which a week later, speaking almost for the first time in the country's history for Serb and

Croat alike, announced Yugoslav neutrality in the present war.

It is possible now to see that Dr. Stoyadinović was, throughout his three-year tenure of the Premiership, in fact serving as a convenient screen to the real source of power in Yugoslavia. The confusion arose naturally, for the Regent, Prince Paul, seemed an unlikely successor to the resolute Dictator, Alexander. At the time his choice as Regent aroused surprise and it was known that he accepted the burden of office with extreme distaste. The tendency at first was to write off as politically negligible this reserved and aloof young Prince, particularly once the star of Stoyadinović was in the ascendant. Certain omens, it is true, might have led the intelligent observer to attribute greater significance to the young King's guardian. Stoyadinović himself, for all his dictatorial graces, owed his position entirely to the Regent's fiat. In 1935 his predecessor, Yevtić, fought the elections as leader of the Serb Radical Union. And after emerging apparently successful from the poll, he was summarily dismissed by Prince Paul for corrupt electioneering. Overnight Stoyadinović was called to fill his place, and obviously a man called to office by the whim of a higher authority cannot hope to exercise the function of a modern leader of the masses. When his downfall came, it was, incident for incident, a repetition of the fall of the former Premier. Like Yevtić, he fought an apparently successful election; like him, he was violently accused by the opposition of falsifying the results; like him, he was quietly dropped and a successor chosen from among his own colleagues. From the hour of his appointment to the hour of his dismissal, he was never in fact more than the Regent's man. Why, then, was the dismissal necessary?

First of all, this "Regent's man" was showing signs of indocility. In Yugoslavia only a Karageorgevic may bear the title of "*Vodja*." If there are to be dictators, they will be kings. The Regent could not tolerate encroachments, green-shirted or otherwise, on the royal preserve of power. But there were other reasons, quite as grave. In 1935 the choice of Stoyadinović, a banker and an economist, had been based on the underlying assumption that Yugoslavia's ills were mainly economic. Like all agrarian communities the country had been disastrously hit by the world economic crisis, and

significantly the onslaught of the crisis had coincided with the complete rupture of relations between Serb and Croat following the death of Radić, while the worst atrocities of the Ustasi were contemporary with the nadir of the slump. Stoyadinović received the mandate to restore harmony by restoring prosperity, but by 1938 it was clear that although prosperity had to a large extent returned, harmony was as far off as ever. Stoyadinović's main points in the electoral campaign of November 1938 consisted of import and export figures, statistics, successful floating of an internal loan, the scale of public works. On the political issue he remained as intransigent as ever in his opposition to federalism and democratic reform.

When the elections reproduced almost to a vote the results of 1935 it was clear that the Croats were as obstinately unreconciled as ever and that therefore Stoyadinović had failed. But his failure also showed up the bankruptcy of the régime. It was no longer possible to attribute the gulf dividing Serb and Croat to anything but to its proper cause, the federal issue. Prince Paul therefore accepted the inevitable and decided on direct negotiations with the Croats. To these, however, the person of Stoyadinović, identified as he was with the pan-Serb policy of centralisation, presented an insuperable obstacle. The Croats were ready to negotiate but not through the Premier. The Premier, therefore, disappeared as suddenly and quietly as he had come, and although his successor, Tsetković, had the immediate conduct of affairs, the Regent's hand was apparent at every turn of the negotiations, and to him must go the principal honours for having carried them through to an unexpectedly successful conclusion.

The principal honours, but not all the honours. One laurel wreath at least should be spared for the brows of Hitler. The significance of events in Yugoslavia during the last four years cannot be fully appreciated apart from their international context. Since 1935 the whole balance of power in Eastern Europe has been radically transformed. Until about that year the influence of the West, based on traditional friendship with France, inveterate enmity for the Italians and strong support for the League of Nations, had been paramount. Thereafter the Sanctions *débâcle* co-operated with the rise of Hitlerism to cut out the West and lay Yugoslavia open to new influences. The general feeling was that the League had

failed and the West was in decline; the Yugoslav leaders drew the inevitable conclusion that Yugoslavia, being a small state with exposed frontiers, would be well advised to make her peace with her powerful neighbours. Stoyadinović combined this practical outlook with real sympathy for the totalitarian ethos, and it was under his premiership that the sensational Pact of Friendship with Italy was signed in March 1937 and the inroads of Nazism upon the Yugoslav state began to be really apparent. Reference has already been made to the rumoured linking of Yugoslavia with the Axis. Although officially denied, it showed how far Stoyadinović was prepared to commit his country.

At this point the dangers of the new position' became obvious. Every year saw an overwhelming increase in German power, and Nazi policy with regard to Yugoslavia was anything but negative. The first onslaught took the shape of the trade drive inaugurated in 1935 by Dr. Schacht, which in a year successfully brought nearly 50 per cent. of Yugoslavia's foreign trade under the control of Germany. Political action such as the organisation of Yugoslavia's German minorities into militant hotbeds of Nazism followed, and in Slovenia this disquieting phenomenon was accompanied by a policy of land purchase which seemed designed to place the main lines of communication in German hands. Germany's success in Austria gave Yugoslavia at one stroke a long and undefended frontier with her terrifying neighbour. The complete annihilation of Czechoslovakia in the following year illustrated all too clearly the fate of small countries which had the misfortune to find themselves in the path of the German steam roller.

This combination of internal and external events threw into sharp relief Yugoslavia's political dilemma, and its relation to the Croat problem did not escape the watchful eye of the Regent. In the final disruption of Czechoslovakia, the Germans used the Slovaks as a weapon against the Czechs. The subordinate minority was first inflamed and then armed against the dominant majority. Substitute Serb for Czech and Croat for Slovak, and was not Croatia an admirable instrument ready to the Nazi hand in order to extend the policy of *divide et impera* down into the Balkans? The supposition was in no way fantastic. Some of Dr. Maček's hotheads were already threatening to turn to the Germans

for support. Discreet Nazi propaganda in Zagreb began to push the policy of secession and "independence" along Slovak lines. Even Maček declared that the eleventh hour had struck and that the Croats would know where to look if their demands were once again rejected. Prince Paul realised that the time for parley had come. Munich led to the November elections and the passing of Stoyadinović, March saw the German entry into Prague and the opening of Serbo-Croat negotiations, the summer brought war to Europe and the realisation of what we can only hope to be a lasting internal peace to Yugoslavia.

It was thus a combination of internal and external factors which solved the perennial problem of Serb and Croat apparently in the nick of time. One last question remains; will the agreement make any difference to Yugoslavia's attitude to the war? It is hard to say. The Croats are well known for their deep sympathy with the democratic West. Their influence may at some future date tilt the scales in our favour. For the time being Yugoslavia in her own interests is working tirelessly to prevent the revisionist Powers, Hungary and Bulgaria, from attacking under the ægis of Germany their *status-quo* neighbours (Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece). If her efforts are crowned with success, this in itself will be some contribution towards the final victory of the West; but the melancholy admission must be made that Yugoslav neutrality is not the attitude upon which in happier circumstances we might have relied. Here the internal situation has little influence. Reconciled or unreconciled, both the Serbs and Croats up to 1935 were keen upholders of collective security. Since that date the steady retreat of the West before Hitler has driven them willy nilly into neutrality. Thus to-day although France and Great Britain are fighting for the freedom of every small country east of Hitler, they fight without their support. The measure of Hitler's success is the terror he has instilled into his neighbours' souls, a terror which numbs them into neutrality even in a conflict upon whose issue the very survival of independence in Europe, and therefore of their own, depends. Yugoslav neutrality means, in fact, that Yugoslavia is prepared to see her destiny decided by alien arms, and by her resignation we can assess the extent to which Hitler has "won the peace."

BARBARA WARD.

## THE JEWS IN HUNGARY.

THE calamity that has overtaken the Jews in Hungary is in distressing contrast to the conditions they had enjoyed for the last seventy years. They had experienced the blessings of political equality in a somewhat lesser degree than the Jews in the democratic countries of the West, but they were for the most part immune from any serious hardship. Proud in their patriotism, and eager to merge themselves in the general population, they had repaid their treatment with the most bountiful services to the State and were always ready to make the utmost sacrifices for its defence. All the more undeserved and revolting, therefore, do they find the legal disabilities to which they have now been subjected, although hundreds of thousands of Jews in neighbouring countries have to suffer a far more galling plight. The oppressive measures that have been enacted against them have aroused the bitterest resentment as acts of injustice and cruelty, which expose them to degradation and beggary. They are the helpless victims of the forces of reaction now raging over the greater part of Central and Eastern Europe, in which the malignant influence of Nazi Germany is playing the dominant part.

The Jews of Hungary obtained their complete emancipation in 1867. The new Constitution of that year declared that "the Israelite inhabitants of the country are entitled to exercise all civil and political rights equally with its Christian inhabitants," and that "all laws, customs, and regulations to the contrary are herewith annulled." For centuries the Jews had formed the only middle class between the aristocrats and landowners on the one hand and the peasants on the other. The aristocrats would not soil their hands with any kind of occupation save military or government service, and the peasants were confined to tilling the soil. The Jews thus fulfilled the useful and vital function of creating and developing Hungary's commerce and providing her with doctors and lawyers. They were the most ardent votaries of Magyar culture, and Magyarised their names. In many parts of the country containing mixed nationalities the Jewish schools were often the only ones where Hungarian was the language of instruction, and they were also attended by Christian children. Before the War the Jews in Budapest had already grown to almost one-fourth

of the population, and in the higher grade schools and some of the University faculties in that city they even formed a majority of the students. Their political status was such that they provided a Minister of Justice in the person of Wilhelm Vazsonyi; and the part they played in the War is attested by the fact that they lost 10,000 men on the battlefield and were awarded a goodly number of the highest military distinctions.

But after the War there set in a period of reaction in consequence of Hungary's loss of two-thirds of her territory and also of the participation of a few persons of Jewish origin in the short-lived Communist Government of Béla Kun. The Jews throughout the country were exposed to a reign of terror for some years by the "Awakening Magyars," and many of them were done to death. The diminution of territory compelled a large section of the youth of Hungary's upper and middle class, who would otherwise have found a career in the army or the civil service, to seek a livelihood in commerce, industry, and the liberal professions, where they met with Jewish competition, and hence the anti-Semitism aroused by political events was exacerbated by economic causes. Popular hostility found expression in the passing, in 1920, of a *numerus clausus* law for restricting the proportion of Jewish students at the Universities, with a view to reducing Jewish rivalry in the liberal professions; and although the civil rights of the Jews were constitutionally safeguarded by the Minorities Treaty, which Hungary, like so many other States, was obliged to sign, the only redress that was obtained with the aid of the League of Nations in 1928 was a verbal amendment of the law—the substitution of an economic basis of admission for that of nationality—while its operation remained in effect as before. But conditions generally were tolerable.

The change in the treatment of the Jews was brought about by the approach of the Swastika. The annexation of Austria by Hitler gave an impetus to the widespread Nazi agitation in Hungary, which had been fostered and financed by Germany. The various Nazi parties clamoured for anti-Jewish restrictions on German lines and emphasised their demands by repeated disorders and riots. They proclaimed that the Jews were the cause of all the country's misfortunes and that only if they were driven out of economic and intellectual life would it be possible for true Magyars to secure a livelihood. The

Government accordingly came to the conclusion that the best way in which to suppress the Nazi agitators, who made no secret of their aim to wrest political power, was to steal their anti-Semitic thunder. They therefore drafted a Bill for the "more efficient protection of the social and economic balance," which was designed to effect drastic restrictions upon the position of the Jews in commerce, industry, banking, and the liberal professions as well as on the press and the stage, and in the cinema industry.

This Bill, after considerable opposition not only on the part of the Jews but also in Parliament and the press, was adopted in May 1938, and took effect on June 28th. It provided that by June 30th, 1943, and in special cases by June 30th, 1948, industrial, commercial and banking enterprises employing ten or more salaried employees must adjust the proportion of such employees, as well as of salaries, bonuses and other forms of remuneration, so that the Jewish share in any category should not exceed 20 per cent. of the total. The proportion of Jews among newly appointed employees must not exceed 5 per cent. of the total until the norm of 20 per cent. was attained. Firms failing to comply with these stipulations might be placed under Government control or expropriated. The law provided further that in the medical, legal and engineering Chambers, in which the number of Jews exceeded the stipulated norm, Jews should henceforth be admitted at the rate of only 5 per cent. of the total number of candidates until such time as the proportion of Jewish members was reduced to 20 per cent. New Chambers were to be set up by the end of 1939 in journalism and in the film and stage professions, where the *numerus clausus* was to be enforced at once.

Although this law was inspired by the example of Germany, it was not of the authentic Nazi brand, for certain categories of Jews were excepted—all those who were baptised before August 1919, as well as Jewish war invalids, ex-servicemen, war pensioners, and their children. The main ground on which the law was advocated was that the Jews occupied a disproportionate share of the trades and professions, and it was necessary to find jobs for the Christian youth. The share occupied by the Jews in commerce, industry, and the liberal professions was determined by the social factors already described, and since they had the full rights of citizenship there was no reason why they should be limited in any particular

sphere. In no case had they ousted Magyars from any field of economic or professional activity ; on the contrary, it was due to their enterprise that positions had been multiplied for the benefit of non-Jews.

In the summer of 1938 the number of Jews in Hungary was 450,000, forming 5·1 per cent. of the total population. They constituted 7·5 per cent. of all those employed in industry, but they had played a very notable part in its development, and to them was due the sole credit for the creation of the textile industry. In commerce they represented 43 per cent., but all forms of trade had always been particularly obnoxious to the Magyar gentry, and the Jews had opened up valuable trade relations with other countries. Fantastic figures have been published in many papers concerning Jewish ownership of the land, but in fact (according to the official statistical returns for 1930) the total area of cultivated land in Jewish hands was only 4·15 per cent.

It is in the liberal professions, however, that the participation of Jews is particularly conspicuous. According to the returns of 1930 they formed 54·4 per cent. of the doctors in private practice, 49·2 per cent. of the lawyers, 31·6 per cent. of the journalists (compared with 42·4 per cent. in 1910), 30·4 per cent. of the musicians, 24 per cent. of the actors, and 14·3 per cent. of the painters and sculptors. On the other hand, and as some explanation of these high figures, it must be noted that in the Civil Service they formed only 1·5 per cent., as their political equality did not extend to an equitable share in the public administration.

The number of Jews and their dependants who would have been affected by the law of May 1938 was calculated as about 50,000. The champions of this violation of the Constitution, the Premiers, first Dr. Daranyi and then Dr. Bela Imredy, argued that since the Jews were little more than 5 per cent. of the population it was not unfair to limit their participation in economic and intellectual life to 20 per cent. They defended their policy on the ground that the Jews were not sufficiently assimilated and that the reduction of their share in the national life was necessary for the preservation of the Magyar spirit and culture. This plea was utterly devoid of justification, for the Jews have made important and enduring contributions to the national culture.

It was largely due to Jewish influence that Budapest was

changed in the course of a century from a German-speaking town into a Hungarian city. Since the establishment of the Hungarian Academy of Science in 1830 it has had fifty-four members who were Jews or persons of Jewish origin. Only two Hungarians have been awarded the Nobel Prize: the first, Professor Baranyi, is a hundred per cent. Jew, and the second, Professor Szent-Györgi, is a "non-Aryan." There is a galaxy of distinguished writers of Jewish origin, of whom the most famous are Joseph Kiss, the popular poet, and Ferenc Molnar and Eugen Heltai, dramatists and novelists. There are illustrious Jewish names in the world of scholarship and archæology, such as Arminius Vambery, who mastered all the languages and dialects of Central Asia and traced the origin of the Magyar tongue; Ignaz Goldziher, who was the first to give a critical history of Arabic traditions; and Marc Aurel Stein, who has made remarkable discoveries in China and Turkestan. To music the Jews have contributed the composers Karl Goldmark and Imre Kalman, and the violinist, Joseph Szegeti; to painting, Philip de Lazslo; to the film world, Alexander Korda; and to architecture Joseph Vago, one of the architects of the Palace of the League of Nations.

The passing of the law of May 1938 caused considerable consternation. The consequence was that although the law did not provide for the discharge of more than 1,500 during the first six months the number actually deprived of their positions was 5,000, and, including dependants, the total number robbed of their means of livelihood was 13,500. Serious dislocation was caused in the business world, for it was not easy to replace the victims with their life-time of experience, and similar disturbances arose in the liberal professions. Thousands of Jews immediately decided that their only salvation lay in emigration.

Scarcely had the Jewish community attuned itself to this disaster than it was threatened by a much graver catastrophe. The disruption of Czechoslovakia, followed by the Vienna "award" in November 1938, resulted in Hungary regaining a goodly slice of Slovakia. Such a glorious victory, achieved by the grace of Hitler, called for a suitable expression of appreciation, and this could best be shown by following more closely in Nazi footsteps. The anti-Jewish law was much too mild to satisfy the persecutors of Berlin and Nuremberg. Under irresistible pressure the Hungarian Government,

before the year was out, declared their willingness to supersede it by a new law that would be much more drastic and introduced a bill for reducing the 20 per cent. limitation to 6 per cent.

The official reason given for this turning of the screw showed to what an extent the Government had succumbed to the spirit of oppression inculcated by the Nazi tyranny. They actually referred to the German anti-Jewish code and stated that Hungary found herself surrounded by territories with a population of 200 million people, which all wished to drive their Jews out. The consequence would be that these Jews would all want to stream into Hungary, and, since frontier precautions would prove ineffective, the State must pass laws that would prevent such an influx.

The prime advocate of the new bill was the Prime Minister, Dr. Bela Imredy, who had previously announced that the first anti-Jew law would be the last. In defending it in a speech in Parliament, he admitted that it would involve certain injustices, but argued that individual tragedies must not deter the Government from their aim. The bill encountered quite a formidable amount of influential opposition, in which magnates and churchmen, Liberals and Socialists, all united, and there were stormy scenes in both Chambers. The hostility was due to a variety of motives: to the fact that the bill was a flagrant violation of the Constitution, to recognition of the cruel hardship that it would impose upon hundreds of thousands of law-abiding citizens, to fear of the serious harm it would inflict upon the economic and intellectual life of the country, and, not least, to resentment against the Government acting as such willing tools of the Nazi despotism. One of the foremost opponents was Count Bethlen, who had been Premier for several years when the country was recovering from the effects of the War. Count George Apponyi, son of the famous statesman, wrote an article in the *Magyar Nemzeti*, in which he said that he was ashamed to witness in his old age the introduction of medieval measures against Jews. The Cardinal Primate of Hungary, Dr. Seredi, pleaded that the bill should not affect Jews who were Hungarian citizens before it became law and that it should in any case not apply to converts.

But Dr. Imredy would not be deterred from his purpose. He was angered by some pamphlets that were circulated, accusing him of partial Jewish origin. "I have no Jewish

blood in me," he replied, and redoubled his attacks upon the Jews. He spoke of the "poisonous influence of the Jewish spirit," and proclaimed to Parliament and people that the Jews could never become assimilated with the Magyars even if they had inter-married. In his veins there flowed old Hungarian blood, which reacted instinctively to the sufferings of the nation, and in response to his "instinctive promptings" he had felt compelled to introduce the anti-Jew bill. But Dr. Imredy was doomed to be "hoist with his own petard." He produced the birth certificate of a Christian grandfather as proof of his pure "Aryan" origin, but diligent searchers discovered that he had a 100 per cent. Jewish great-grandfather, Jacob Heller, who had lived during the Napoleonic era and was baptised at the age of seven in 1814. This unfortunate discovery covered Dr. Imredy with ridicule and caused his immediate downfall. Count Teleky, who succeeded as Premier, took up the obnoxious burden and advocated the Bill with not less ardour.

During the debate in the Lower Chamber a sensation was caused by the appearance in the public gallery of a number of Jewish reserve officers, dressed in mourning and wearing numerous decorations, as a silent protest against the iniquitous measure. Many deputies were deeply moved by the demonstration. The Jewish member, Dr. Johann Vazsonyi (son of a former Minister of Justice), at once demanded that the Government should alter the Bill so as to ensure to any Jew who fulfilled his duty to the country faithfully the same treatment as that accorded to his non-Jewish fellow-citizens. But the Government were inflexible. The Bill was carried and came into force on May 4th.

This second "Jew Law" takes no account of the racial principle, partly because of the strong opposition of the Catholic Church and partly because the inclusion of that principle would have affected over one million persons—a rather large proportion in a population of ten millions. The Law applies only to those who are Jews by religion, and half-Jews are generally treated as Jews. Moreover, all those who were already Christians on the day of their birth or were baptised at least before their seventh birthday, and whose Jewish parent was a Christian before January 1st, 1939, count as non-Jews, but only if the family has been domiciled in Hungary since 1849 and this can be proved by documentary

evidence. Jewish war-invalids, ex-servicemen who had received gold or silver medals, University professors, and Olympic champions are also exempted.

The Law limits the Jews to 6 per cent. of the membership of the Chambers of the liberal and academic professions; restricts the participation of the Jews in public contracts to 20 per cent., and from 1943 to 6 per cent.; forbids them to occupy any controlling, managerial, or influential position in newspaper offices, theatres, cinemas, or film studios; utterly excludes them from the Civil and Municipal services, and from the staff of social insurance organisations and all public institutions, as well as from the vocations of notary and sworn interpreter. It requires that all Jewish professors and teachers in colleges and higher grade schools, and all Jewish district notaries shall be retired by January 1st, 1943, and all Jewish public prosecutors by January 1st, 1940, with compensation. Jewish students at Universities and higher grade schools are to be limited to 6 per cent. All licences held by Jews for the sale of State monopoly articles must be withdrawn within five years and not renewed, and trade licences issued to Jews must be limited to 6 per cent. of the total held in the local community. Jews have no right to buy or sell land, except by permission, and they can be compelled at any time to sell or lease their agricultural property on terms fixed by the authorities—a provision that amounts to forcible expropriation. In industrial concerns, mines, banks, money exchanges, and insurance companies Jews must be limited to 12 per cent.; they can be dismissed at any time at short notice, and their compensation or pension depends upon the generosity of the employer.

The Law also prescribes that in future no Jew can obtain Hungarian nationality either by naturalisation or marriage. The Minister of the Interior can annul the naturalisation or denization of any Jew who acquired Hungarian citizenship after July 1st, 1914. This provision may seriously affect a large number of the 150,000 Jews of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia who have been incorporated within the State. Only those Jews who are able to prove by authentic documents that their ancestors were Hungarians, born in Hungary, and domiciled since 1867, have a right to vote for Parliament and Municipal Councils, and can be elected members of them.

It has been estimated that of the 600,000 Jews who are now

subject to Hungarian rule, at least one-third will be affected by the new law. The prospect facing them, whether their dismissal has already taken effect or is still impending, is one of distress and despair. Most of them are business employees or members of the liberal and academic professions, who are only too anxious to emigrate, but unfortunately do not possess the means to enable them to do so. At least 50,000 Jews have already applied for emigration facilities, without specifying to what country they wish to go, for they do not know for what country they can obtain a visa. Even those who have the necessary means for emigration cannot obtain permission for the transfer of their capital.

Grossly devalued as Hungarian citizenship has become for the Jews, those Jews of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia—numbering about 75,000 in each district—who have recently come under Hungarian rule, have experienced much difficulty in acquiring it. In order to obtain a Hungarian passport, they must produce three witnesses—Hungarian citizens—to testify that they comported themselves as loyal adherents of Hungary in the 'twenties, after they had ceased to be Hungarians. The loyal attitude of these Jews towards the Czechoslovak State is now accounted against them as a crime. But if the new Jewish subjects of Hungary have no passports or become "Stateless," they will be faced with a very difficult problem in their attempts to emigrate.

For emigration appears to the new as to the old Jewish subjects of Hungary the only means of salvation from the dismal doom that they fear is creeping over them. The second "Jew Law" may satisfy the Nazi oppressors for the time being, but sooner or later there may be a renewal of pressure both from within and without to introduce a third "Jew Law." How long the Hungarian Government will be able to resist the pressure to which the more powerful Government of Italy felt obliged to yield, it is difficult to say. That pressure will doubtless increase as the economic needs of the Third Reich become more exacting, for the elimination of the Jews from Hungary's economic and intellectual life is Germany's opportunity; and in addition to this gross predatory motive is the malignant lust for oppression, which the Nazi sadists are bent upon indulging in an ever-widening region.

ISRAEL COHEN.

## A STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL HISTORY.

IN these restless days, when our histories of the present time may be written with an imperfect knowledge of the past, we are apt to forget that not many years ago international historians could collaborate for the common benefit with excellent results. For example, diligent investigators of the dark corners in modern European history could not fail to note an unhappy sequel to the "German struggle for Liberty" from 1807 to 1814. The political system of the leaders of the central European states in the Napoleonic period left a bad example to their descendants. Such liberty as was permitted for another hundred years was not that which Stein and Gneisenau had claimed, nor even that which Mill defined in his protest against a perverted political morality which posed as science. During the last fifty years, however, international history has been largely compiled by the best methods and from the best materials available, regardless of the nationality of authors or editors. Unfortunately this practice is likely to be no longer safe, for it is alleged that while Social-Democratic states may ingenuously avow some Marxist heresies, Totalitarian states may disingenuously tamper with historical facts. In view of the strained relations that might result from such an academic quarrel, an attempt should be made by the respective national academies to correct or adjust such differences. The value of any historical publication must depend on the method of its compilation, and if this method is influenced by some political interest it may become positively misleading. At the same time historians of all nations have sturdily upheld the dignity of an academic status which has been respected, even though the liberty of free speech, a free legislature and a free press has not always been recognised.

But there is still another obstacle to these amenities. The present writer was reminded by a distinguished and very friendly German historian, when a correspondence of more than twenty years was interrupted by the World War, that insular scholars could have no conception of the difficult position of nationals protected only by precarious frontiers from repeated invasion and reprisal. Again, it has been pointed out that certain drastic devices of modern warfare

had long ago been known in embryonic forms, and Victorian rumour depicted one device so terrible that humanity required its immediate suppression. From time to time there was a hushed whisper of its possible resurrection, but though there was some search among official tombstones, the conclusion was mainly negative. Now this *sancta simplicitas* preceded the first cautious experiments in a mechanised traffic by land and air which was destined to effect a complete change in human mentality and in the conditions of international relations and prospects, threatening even the dwellings of a sea-girt nation, together with its industrial and commercial livelihood. For the command of speed and the conquest of space, which already are the cause of death or injury to rash adventurers, might lead to the lust of war, if the rich but weak nations were at the mercy of those poor but strong. A nation that has imprudently disarmed, while its "friend the enemy" has rearmed with secrecy and sacrifice, may not be able to make a recovery at leisure.

It might seem that a conservative procedure in the making of treaties of peace has failed to provide for the safety of a nation, though from the first some security was desirable. In these later days when a perplexed and anxious scrutiny of the broken terms of futile treaties may reveal the ugly fact that a beaten enemy has only crouched, to spring with strength renewed and overweening, there has been a belated search for truth in national history; from which it might be imputed that only a welcome truth can easily be found in History made and recorded by every nation on its own behalf.

Now, what can European historians do about this? Of course they can declare that it is not their business and they would surely be unwilling to scandalise their brethren in other seats of learning by personal abuse of their great ones! The publication of criticism or protest might only evoke the specious answer that political methods, which appear constitutionally objectionable to the nationals of a Social Democracy, are essential for the constitutional requirements of National Socialism, and *vice versa*. But when a Nazi minister invoked lately the judgment of the "Muse of History" his case was not one that historians could support, for here he was out of his depth, and therein lie the comedy and tragedy that are daily presented to us. For when friendly nations make unfriendly reproaches to one another on the

strength of supposed facts, which their own historians will not be able to justify hereafter and on the analogy of which they could not hope for favourable judgment in their own or any other courts of law, it might seem time that something should be done about it in the interests of all concerned.

This is really possible without imposing upon the political or social activities of a League of Nations. Have we not a well-organised international Historical Congress with its relevant committees, representing the respective academies and learned societies which collaborate amicably in historical studies? It is true that the non-Aryan bar might exclude some notable continental scholars, but such prejudices have not always been consistent. It is remembered that the Children of Shem took a leading part in founding the colonial and foreign commerce of a New England where there has always been insistence on a colour bar, which does not seem to prevent Aryan aspirations, in an older world, for similar benefits from the Children of Ham.

As matters stand, old allies have fallen out with later peace-makers; but besides the admitted grievance of worn-out treaties, there is also the distrust of new ambitions. Perhaps young nations, like young children with their innate realism, may wish to believe only what they like, but in that case the position is rather a difficult one. At the same time, we should remember also that it is "liberty" that we crave, and not "license"; and before we put ourselves upon the "Bill of Rights," it might be wise to gain disillusionment by a glance at the Secretary of State's "Warrant Books" for those "good old times." The fact is that from time to time, in the discussion of international affairs, a point is reached at which reiteration of rude abuse or polished sarcasm may cease to impress and when, to escape jovial or cynical irrelevance, a simple statement may perhaps appear worthy of consideration.

That the discovery of historical facts can be equally advantageous to statesmen and historians in every country may be seen from many incidents which arise from time to time and which cannot be easily settled by the Law Officers alone. A few years before the World War the British War Office was asked officially if there was any established agreement as to the sanctity of national archives during a state of war. The apparently correct answer was that the enforced restitution

of certain Napoleonic plunder must be regarded as a precedent for all time, but the experience of Belgian, French and Italian archivists during the subsequent War may be read at large. This and other cases suggest that an agreed respect for archives and other sources of historical literature might be associated with a regard for historical accuracy, safeguarded by national institutions. Without such an agreement, it must be insisted that misunderstandings on questions of fact are likely to arise and cannot fail to add seriously to the existing controversies between the nations.

The *American Guide to German Archives* reports that everywhere in Germany the conditions of access to the archives are most generous, with the additional advantage of careful and scientific preservation and exposition even of local archives by skilled archivists, conditions which excited the envy of our own Royal Commission on Public Records of that period. A few months earlier, in 1913, delegates from German institutions made a brave show at the Historical Congress in London, but a few years later most of them had resigned or had been expelled from their honorary association with British societies during the last and most bitter stage of the World War. But even before the Peace, special reports had been obtained from corresponding members in allied countries as to the effects of the War on their respective archives.

If we were able to survey the impressive results of our own collaboration with other nations in the compilation of historical studies, including the auxiliaries, we could only come to one conclusion. Here every aspect of a nation's growth and activities, from the earliest times to the present day, has been written and revised by the active or tacit agreement of a world-wide family of nations, each one of which has laboured in a cause that is one of the mainstays of our civilisation.

To mention but a few notable instances; the life of Richard, "King of the Germans" in the thirteenth century, which is now being written by an English scholar, has been already written by German scholars, who have also supervised details of the activities of Almain Merchants; while Italian scholars could help with new adventures by merchants of Venice, in which many English owners risked their cargoes against the Moorish galleys to fetch pomegranates or Toledo blades in exchange for the English wool and cloth which furnished the cash put out to usury by English landowners and lawyers.

The position of the Jews in medieval Europe presents difficulties to the historian, and in the later period of Jewish activities in Northern and Central Europe these difficulties increase and are associated with the position of the Jew as an emigrant or colonist. An American professor of Business History has hesitated to decide to what extent the Jew may be regarded as a good colonist. It is already evident that there is need for more historical research in the later period. That already published by Jewish historians for the earlier period is valuable. German historians, who have contributed largely to that period, should be able to assist still further in the later period also.

Nevertheless, during all those centuries of violence and danger the rich cities and fertile manors of "Magna Britannia" were not overwhelmed. And though Continental countries, with their vulnerable frontiers, suffered greater damage, few national monuments of architecture or art perished before the present century when, by the perversion of scientific discoveries, war became an object of shameless political expectation, as well as of nameless terror. But for many years past, there has been, especially in Germany, an earnest attempt to facilitate the removal of precious records, books or works of art to places of safety, and this is surely a precaution for a common benefit which might be generally observed and encouraged, together with further precautions for the immunity of ancient buildings, the destruction of which would be remembered as a common reproach to European civilisation. Perhaps too it was vainly regarded as a hopeful sign that there should have been impartial appreciation of official arrangements and decisions in athletic or sporting contests between the nations, though this seemed a test of honest judgment as clear-cut as any decision affecting historical opinion.

Finally, will English historians of world-wide repute, and others who follow in their footsteps, have to abjure conclusions reached after an exhaustive examination and the citation of official documents relating to the diplomatic history of more recent years, if they should find themselves no longer in agreement with some foreign national opinion or political interest? Studies of the culture of an older civilisation, which are still of some æsthetic and economic importance, are publicly commended in authoritarian circles and have even

been transmitted to this country under the direction of foreign scholars. No reasonable person would anticipate the disturbance of these idealistic studies for political reasons, even though the ideals pursued include studies of religious and civil liberty. Does not this suggest that freedom for the serious study and sober discussion of historical problems is really a matter of academic rather than of political interest?

Since this article was written, much history has been made, with protestations of good intentions and reproaches of ill advice on either side. It is clear that such contentions could only lead us in one direction, and that not in the "way of peace"; and if armed strife has ensued, there can be only one ultimate result. "Ye fight and war, yet ye have not." At the same time, it might seem futile to insist that the conditions of existing treaties of peace must be maintained until they are modified by consent, that justice must be done according to international law, and above all that the national and commercial liberties of every State, great or small, must be respected if the first principle of civilisation is to be preserved.

This indeed is the rub, for having been able to prepare for war while other nations prepared for peace, the Powers of the *Axis* and its followers profess to have a free hand for receiving the ill-gotten benefits, objecting to the plea for peace and goodwill that a "new order" of World power must henceforth be envisaged with fresh boundaries and treaty conditions. Here then we have already a specious and instructive proposition for the consideration of international historians. Indeed it is one that calls for a decisive ruling in view of the plausible pretension of a totalitarian régime to efficiency, in contrast with a policy of liberty and *laissez-faire*. In view also of the circumstances in which an unparalleled threat has been offered to the existing ideals of World civilisation, it is of the greatest importance that all recognised historical institutions should take careful and impartial note of what is happening. *Sic vos non vobis!*

It has been officially suggested that those governments responsible for the terrible catastrophe of the present war will have to stand "at the bar of History." Cannot this authoritative *dictum* be supplemented by another metaphor? Learned fellowships of the nations might form an irresistible phalanx in the cause of historical truth.

HUBERT HALL.

## WAR IN THE AMERICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT.

THE American trade unions, perhaps the most powerful industrial labour organisation in the world, are spending an increasing part of their energies in internal warfare, since the peace efforts of last year were unsuccessful. There are a great many reasons which made the split when it came about in 1935 not only unavoidable but also a source of progress. But there is hardly any doubt to-day that the present state of war between the American Federation of Labour (A.F. of L.) and the Committee for Industrial Organisation (C.I.O.) is becoming every day more dangerous for the many important positions which labour has been able to conquer since President Roosevelt started the New Deal in 1933. Admittedly, too, the numerous clashes between the two warring factions of the labour movement are a contributory cause of the economic difficulties with which the United States is faced. Nevertheless, and in spite of official efforts of the Administration to bring about peace in the labour movement, the prospects that this may be achieved in a not too distant future are still not great.

In October 1937 the C.I.O. offered to negotiate for peace. The main peace forces within the C.I.O. were Mr. David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman. Mr. Dubinsky is the president of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, one of the most powerful and best organised unions in the country. Mr. Sidney Hillman is the leader of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union and assists John L. Lewis in the leadership of the C.I.O., especially in dealing with the Administration and the different Government agencies. David Dubinsky is so to speak the most "European" of the American labour leaders; he not only knows Europe better than most of the rest, he also has deep understanding for world-wide labour interests. The unification of American labour is in his mind not only indispensable from an American point of view, but also as a contribution to the international cause of labour. In spite of the fact that he is the head of a suspended Union within the A.F. of L. his contacts with the International Federation of Trade Unions with which the A.F. of L. is affiliated are frequent and intimate.

Both Mr. Dubinsky's and Mr. Hillman's unions need the

co-operation of A.F. of L. organisations whenever they try to organise labour in outlying districts. Sidney Hillman, who is very much concerned about the political influence of labour, sees in a united trade-union movement the proper instrument for the political defence of labour interests and for effective backing of President Roosevelt. On the other hand, some of the biggest C.I.O. unions, such as the miners (Mr. John L. Lewis's own organisation), the steel and the automobile workers, were visibly much less in favour of the peace move. Within the A.F. of L. its Vice-President, Matthew Woll, the representative of the A.F. of L. in the International Federation of Trade Unions, was the leader in favour of peace negotiations. The Railway Clerks' Union, led by Mr. George Harrison, and some of the minor unions backed his move.

According to the peace proposals submitted by the representatives of the A.F. of L. the ten unions which had originally constituted the C.I.O. were to be readmitted to the A.F. of L. The other newly formed unions would have had to negotiate with the corresponding A.F. of L. unions about their merger. The C.I.O. delegates suggested that the C.I.O. as such should be admitted as an autonomous organisation. They rejected the terms offered by the A.F. of L. for various reasons, the main one being that the craft unions would have had, under these terms, a majority within the united organisation. As a matter of fact, the fusion of the C.I.O. unions with the corresponding craft organisations would have strengthened the A.F. of L. representation at a national convention; under the existing voting system the votes of C.I.O. minorities within the reunited craft unions would have added to their voting power. Furthermore, there exist in some of the A.F. of L. unions and in the central organisation of the A.F. of L. the so-called class B members, who while paying full dues have no share in the making of the decisions of the union. The C.I.O. delegates apparently had some reason to fear that a part of their members would become class B members in the A.F. of L. So the peace terms offered by the A.F. of L. were rejected, only Mr. Dubinsky being in favour of their acceptance. He argued that peace in the labour movement was worth almost any price and certainly the price of being a minority—for a while. For he assumed that in a fairly short time, two or three years at the most, the supporters of industrial unionism,

thanks to the irresistible trend of economic development, would win the majority within the unified movement.

However this may be, the clash between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. has visibly grown from a difference, on undoubtedly very important questions of organisation, into a conflict of personalities: John L. Lewis on one side, William Green on the other. And while reconciliation about the question which caused the split might be possible with some effort, it is hard to see how the leaders on both sides could again co-operate with each other. William Green was formerly a member of John L. Lewis's organisation, the United Mine Workers' Union. He represents the continuity of A.F. of L. traditions. He is a faithful pupil of Samuel Gompers, the founder of the A.F. of L. Cautious and conservative, he sticks to the principles of craft-unionism on which the A.F. of L. was built and grew—but which also explain its failure to cope with the problem of rapidly expanding mass industries and the large masses of unskilled workers they employ. Politically he supports the thesis which a spokesman of the A.F. of L., Adolph Strasser, defined fifty years ago: "We have no ultimate aims. We are going on from day to day. We are fighting for immediate objects, objects that can be realised in a few years." It would be wrong, on the other hand, to assume that William Green is blind to the hard facts of industrial evolution which make craft-unions a less and less useful instrument for the organisation of the working class. During the war William Green himself had said quite openly that industrial unions bring about "a more perfect organisation, closer co-operation and tend to develop the highest form of organisation." But as President of the A.F. of L. he felt bound to conform to the decisions of its conventions which, while accepting in principle industrial organisation, maintained the jurisdiction of the craft-unions over the skilled workers in the mass-production industries such as the automobile industry and looked askance at the efforts to organise non-skilled workers.

John L. Lewis, once himself an ardent believer in craft-unionism, has been converted to more modern forms of trade unionism by the great depression. Until 1932 he had ruled over his own union, the United Mine Workers, in a semi-dictatorial fashion. He had expelled from it Mr. John Brophy—to-day Director of the C.I.O.—and Powers Hapgood

—now one of the most active leaders of the C.I.O.—both because of their radical ideas. He is far from being a Socialist or a Communist. Hostile propaganda describes him as a tool of all sorts of “Reds.” As a matter of fact, Communists of all denominations and Socialists played some rôle in the building of the C.I.O. But even John L. Lewis’s worst enemies do not dare to accuse him of being himself a “red.” More than most of the A.F. of L. leaders he is aware of the rôle the Labour movement has to play in the defence and development of democracy, but his “Labour’s Non-Partisan League” is not a political party, apart from the American Labour Party, its branch in the state of New York. His day of awakening came during the first years of the New Deal when the A.F. of L. failed conspicuously to avail itself of the new opportunities which the N.R.A. offered to Labour. The failure of organised Labour to back the N.R.A. codes by organising the workers in the mass industries made them ineffective while John L. Lewis’s union, built on the principle of industrial organisation, tripled its membership in a few months. When his efforts to induce the A.F. of L. to take the lead in the organisation of the mass-production industries remained unsuccessful he resolutely burned his ships behind him and set out to create the C.I.O.

The split might easily have been a temporary one but for the growing bitterness between the leaders on both sides. John L. Lewis is a powerful man. He is the undisputed master of the United Mine Workers which formerly was the biggest organisation within the A.F. of L. He had been responsible for William Green’s election as president of the A.F. of L. after Samuel Gompers’ death. He is body and soul of the C.I.O. It is not easy to imagine that he would allow his organisation to be absorbed by another one in which he would be the second in command and this under William Green. On the other hand, the A.F. of L. and William Green are so full of resentment against John L. Lewis that even to co-operate with him would be considered a tremendous sacrifice by them. The C.I.O. made most of its amazingly successful career during the brief but strong period of economic expansion in 1936 and the beginning of 1937. Many observers expected it to break down or at least to be dangerously weakened during the following recession. Most of the newspapers and the A.F. of L. leaders announced its impending death. The more so as there

were serious signs of an internal crisis in the C.I.O., especially within the Automobile Workers' Union, while Dubinsky's union drifted slowly away from the main body of the C.I.O.

The Automobile Workers' Union is, together with the Steel and the Rubber workers' unions, the most outstanding success of the movement for industrial organisation. The union exists since 1933. It left the A.F. of L. in April 1936, counting at this time about 40,000 members. It joined the C.I.O. which led it into the great strike movement at the General Motors, etc. Fifteen months later the membership had grown to about 400,000. There followed a period of stagnation. The union had been unable to assimilate fully the whole of its new membership, the greater part of which had never before been in contact with organised labour. Factional strife broke out. Homer Martin, the President of the Union, accused his opponents who were led by Vice-President Richard Frankenstein, of being communists, while they in turn pointed to his frequent contacts with Mr. Lovestone, formerly one of the leaders of the Communist Party and now of one of the communist opposition groups. The conflict between the so-called "Progressives" under Homer Martin and the "Unity Group" led by Frankenstein and Wyndham Mortimer, while the group of the Socialist Walter Reuther tried to keep the balance between the two, endangered the very life of the union. Homer Martin expelled four members of the Executive of his union and suspended another one in his functions.

John L. Lewis, who had kept out of this conflict for a long while, came finally forward with a peace offer which was immediately rejected by Homer Martin as an unwarranted intervention into the internal affairs of an autonomous organisation. Some of the biggest local organisations decided to cease paying their dues to the C.I.O. Homer Martin seemed ready to leave the C.I.O. altogether. In this critical situation Mr. Philip Murray, Vice-President of the C.I.O. who had taken a leading part in the campaign for the organisation of the steel workers, and Mr. Sidney Hillman offered themselves as arbitrators. This offer was accepted by both sides and Mr. Martin and Mr. Frankenstein pledged themselves in advance to accept the verdict of the arbitrators. Wisely enough the arbitrators refused to make any comment on the respective responsibilities for the conflict, but limited themselves to recommending the reinstatement of the four ousted officers—

which was identical with John L. Lewis's original proposal. Homer Martin submitted to this verdict and on October 4th the reinstated officers took their seats in the executive board of the union. The crisis in the Automobile Workers' Union was over, at least for the moment.

Dramatic as this conflict was, the much more diplomatic question of the relations between Mr. Dubinsky's union and the C.I.O. may well be of greater importance for the future of the C.I.O. It concerns the whole outlook of the movement for industrial organisation. The International Ladies Garment Workers' Union was one of the backbones of the C.I.O., right at its beginnings. The two needle-workers' unions, Mr. Dubinsky's and Mr. Sidney Hillman's, did much to make the C.I.O. drives in the automobile, steel and rubber industries financially possible. But at the same time Mr. Dubinsky avoided carefully any steps which might have separated him definitely from the A.F. of L. His union is only suspended, not expelled from the A.F. of L., and therefore still virtually a member of the A.F. of L. It constitutes in a way a link between the two trade union centres. Mr. Dubinsky is anxious to use this unique position in order to further the peace movement. He was the only leader of the C.I.O. who voted in favour of acceptance of the peace terms offered by the A.F. of L. While belonging to the C.I.O. he is trying to maintain a certain aloofness from it. He has, therefore, resisted the efforts to develop the C.I.O. into a permanent dual organisation which might make the split permanent. His union, which is especially strong in the New York area, refused to take part in the New York State Convention of the C.I.O., which set up a permanent State organisation duplicating the A.F. of L. State federation.

The Executive meeting of the union decided in May to stay with the C.I.O. "at least for the time being" because this may serve the movement for peace within the ranks of labour. At the same time, it appointed a committee of five members which was instructed to "use every opportunity" to achieve reopening of the conferences between the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. As was disclosed a short time ago, this committee saw the President and may have been instrumental in bringing about his intervention in the conflict.

As was to be expected, the A.F. of L. made all possible efforts in order to take advantage of the crisis in the C.I.O.

Mr. Dubinsky's attitude does not leave much room for doubt whom he considers mainly responsible for the breakdown of the peace move. The struggle within the automobile workers offered another opportunity for attacks on the C.I.O. The main line followed by the A.F. of L. in this was to point out the unique position of John L. Lewis within the C.I.O. "Further peace meetings between the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. are useless," said one of the A.F. of L. leaders in September, "because the C.I.O. is a one-man owned and operated organisation. Only the elimination of John L. Lewis would seem to lend any real hope." In October, the A.F. of L. convention in Houston (Texas) confirmed this stand, singling out John L. Lewis as the scapegoat for all the trouble in the labour movement. John L. Lewis replied by offering his resignation, provided William Green would resign at the same time as President of the A.F. of L. Neither of these resignations did, of course, materialise. William Green mockingly pointed out that John L. Lewis avoided carefully to commit himself to resign as President of the United Mine Workers; this is the union which is practically running the C.I.O. and paying John L. Lewis's salary, while William Green has no job besides the one as President of the A.F. of L. Already during the summer the A.F. of L. had announced that it was willing to allow C.I.O. unions to return into the older trade union centre. It guaranteed them full autonomy in the conduct of union affairs and freedom from political assessments. Furthermore, the A.F. of L. began to charter new unions to compete with C.I.O. organisations and organised a "war chest" for the fight against the rival trade unions by imposing a special tax of one cent a month on each member of affiliated unions. The conflict is not only endangering industrial peace in the United States, it tends to develop into a menace for the newly erected structure of social legislation in this country. It is now being extended even beyond the frontiers of the United States.

Since the failure of the N.R.A., the legal basis for the workers' right to organise and conclude collective agreements is the "National Labour Relations Act." Under this act the National Labour Relations Board is given discretionary powers to determine the bargaining unit, i.e. the union best fitted to enter collective bargaining. This tends first of all to exclude the so-called "company unions," unions led or financed by the management. But the Board has also fairly

often had to choose between rival A.F. of L. and C.I.O. unions and the A.F. of L. complains that its decisions have been one-sided in favour of the C.I.O. It is extremely difficult to form an independent judgment about this complaint. It must, however, be stated that so far the Supreme Court has always decided in favour of the Board whenever its decisions came up for revision. The A.F. of L. started a campaign against the Board. So one of the most important pieces of social legislation in this country is in danger of being a victim of the internecine strife of the labour movement. At the same time, the A.F. of L. is carrying its fight into the field of general politics. Congressmen who are accused of having too intimate relations with the C.I.O. see their re-election opposed by the A.F. of L. Maury Maverick, Congressman for Texas, the leading spokesman of the progressive forces, failed to win his primary election and the A.F. of L. attributed his defeat to its refusal to endorse him because of his alleged preference for the C.I.O. The seat will be held by a reactionary.

The so-called international unions in the United States derive their name from the fact that they have affiliated locals in Canada. The Canadian Trades and Labour Congress refuse so far to expel from its ranks these locals which now belong to C.I.O. unions. Now the A.F. of L. is trying to force the Canadian unions to declare war on the C.I.O. Every Canadian union will in future have to hold a charter from the A.F. of L. in addition to the charters of the Canadian trade union centre. The A.F. of L. may at any time suspend or revoke charters issued by the Canadian congress. In a similar way the war is being extended to Latin America. John L. Lewis has established intimate contacts with the newly created Latin-American Federation of Labour which is being led by the Mexican Federation of Labour (C.T.M.) under Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The A.F. of L. is trying to revive the old Pan-American Federation of Labour with which the Mexican "C.R.O.M." is affiliated. In view of the growing dangers the conflict is bringing about for American economic prosperity President Roosevelt himself made an effort for conciliation in a letter addressed to the A.F. of L. convention. It is even hinted that he may be willing personally to act as mediator. So far, the response from the A.F. of L. was not encouraging, in spite of the fact that the powerful teamsters' union under Mr. Daniel Tobin came out in favour of a new

peace move. The A.F. of L. wants Lewis's head. The C.I.O. does not seem to be willing to sacrifice its leader.

Since this article was written, peace negotiations have actually started between the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O., according to the President's wishes. Under the pressure of several unions, such as the powerful teamsters' union, the A.F. of L. negotiators showed a high degree of willingness to compromise and declared that the A.F. of L. was willing to accept the main former A.F. of L. unions which had joined the C.I.O., in their present state, including their new membership as increased since the split. In many cases C.I.O. unions have organised workers who would belong to A.F. of L. unions under the traditional craft rules of the American labour movement. John L. Lewis, on the other hand, came out with the surprising statement that he did not believe that this concession was really made in good faith. In addition he directed bitter personal attacks upon the A.F. of L. negotiators, particularly Mr. Matthew Woll, Vice-President of the A.F. of L. and its representative in the International Federation of Trade Unions with which the British trade unions are affiliated. The C.I.O. leader accused these men of being reactionaries and charged them with being financially dependent upon sources outside and antagonistic to the labour movement.

For the time being this statement ended the negotiations. However, the painful impression remained that Mr. John L. Lewis had accepted the negotiations in the hope only that the A.F. of L. would operate so clumsily that the burden of the failure could be placed upon its shoulders. Whatever one may think about the merits of the accusations levelled against the A.F. of L. leaders, John L. Lewis knew these men long before he entered the peace parley. It would appear that certain C.I.O. successes during the last months encouraged its leader in the hope for a complete victory over the A.F. of L. However this may be, as the situation now stands, John L. Lewis appears to many as the man who prevented the union of the organised labour movement.

ADOLF STURMTHAL.

*Lecturer on International Relations.*

American University, Washington.

## AN ESSAY IN SLAVONIC FOLKLORE.

IT would be difficult to find a neater definition of the traditional attitude of the rustic Slavs towards the idea of the Devil than the much-quoted Czech proverb : "The devil is not so black as they paint him." In their mythology the ancient Slavs never formed a conception of evil pure and uncompromising. They preferred a Devil in whom, as in man, good and evil are grotesquely mingled and with whom relations were never strained. Thus when he emerged from anonymous elementary existence and became a paintable personality, the Slavs decided that an all-black portrait was not the right style to adopt where one is concerned with an old friend for whom much might be said.

In the current superstitions, proverbs and folk tales of the Slavs, several distinct stages of demonology are discernible. Dating back to different periods they now live on in a curious mixture of ideology which has been, and still is, always ready to absorb more than it discards.

### I. *The "Churt" of the Animistic Stage.*

The original name for the Devil was *čert* (pronounced churt) in Czech, *čort* in Russian, *czort* in Polish, *črt* in Lusatian, or *škrt*, *škart*. The root of these words is seen in the modern verbs *črtati*, to sketch, and *škrtati*, to strike a surface with a match or pencil, to strike out. It is an onomatopœia intimating that the first churts were conceived of as small nimble creatures springing out of or from behind objects, and disappearing again at once, almost too quickly for a human eye to see them.

The churts began their careers as a legion. They lived first in caves and hollow trees. There is a current expression in Russian : "to fall in love with somebody like the Devil with a dry willow tree." When people started to build houses the churts fell in with the idea, choosing lofts, dark corners and the floor as their own. They lurked in shadows, short of stature, hirsute, with a tail but no horns. Mustard seed seems to have been their favourite food, for we are told that one can still see them if one stands near a bowl full of mustard seed on a midsummer night. They were freakish little creatures, neutral in disposition but very easily offended. Any omission of an established custom, such as performing a job at a wrong time or in a wrong way, made them cross. So even now it is

believed to be unlucky to sweep the floor "against" the window or carry out the sweepings after dusk. In a Polish tale a churt appears in butter churned on Friday night (cp. May-butter, made in Germany on Walpurgis night). A Russian housewife finds a churt in the bread which she kneaded in a dirty trough. A churt can also "unwind himself" out of the yarn spun on Thursday.

The chief activity of the churts has always been to tease and corrupt people's good temper. They can make a thing disappear by sitting on it or covering it by their tail or claw. The other day a learned professor was advised by his landlady, in good earnest, to say, "Churt, please, let your claw go," whenever spectacles or notes for a lecture proved missing. If a visitor arrives in the middle of spring-cleaning or an income-tax reminder flutters down the letter-box just when one's salary has been cut, people would say, "It must have happened just to-day as of course the churt *would* have it."

The churts are very vigilant. They "never sleep" and would watch with a malicious pleasure any person lacking in concentration or prone to forgo their promises. They venture into church and hunt underneath the pews for prayers dropped by fidgety worshippers. To quote John Huss, they are "ever ready to collect the 'munched' lines of the psalms recited with unseemly haste."

## 2. *The Devil of the Converts to Christianity.*

(a) *In the West.* The struggle between the heathen religion of the Slavs and the Christian Faith has left behind a line of demarcation dividing the Western Slavs, converted mostly under Teutonic pressure, and the South-Eastern Slavs taught by the apostles from Greece. Demonology is one of the many instances where the division, though not sharp or consistent, can be traced quite clearly. Perun, Triglav, Veles and other West Slavonic deities shared the fate of their Nordic, Celtic and Teutonic rivals—they were deemed Powers of Evil. They could not go to exile like the Baltic "*ludci*," because the neighbouring countries were hostile, nor could they have been sent into an underworld like Loki, because the placid lowlands by Elbe, Vistula and Danube did not provide the local religions with any clear conception of hell. They retreated simply into the background (cp. *Götterdämmerung*) and in the process of several centuries fused with the Devil of the Christian creed

making him far less black than the apostles believed he must be. A new word was adopted for this kind of devil, *dábel* (Czech), *diabol* (Russian), *djavo* (Serbian), *djabel* (Polish). The old word *churt*, however, remained in use and was probably applied to him at home, or retained for the smaller goblins. But in the long run the two words became almost equivalent and only a phrase reminds us of the original difference of the terms, viz. "*Cert jako dábel*," that is "Like the Churt like the Devil." The phrase is now used much as the English "between the devil and the deep sea."

The new Devil lived at first in remote valleys or hid in rocks, an open worship of the old deities being discouraged. He hated the sound of bells and was afraid of the sign of the cross, but trusted people whom he met alone or in a small company. The hope that he might return and come again into his own was abandoned, but the shock of seeing the ancient idols hewn to pieces by the missionaries lived in the subliminal memory of the converts.

Another argument for the Devil's career in the pre-Christian ages is the idea that "The Devil is old." (Cp. Goethe "To understand the Devil one must be old.") The more naïvely people think of him, the older he appears. A high-spirited lady, a late belle of the drawing-rooms of the 'eighties, used to reassert herself against her not-so-respectful nieces by saying, "Old? I? Certainly not. I am not the Devil." The Devil was much taller than the churt. In addition to his stature he had now horns, like Perun and other thunder gods. He also took over Thursday for his own and insisted on it being a holiday. No spinning or washing was to be done, and beans, the traditional food of the demons, were cooked for dinner. In Austria-Hungary Thursday was a holiday in provincial schools right up to the twentieth century.

(b) *In the East and South.* Under the influence of the Apocrypha and the patristic writings the eschatology of the Slavs belonging to the Orthodox Church is more dualistic from the beginning. The Devil appears on the stage as soon as the days of the creation of the world. A *Simia Dei*, he tries to make a world, too, but fails. All things unpleasant and barren are attributed to him.

The Slavs, devoted to agriculture and always continental in their tastes, attributed to the Devil islands, sea coasts, marshes, bogs, rocks and all unproductive land. The Devil

made the plants which can live on poor soil, like thistle, or on swamps, like *parnasia pallustris*. *Scabiosa pratensis* is called in Bohemia *čertkus*, i.e. Devil's bite, for the Devil, who found it on his boggy meadow without having planted it there, bit its root off in a fit of temper. He also bit out the first and third quarter of the full moon and he tries every now and then to steal the moon altogether (eclipse). It is still customary in the Balkans to cover the wells during an eclipse of the sun lest the water should become poisonous. Envious of God's success in creating the sun, the Devil often hides in black clouds and is then chased and shot at by St. Ilia, the patron of good weather, who owes his reputation to his identification sometimes with Helios, sometimes with the prophet Elijah.

The Devil attempted further to make man, but the result was a monkey. His other creatures are the magpie among the birds and the silurus among the fish. God, in pity for his disappointments, gave him the dog who in those days had no hair. The devil gave the dog his fur and reared it to be a wolf. Of a later origin is the mouse. When Noah was making preparations for the Flood the Devil in his envy wished to wreck the plans for man's preservation and made mice and rats. But God saw him at it and said, "Let there be cats," and so cats were made to catch the mice.

Failing to be God's rival the Devil turned into Satan, the accuser, the adversary, the seducer of man. The word Satan is not used by the Slavs except in connection with the scripture or catechism. Instead he is often called the murderer of the soul, *vorog* (Russian), *vrág* (Polish), *vrag* (Serbian). As such he has grown wings, a feature hitherto unknown in the Western tradition. He still wears no clothes at this stage. Under this Greek and Persian influence the Slavonic Devil begins the long and losing combat with man whose soul he wants to destroy. Out of sixty legends on the theme there is only one in which victory is his, and that is to be found in Tolstoy's writings. How far Tolstoy altered its original version is difficult to tell, but the moral is obviously his own.

The Devil had been trying for eighty years to seduce a pious *moujik* to sin, all in vain. At last he said to the man, "Ivan, there are three sins from which you may choose, but sin you must before you die. So make up your mind which you would rather do : to blaspheme, to commit a murder, or to get thoroughly drunk." Ivan was getting very tired of the

Devil's frequent visits, so he thought the matter well over. Murder was out of the question of course, and blasphemy—oh, no, that did not bear thinking of, but what about getting drunk? Lots of people get drunk every Saturday and the earth does not swallow them up; why should not he do it just once and rid himself of the tormentor? So Ivan betook himself to the tavern and the sin was accomplished. The Evil one was satisfied and never came again. But Ivan, passing the tavern next time, remembered the taste of vodka and went in, and soon was gloriously drunk once more. And he started drinking daily, and quarrelling with his wife, and cheating the *barin*. Once when he was about to go to the tavern, his favourite grand-daughter tried to stop him. Ivan was seized with fury, lifted his stick and struck the child so that she fell dead. Seeing what he had done he ran out, and, shaking his fists against the sky, cursed Heaven in a terrible blasphemy.

But this fable is a great exception. Almost invariably the Devil is not clever enough to outwit man, though he invents games and sports to divert man's mind from God. At a later date he taught man playing cards and still later smoking. Therefore cards are called Devil's psalter and tobacco his seasoning. His chances were specially low when he attempted to win the soul of a holy bishop or an anchorite. Among many instances of how those energetic ascetics sublimated their temptations and made Satan serve them, the case of St. Procopius is one of the most graphic. Using holy water and a thorny rod, he taught the Devil to plough. Another victorious example is St. Nicolas, who seems to have taken the Devil almost for his pet and is still seen to walk with him and the angel, a harmonious and happy triad. Frequently the Devil himself is called Nick, and dogs and wolves have in St. Nicolas their patron saint. On his feastday they must not be beaten or hunted and they would not bite.

Coerced and domesticated by the saints, the Devil entered upon innumerable bargains with the peasants, sometimes still hoping to destroy a soul, but more often simply to earn his bread and cheese. Here is a story from Russia. The Devil offered his services to a cottager on the condition of going halves for the harvest. "Will you have the half above or under the ground?" asked the cottager. "Above," said the Devil quickly. The cottager planted beet, had the

roots and gave the Devil the shrivelled leaves. "This year it is my turn to have the underground half," said the Devil next spring. The cottager agreed and sowed wheat. So the story goes on, and the Devil is outwitted always, whether the choice is between the outer or inner part of the fruit, or the first or the last sheaf.

### 3. *The Post-Medieval Devil.*

The further progress of the Slav Devil is limited to the West. In the east and south of Europe it was checked early, together with many other features of civilisation, by invasions of various Mongol peoples. So while the Western Devil benefited by the Crusades and minstrelsy, by Scholasticism and the New Learning, the South-Eastern species remained, from the days of Khubla Khan to the days of Gogol and Saltykov-Scedrin, the same simple-minded, shaggy, nature god. Even in the West his evolution was retarded by the German wars and religious unrest. The thread of poetical imagination is picked up again in the sixteenth century, and the fairy tales and legends from that period onwards bear distinct marks of the days of chivalry and neoclassicism. The collections of the first Slavonic folklorists offer abundant material for study, in which the ideologies of sundry periods are embedded in the same clear and fascinating way as geological strata.

The New Devil's pedigree goes back to the discovery of the Arabian Nights by the Crusaders. From the djinns he learned an amazing number of tricks—how to handle magic carpets which make wings superfluous, how to dazzle man with table-cloths which at his bidding cover themselves with unheard-of delicacies, or sticks which beat one's enemy all by themselves, how to hide or conjure up castles-in-an-apple, and so forth. He is now on visiting terms with man and has a fixed abode in hell under the ground. The Slavonic hell, though borrowed from the classics, is not a gloomy place like Hades or one without comfort and hope like Dante's Inferno. It is well arranged, with Lucifer for a king, a very hot place, very rich and somehow homely, like a brewery in a well-to-do borough. If a meadow of asphodels belongs to it it is used by a couple of devils for a combat, almost a match, we might say; if, on rare occasions, we hear of the black waters of the sunset seas, the Devil Ferryman manages to get his time off duty somehow.

It goes without saying that now the Devil wears clothes.

The cloven foot is hidden in smart boots, his horns under a feathered beret. Only a goat-beard remains to remind us of his forefathers, but a pointed beard is quite the fashion. Besides the traditional black he favours red, the colour of fire. But, unlike Italy, he never wears yellow, the colour of infamy. Why should he? He has become very clever indeed. Gone is the time when he was only as wise as the snake: he has had now the academic schooling worthy of any lawyer or divine. He has learnt all there is about alchemy and science. He is fit to be the jester of kings or their moneylender. Now and then he is a perfect Mephistopheles, but such instances are rare.

A new, and highly commendable, virtue of his is a marked sense for dependability, so much so that many a rogue has out-devilled him. When at last he has realised how cunning man can be, he covers himself by a contract, preferably signed in blood. Even then he always loses, e.g. in the *Fisherman's Son*, or in *Záboř's Bed*. In both stories a motive of bargaining with a babe's soul is used. Still he remains honest and pays his debts scrupulously. There is a proverb, "Do good to the Devil and he will repay you with Hell," and a phrase, used when a mishap occurs, "The Devil owed me this." Having now—that is to say in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—so much to do with witchcraft, he develops a partiality for cats. There are still many housewives among the Slavs who would not have a black cat. The superstition of the lucky black cat first thing in the morning is unknown. In Russian the phrase, "A black cat ran between them" signifies that friends have become estranged.

Another new feature of his is a marked courtesy to women. He is, or in any case is taken for, a bachelor. He visits balls, fairs and country gatherings such as spinning or feather-stripping parties. In many a story he appears in response to a secret sigh of a wallflower. As a lover he is generous and shows a great knowledge of feminine temperament. Alas for him, he lives to regret his adventures.

A truly medieval characteristic is the Devil's fear of three objects, the cross, the aspergillum and the cock. The current phrases to be afraid of some person or situation "like the Devil of the cross," or "all of a sudden there goes the aspergill, my churt," speak for themselves. The idea of the cock as a safeguard against evil spirits is of course well known to all Indo-European races. In a Polish

variant of the theme the Devil has succeeded in winning the soul of a baron. On the night when the soul was due to him he walks bravely into the village where the manor stands, for he has been careful to have all cocks there stolen by a vagrant Jew. Yet when midnight strikes and the Devil's arm stretches to seize the prey, a tiny voice crows under the window. It is a newly hatched chicken, only half out of the shell, but its voice is enough to chase the Devil away and save the baron.

#### 4. *The Protector of the Serfs.*

The eighteenth century was a terrible time for the Slav peasantry. The double burden of serfdom and long compulsory military service proved often beyond the strength of the subjects of the Enlightened Despots. He who deserted or refused to comply with his landlord's inhuman regulations, had to choose between suicide and hiding in forests till he was hunted down like a wolf. Now and then a band of outlaws managed to gather round a leader and form a *kamaradstvo* of highwaymen. The gentry and rich townspeople were afraid, but the serfs looked up to the robbers as heroes and avengers of their wrongs. Stories of the highwaymen's ingenuity in avoiding their persecutors, of their power and their kindness to the oppressed, soon grew into tales of fabulous dimensions. The robbers became endowed with fairy gifts and magical faculties; they were invulnerable, invisible at will and able to turn into giants or animals. No wonder the idea of Devil became mixed up with the romance of the robbers. Tales of how he appeared in a green hat to meet the despair of the objects of tyranny are countless. He became in fact an angel of vengeance on the inexorable landlords and officers, a dream-fulfilment of the serf's craving for social justice and redress of all his suffering.

A typical story of this period is that of the "Devil's brother-in-law" (Bohemia). Jirka succeeded in running away from the barracks where a callous sergeant made his life a misery. He could not go home for fear of the bailiff, a man equally evil-minded. He hid in a forest, met a Gentleman in Green there and entered his service. When his new master seized him and flew up in the air, Jirka realised that his new place would be in Hell, but made up his mind to hope for the best. It could not be worse than the barracks or the squire's

prison. His hope proved to be right. For seven years Jirka stayed in Hell, tending three large cauldrons over an ever-burning fire and feeling quite happy. When his time was up, he received generous wages and permission to peep into the cauldrons. In the first he found the sergeant, in the second the bailiff, in the third an aunt who had treated him badly in his boyhood. The story ends with a triple wedding. Jirka is married to the squire's youngest daughter, while her two sisters are taken to Hell to be married to devils as a punishment for their pride.

### 5. *The Devil's Yesterday.*

In the nineteenth century the Western Slavs began to revive from the stupor into which they had fallen under the Germanising efforts of the Habsburgs and the Prussian kings. Their cultural progress had been artificially retarded for over a hundred years, during which naïve superstitions flourished placidly in the mind of the middle classes. While the newly liberated farmer settled happily to work at his freehold, his creed summed up in the proverb "Fear God and don't annoy the Devil," the townsman was not averse to imitating any freak of occultism discarded by the fashionable drawing-rooms. We may quote the *séances* in the so-called Faust's House in Prague as an example. The nineteenth-century novels of the Slavs are full of tame hints at the thrill of contemplating, but never actually putting into practice, an approach to the Evil One.

The national revival of the Czechs and Poles from about 1790 onward was accompanied by much success in the field of music. It is interesting to note how almost every composer of this period has made use of the devil motive in his works, and built upon the vernacular tradition that the Devil is fond of music and partial to musicians whom he rewards with gold. Besides innumerable songs we may mention Smetana's opera *The Churt's Cliff*, Dvořák's *The Churt and Cathleen*, Weinberger's *Švanda the Piper*. So what with the survivals of the earlier times and the neoromantic music the Devil was not so badly off even in modern days—that is to say, up to the fateful hour when he met the Realist.

The Realist put his foot down and decided that the Devil, *alias* Churt, does not exist, and therefore must go to hell. Like the Devil himself the iconoclast might not be so black as

they paint him, but one virtue he has always lacked which the Devil possesses—the sense of proportion. So the Devil was turned out, first from the school and nursery, then from the shanty booth at fairs, from literature and science, and finally from most sermon books. He has become a laughing-stock of the provincial butcher's boy and a joke for any simpleton.

Yet every year a red-letter day comes for the old chap, a day when he is once again a demigod and very nearly the centre of the picture. This is St. Nicolas Eve, December 5th. Snows fall thickly, sledges run over the fields and in the town the tram conductors wear high fur hats and top boots. There is a smile on everybody's face as they see the tinsel-trimmed shops and stalls at street markets. The Devil's image, together with his beloved patron saint's, is seen everywhere. Picture postcards and china statuettes shine with gorgeous red. Countless replicas were baked overnight of dough, gingerbread, pumpernickel, sweetmeat or chocolate. Would not his eyes, made of raisins, twinkle and rove towards the stalls with birches, neatly bound and some of them gilded? Most of the birches will no doubt go, like Valentines, to the grown-ups for a joke, but there will be a good few bought to fulfil the traditional duty of the birch. These will be thrust behind the corner of a picture or a mirror and referred to, even by the realistically minded parents, when the new generation shows undue independence.

The short day wears off. It is night. St. Nicolas's night! Out springs the Devil! hurrah! He bounds and fawns at the holy Bishop's feet, he frightens the gentle Angel so that he nearly drops his load of apples, nuts and candies. The rascal has to be put on a chain. There, he has smudged the Bishop's alb, and though contrite under the rebuke one moment, the next he is already putting his tongue out at the passers-by. What a night the three spirits have together! How the children scream and the old folk smile at their entry—how the Devil almost breaks the chain when a pretty maiden turns up her pretty nose at his jokes, how he roars and thumps at the doors which would not open to the Angel's knock! Midnight strikes before the Three have finished their round. The Angel's robe is become almost as black as the Devil's face, the Saint is yawning behind his cotton glove. The Devil is crunching a *lovely* bar of chocolate.

W. J. BROWNEY.

## A VISIT TO AUSTRALIA.

I DID not wish to visit Australia. I saw her as a new country lacking in the interest and charm of an older civilisation, and visualised her as scrubby, raw, and sun-scorched. I sat in the woods near my home one February morning and wrote in my diary, "If someone said to me, 'You need not go to Australia,' I would rejoice."

Little did I imagine that I was going to a land that offered intense beauty and interest ; to a land so ancient that beside it, geologically, our continent is but a youngster. For the colonising of Australia by the British is only an icing on the rich cake of prehistoric interest that is found there. This colonisation and all that has been achieved within one hundred and fifty years thrills one by its romance. Every sheep, cow and horse was taken by the colonists in sailing ships ; and wheat and other grain was introduced to a land that produced practically nothing but grass, edible roots, and edible grubs. After a while I found that, when living in Australia, I had my interest continually directed towards the past, to the cult of the Aborigines, and their prehistoric land, whilst equally my interest was directed forward to the development of a new and splendid nation. In this way life in Australia is never dull.

My visit to Australia included Fremantle and Perth, then some months in Adelaide, a stay of two months in Alice Springs in Central Australia, two or three visits to Melbourne, a few days at Canberra, then Sydney, and so home.

The back door of Australia is certainly Fremantle ; the front door is Sydney Harbour. I hope Fremantle will forgive me, but I was frankly disappointed with the first sight of this port when we landed that March day. We had called at ports that suggested the Arabian Nights, only to arrive at the other end of the world to find something resembling English suburbs. Tin roofs, with faded paint, some even rusty ; bungalows with variegated ironwork on the balconies, and over all a white fierce light. Such were my first impressions of Australia. Here and there a festoon of purple bougainvillea falling over a fence, or a hedge of plumbago cheered us as we drove from Fremantle to Perth. Later, walking in the King's Gardens, surrounded by splendid sub-tropical trees, I looked down on to that vast lake, the Swan River, and to the hills beyond, a delicate turquoise shade, with filmy shadows

thrown across them, and the sight of this vast and beautiful panorama held the key to the beauty I was to find all over this ancient and strange continent, lying isolated in the southern seas. Now when I look back on the interest and beauty which Australia offers, I can hardly recapture the feeling of depression that her ports gave. Do not judge Australia by her doors to the sea.

In Perth, city of broad streets and clean buildings, the general interest of conversation was the recent rain. It is of national interest in Australia. Besides the healthy look of the people in the streets I remarked on the absence of elderly people. My assumption was that in a country where the temperature sometimes rises to 110 degrees in the shade, no one lived to old age. Otherwise, where were the old men and women, the feeble and the frail? The answer was given me later. These seeming middle-aged, robust-looking men and women were their aged; but in this land of sunshine and youthful spirit no one looked old. Here were men and women of over seventy, upright and gay, enjoying life. This, then, is the place to live. It is a fallacy to think it is always hot in Australia. In the modern houses central heating is installed, which is much needed during the winter and spring.

Adelaide is a little city of flowers and joyousness. To live on North Terrace, with its quaint Victorian houses (now, alas, having to give way to taller structures), always in sight of trees, lawns and flowers, to enjoy the cheerful atmosphere of easy, happy life beneath a clear sky and vivifying sunshine, this is life indeed. Australia lends itself to pageantry; and a levée at Government House, with the regimental band playing on the lawns; a procession to the University of the Vice-Chancellor and the Professors, the gay flower borders in North Terrace mingling with their scarlet and purple hoods, all enhanced by the gaiety of the sunshine, remains in one's mind a part of the happy scenes that modern Australian life is always offering.

Adelaide is more in touch with life in the country, or the bush, than any of the other capitals. It is, to begin with, nearer the hills and the orange groves, and the open rolling country. To it come those from the Northern Territory and the far Eastern plains. Australia is certainly a land of holidays; and every opportunity is taken to enjoy them. Behind all the social meetings of the day, starting at 11

o'clock, for tea, coffee and cakes, and behind all the Australian women's interest in dress (how well Australian women do dress) there is always the thought of the land and of primary productions. This interest in land, sheep, cattle, race-horses and racing, is one of the attractions of Australia. Too many flock to the towns, but I believe at heart all Australians have a sense of the country.

Life is more simple in Australia. It has not become the complicated intricate task of Western Europe. But Australia must have more people; and those who come armed with an urge to work and who have some private means are the most welcome. The new scheme of assisted migration through nomination gives great facilities. I soon realised that to accept a post in Australia is no sign of defeat, but a great opportunity. It means scope in a country of splendid national vigour.

Those that intend visiting or living in Australia may be sure of two blessings: kindness and sunshine. In Australia I found all the traits of the British race, but with that enemy, reserve, happily removed, that kill-joy of so much affection, the self-made prison bars of sensitive natures.

Australian cities are becoming quickly modernised. In the centre skyscrapers are rising, and streets of Victorian or even Georgian features are disappearing. They defend their tin roofs by saying that tin is more useful for collecting the rain when it falls. I began not only to become used to the ugly roofs, rusty and faded, crowning equally ugly bungalows, but even to grow fond of them, because they became associated with the happiness I found in this sunny land. They had no pretensions, there was no idea of making them Tudor by adding artificial beams and useless gables. They were just homes, built at a time when building material was scanty. Even D. H. Lawrence forgot that he had once grumbled at the bungalows, for Australia wove her magic around him too, and he is able to write in *Kangaroo*: "Tin roofs and scattered shanties will always remind me of Australia. They seem to me beautiful, though it's a fact they have nothing to do with beauty."

People in Australia do not have frayed nerves. I put their good temper down to the sunshine and to the amount of good food they eat. Their feeling of loyalty to the Mother Country is deep and touching. This is one of the many joys of living

in Australia. I found, too, little complaint and much optimism. Everyone is busy, or enjoying themselves; they do not know what self-pity is. Only when the north wind blows, bringing grey skies and dust storms, with intense heat, do people go about complaining. I came to the conclusion that Australians are spoilt in the way of weather, and that we, who have to be content with days of dullness, fog, biting winds and endless rain, accept gladly the days which they discard as bad.

The Australian youth is splendid. Beauty of face and limb, with charming deference for those older than themselves, they hold my admiration. The much-talked-of Cockney accent, noticeable in some, is completely lacking in others. The mystery is how did they first acquire the change of the "a" to "i"? Again, their "o" is more often than not pronounced "u"; thus school becomes schule; moon is muune. This has its attraction.

As they come from British stock, Australians have gardening in their bones. I have never seen a greater profusion of flowers than in Australia, for here again is the meeting-place of the English plants with the sub-tropical. Heliotrope and roses, lavender, oleanders and plumbago, grow beside the familiar annuals, and over all is the radiant light of Australia.

There are no primroses, no bluebells among the wild flowers, which all seem dry and twiggy compared to our luscious flowers. The purple bugloss or Salvation Jane, as it is commonly called there, is an exception. I have seen this plant growing in stretches up the side of Mount Lofty, a glorious carpet, chequered by sun and shade, here a pale mauve, there a deep purple. In South Australia one November day we found on either side of the road twenty varieties of wild flowers. There were three varieties of orchids, delicate, spidery things, various grevilleas, the crimson bottle-brush, the common heath, brown-berried baronia, and a delicate blue flower, commonly known as bluebell, but quite unlike our wild hyacinth. Most of the plants were drought resisting. As I roamed about the scrub, picking flowers here and here, I thought how horticulturists and botanists in England would delight to be in my place. There was not one flower in my bunch that I could have found growing wild in England.

Then there are the great primeval forests of Australia, called by the misleading name of the Bush. Here the tall

eucalyptus giants, like marble columns, rise 200 feet out of a dense growth of tree, fern and tangle, a growth that has never been touched until the white man came and cut a road through. These vast, silent forests hold one in their mystery and beauty.

To study the fauna of Australia, a sanctuary has been opened to the public in a corner of one of these virgin forests, at Healesville near Melbourne. In this Australian Whipsnade, the Koala bears, so much admired, so friendly, look at one with queer sleepy expression. They have an intelligence of the lowest order. Their fearlessness makes one realise how they would fall a prey to the more developed animals that never penetrated to this isolated continent. Indeed, the fearlessness of birds and beasts in Australia is most marked to a visitor. I have seen the Kukkaburra sitting motionless in the forest on a bough a few feet away, and quietly contemplating me.

At Healesville I saw the duck-billed platypus, playing in its pool with a mop with which its indefatigable guardian, Mr. Eadie, an official of the Sanctuary, tickled it, to show off its graces. This animal with close fur and a duck's bill, a mammal that lays eggs and lives in water or on land, can only be seen in Australia, and only Mr. Eadie has been able to keep one alive in captivity.

Not all visitors have penetrated into the heart of Australia. Some think it must be quite a feat to visit Alice Springs, the township in the Northern Territory, but since the Government has provided a good though halting train to take you from door to door (except for one change into the narrow gauge at Terowie) you need but book your ticket, and then be sure you arrive on the right Thursday at Adelaide station. If you miss the train you have to wait a fortnight. Lately I understand the train leaves every week. Once on board I do not think there is a more friendly or convivial journey in the world. It lasts three days and two nights, and the distance is 1,100 miles. The track runs due north from Adelaide and the terminus is in the very centre of Australia.

I left Adelaide for Alice Springs on a cold July morning. The Mount Lofty range was obscured in fog. Not until we had travelled for ten hours northwards did it become warmer. By that time we had left the cultivated country, with the broad, sweeping acres of brown and red ploughland, and here and

there a darker streak of green where the young corn was sprouting, and had reached a brown, dried-up country. Away in the distance rose a ridge of blue hills, with great clouds riding over them, bringing a promise of rain that never came. Everywhere the grazing country looked like brown ploughland, which as the sun went down became gilded in a golden lustre. It spoke of endless drought, and a fight for existence, yet these wide open spaces, where no grass grows, save after rain that comes seldom, have a beauty all their own.

Among the other occupants of the train were a party of gold prospectors and two young women nurses going as far as Oodnadatta to stay three years there nursing in the Inland Mission. It was a most sociable, cheery party, the meals on board were well cooked, and sleepers were provided. The train stopped every few hours, to pay the fettlers on the railway, and fill up their water-tanks, then passengers alighted and strolled about, and casually mounted the train as it moved off. Here I saw the scarlet flowers of the Sturt Pea, growing by one of the shacks on the side of the rail.

During the night we picked up the cricket news on the wireless, and were regaled with the latest score of the Test teams in England.

I awoke the second day to find greater aridness. We were surrounded by endless miles of cruel red baked earth, where only a few stunted and half-dead mulga trees struggled to live. The bleached bones of cattle by the wayside told of drought and tragedy. And then we came to the sand, and to the township of Maree, which is nothing but a few corrugated-iron huts, a small hotel and store, all unprotected from the pitiless sun. Here Afghans, tall and majestic, strolled about the station. These Afghans keep the camel teams, which still are used for transport, although motor lorries are replacing them.

We were travelling through a land where Time did not matter; there was just endless space, a hot burning sun, and on both sides mirage after mirage. Once some kangaroos bounded alongside the train, but otherwise there was no sign of life. Oodnadatta, which until recently was the rail terminus, is another isolated township. Here a few green pepper trees gave relief to the eye, and here too were more Afghans and their camels, waiting for loads. Then on again, through red sand, broken by the grey tufts of the salt bush and past the

dried-up salt lake, Lake Eyre. Is the whole interior of Australia drying up, I asked myself?

It was not until the middle of the night of the third day, owing to engine trouble, that we reached that oasis in the centre of Australia, the township of Alice Springs. Shall I ever forget the wonder of the starlit sky as I alighted? Anyone who has not seen the southern sky can picture these myriads of stars, beginning close down on the horizon and sweeping across the heavens with the "white star road" of the Milky Way spanning the dome.

In the morning I awoke to hear parrots screaming as they flew over the tin roof of my humble lodging. They were *golahs*, with their pink breasts showing. They flew in the direction of the steep, barren range of hills that guards the township from the south, hills which in the early morning light were flushed to a magical shade of coral pink. Then some Afghans chanted their morning prayer near by, in the clear, frosty air, for frosts are common here in the winter where the elevation is 2,000 feet. Whilst I lay in bed, in my airy room, with its rafters and tin roof, I watched some Aborigines pass down the sandy way beside my window, the women looked sordid in soiled skirts and faded jumpers, the men in old trousers and coats and felt hats. It was a disillusionment, and I soon found any romance that might cling to these people of the Stone Age period is destroyed here, where they are in contact with the white people. It was hard to realise that these untidy, half-civilised natives were some of the great hunting Arunta tribe. The Aborigines live in a desolate camp two miles from Alice Springs, and have rations given them once a week. Most of the young Aborigines work as gardeners, stockmen and Government wood-cutters to the white people; the *lubras*, the native women, help in the rough housework. But in spite of their ludicrous clothing, the fine poise and bearing of these natives was not altogether hidden. One has to go farther north-west and north-east to see them in their natural state, where anthropologists are studying the customs and complicated social code of this vanishing race, and awaking the Australian nation to the importance of preserving the remnant of these people, who, it is now surmised, have their origin far back in Asia, or along the Mediterranean.

If the surroundings of "The Alice" are barren and

forbidding, and all water has to be pumped up by means of windmills and electric pumps, I found a great fascination in this parched land, in the gum trees, which grow in the dried-up bed of the Todd river, a river that only flows once or twice a year. The bark of these gum trees is like white satin, and their foliage is grey-green. Here the green parrots and cockatoos gather, their plumage flickering among the branches.

My two months spent in central Australia brought me in touch with geologists, gold prospectors and miners, cattle-station owners, anthropologists, and, best of all, the bush people, those valiant men and women who are fighting drought, isolation and hardships with a splendid courage and spirit. If, in this survey of Australia, I have made the picture too radiant, perhaps it is owing to the radiancy of the light that bathes the whole country, and sheds a glamour over the people. Australia has magic. One feels it after a few months there. For just as one's eye becomes accustomed to the far-distant horizons, so one's mind gradually takes in the romance and the mystery of this ancient land that has been left alone so long, so long indeed that geologists say her best days are over and that she is drying up. May others like myself receive inspiration from this new-old world. But go to her with an open heart and an open mind.

THEODORA ROSCOE.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### FROM BERLIN TO MOSCOW.

SINCE the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed in Moscow on September 29th the general balance of forces in Europe has shifted with a speed and a consequence that no one could have foreseen. The plain story of what has so far happened in the diplomacy of this astonishing war seems to suggest that something still more incalculable lies ahead : and not far ahead.

The very dates are interesting. It was late on the night of August 21st that the announcement was issued in Berlin that Herr von Ribbentrop would fly to Moscow on the 23rd to sign a pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union. That flight to Moscow soon promised to become as historic a turning point in European history as Napoleon's famous thrust at Moscow a century and a quarter before. It was a pact of "non-aggression" that was signed at Moscow on August 24th. To read the text of that document only a few weeks later was to discover a bristling irony in almost every word of it. In Article I the two contracting Powers undertook "to refrain from any act of force, any aggressive act, and any attacks against each other or in conjunction with any other Powers." Article 5, a very parody of the Munich agreement less than a year old, prescribed that "in case differences or conflict should arise between the two contracting Powers or questions of any kind, the two partners will solve their disputes or conflicts exclusively by friendly exchange of views or if necessary by arbitration commissions." The only really interesting thing about those high-sounding moral protestations engaged in by the rival gangsters, each of whom knew that the other had no intention of honouring them (except in so far as it suited his nefarious purpose to honour them), was not whether, but how soon, they would be dishonoured. Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop, whose obvious only practical interest in the matter was that, according to their calculation, it would enable them to defy Britain and France and to proceed at once to the conquest of Poland, duly plunged across the Polish frontier one week later, namely on September 1st. Little more than a fortnight later, when the German forces by inhuman methods had broken Polish

resistance, the Russian army plunged into Poland (September 17th) from the other side, and proceeded to appropriate as much of the spoils (and it soon began to look like the lion's share) as they could capture.

What do gangsters do in such circumstances? Obviously, until they could abandon their mutual pretences, they must go still further in pretence. A treaty of non-aggression was thus diagnosed to be not enough. On September 29th Herr von Ribbentrop (again) signed with Molotov (again in Moscow) a "Treaty of Friendship." On the same day they signed another treaty (the need of treaties having rapidly become something like dope to a dope-fiend) "to establish peace and order in the territory of the disintegrated Polish State and to secure for the nationalities living there a peaceful existence on the basis of their national peculiarities." Other peculiarities were certainly present, even rampant, chief among them being the fevered talk about such things as "peace" and "order" on the part of two brigands whose only object was the very opposite. Next—and the interval this time was logically and realistically eliminated altogether—Russia plunged into her annexationist designs upon the Baltic States. It was on the very day, September 29th, of the Russo-German treaties which enshrined their "friendship" and which partitioned Poland that the Government of the U.S.S.R. signed with the Estonian Government a Pact of Mutual Assistance, which heralded the Russian plan for dominating the Baltic. The language of gangsters needs a Pickwickian elasticity of understanding. Herr Hitler, after one of his kills, is never tired of proclaiming that this is the end of his appetite. "Herr Sthalin" as Herr Hitler called him in a linguistically annexationist spirit in his speech to the Reichstag on October 6th, used such words as "friendship" and "neutrality" towards Germany and the rest of the world, when he did not mean what simple people mean by those words. When he proposed, for instance, to swallow small and helpless Estonia he called it an act of "mutual" assistance.

It would have been interesting to listen-in, if such a thing had been possible, to the mental reactions of Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop when they were presented with the spectacle of their Russian "friends" adopting all the devices made sacred by themselves. If imitation be the

sincerest form of flattery, Mr. Stalin certainly flattered Herr Hitler. The technique followed by the Moscow gang faithfully emulated the classic technique. As Herr Hitler, before "destroying" (one of his later words, equally misapplied) Czechoslovakia and Poland, had laid stress on Czechoslovak and Polish terrorism at the expense of innocent Germans, so Stalin, as the first step towards destroying eastern Poland, dwelt upon the terrorism that had been inflicted by the Poles upon innocent Russians. *Quem deus perdere vult, prius dementat*. Herr Hitler now found himself not only the enforced spectator of a rival gangster's employment of his own technique, but faced with the nemesis of realising that he himself had opened the gates to his rival. Perhaps too he had enough sensitiveness left in his warped nature to appreciate, albeit dimly, the impression that might be made upon intelligent Germans by the fact that the German Leader had himself exposed to the danger of bolshevisation the whole of Europe, including Germany.

The result was, five weeks after the beginning of the war—or after the declaration of war, which appeared not yet to be the same thing—the diplomatic spectators were wondering whether an army revolt or a communist revolt would first come to a head against a doomed Hitler.

### I. THE CONTRIBUTION OF RUSSIA.

Just as in the last week of August it was the news of the Russo-German pact of non-aggression that precipitated the state of formal war, so it was the subsequent activity of Russia that promised entirely to alter its character. Neither the one nor the other can be understood unless one remembers that the resignation of Mr. Litvinov on May 3rd last inaugurated a new policy which the Kremlin never attempted to disguise. When the British delegates went to Moscow last June in the misguided hope of mobilising Russia in a "peace front" against Germany, they were met virtually with this argument: "Your purpose is anti-German. We are willing to help you at a price. We are willing even to call ourselves partners in a combination to prevent German aggression (for the words do not much matter by contrast with the substance) if we can strike a bargain. Our own purpose is aggression. You may cloak it as you wish. Let us put it in

this way. Your object is to defend Poland against Germany. Neither you nor France can reach Poland. If there is to be any defence of Poland, only Russia can undertake it. Therefore we demand the right, if and when we diagnose the danger of a German aggression, direct or indirect, against Poland, to occupy Poland with our troops. For our part, that happens to be our particular object : to occupy Poland with our troops."

The negotiations failed, as they were bound to fail. It was politically impossible for Britain and France to combine a Russian alliance for the purpose of defending third parties against aggression with a tacit and compensating connivance at Russian aggression against those very third parties. When by contrast Herr von Ribbentrop went to Moscow on August 23rd, he talked what gangsters recognise as good sense. Germany wanted the diplomatic victory of swinging over Russia from the Allied to the German grouping. Russia wanted Poland, or half of it. The deal was made on the spot. Of course there were subsidiary effects. Russia had contrived to break the Anti-Komintern Pact. Even Herr Hitler, agile and skilful as he is in his mental gymnastics, could not combine at one and the same time an anti-Komintern with a pro-Komintern policy. Japan therefore had to accept the position that having been invited by Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to join an anti-Komintern pact, which she gladly undertook because it promised to provide her with allies against Russia, now found that she had been duped. Italy in her turn found not only that she had been jockeyed into an alliance with (instead of against) her traditional enemy, communism, but was also relegated to third place in the group.

Russia was now beating the other dictators at their own game. She had made Germany conquer Poland for her, and had broken her own encirclement by the anti-Komintern alliance. What then was to be her further object? There was never any mystery about it. She became devastatingly "neutral" towards what she gladly welcomed as the war in the west. She wanted Britain, France and Germany to fight to the last man and to the last bean, was willing impartially to supply both sides with anything they wanted, if they could pay for it, and of the two sides would rather Germany were exhausted first because Germany was the next on her list for communist revolution. The whole history

of Russia's relations with all parties was entirely consistent. Marshal Voroshilov in an interview with *Izvestia* three days after the signing of the Russo-German Pact of Non-Aggression declared openly that during the staff conversations with Britain and France the Soviet delegation had argued that to be able to give effective help to them the Soviet troops would have to enter Polish territory: a thesis rejected alike (and with good reason) both by the Anglo-French delegation and by Poland. Mr. Molotov, speaking in the Supreme Council of the Soviets on August 31st, also declared that the Anglo-French position was "shot through with contradictions." He explained that "the most fundamental of these was that they [France and Britain] feared aggression and sought a pact in order to strengthen themselves. But at the same time they feared to strengthen us, and this fear became the uppermost consideration. We signed a pact with Germany when it was evident that nothing would come of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations." On that day, introducing the new Conscription Bill, Marshal Voroshilov with the technique he had stolen from Herr Hitler declared that Russia was "surrounded by hostile capitalist States" and remarked ominously "Now that the entire world is preparing for war, we shall not be caught unawares."

The further clues to Russia's object now came almost daily. On September 15th, for example, *Pravda* argued that the country must be fully mobilised "because the capitalist world has been caught by the war fever." On the following day an armistice was concluded with Japan with the probable only object of stopping the fighting on the Mongolian frontier in order to free Russia's forces for the supreme opportunity in Europe. The Russian troops crossed the Polish frontier within twenty-four hours. As those troops were crossing the frontier Mr. Molotov broadcast an address to the Russian people in which he first made the routine argument that as Poland had "collapsed" the treaties with Poland were no longer valid, and which he ended in the style made familiar from Berlin, thus: "Peoples of the Soviet Union, the citizens of our country and the men of our Red Army and Navy are all united as never before round the Soviet Government, round our Bolshevik Party, and round their great Leader, our wise comrade Stalin, for the achievement of new and unparalleled successes in labour, in industry, and on the

collective farms, and of new and glorious victories of the army at the front." In less than a fortnight the Russian troops had occupied the greater half of Poland, in particular carrying out an operation apparently designed to "beat the Germans to it" for the Rumanian frontier. After a provisionally agreed line of demarcation nearer to the Vistula and the San, the definitive demarcation provided for in the partition treaty of September 29th followed roughly the "Curzon line" of 1919. That division gave to Germany the main riches of Poland (the minerals of Silesia, the textiles of Lodz, the various central industries round Warsaw, the wheat of Lublin and the timber of the Carpathians) but gave her also the maximum potential mischief in the form of the bulk of racial Poles; whereas Russia, by confining her claim to those forest and agricultural parts where the population was more akin to her own, made her immediate object of bolshevisation easier to achieve, and also she did retain the oilfields of Galicia.

The unanswered questions were whether Germany and Russia had reached a firm understanding for the division of the spoils in Eastern Europe; whether Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop really believed themselves strong enough (with their well-known contempt of Russia in the military sense) to give rope to Russia in the confidence that they could take it back whenever it might suit their purpose; or whether Russia had effectively stolen a march on Germany.

The answer to those questions obviously could not be given until the event decided: for there was no honour among the thieves, and the upshot of their "friendship" would in the end be decided by their rival military strength. But at the outset it could not be denied that Moscow had usurped the initiative hitherto exercised by Berlin. Herr Hitler did not summon Mr. Molotov to Berlin; he sent Herr von Ribbentrop to Moscow. In Moscow too there gathered the representatives of the Baltic States, summoned (again the German manner) to receive their sentences. Mr. Sarajoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, arrived in Moscow on September 23rd. It was soon made clear that, either with or without German connivance, Russia was determined to reconstitute her pre-war Courland, even though a form of sovereign independence was left to the Baltic States. The treaty of "mutual assistance" with Estonia was signed in

Moscow on September 29th, the very day of the partitioning of Poland and of the Russo-German treaty of "friendship." In turn Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were summoned to give facilities to Russia for naval bases on their coasts, and for air bases in their territory. On October 10th, a Finnish envoy too appeared in Moscow, but unlike the other three of the pre-war Russian Baltic States, Finland made military preparations for resistance. It was to be taken as a measure of Russia's strength and of the still unresolved doubt about Russo-German collusion that Finland did capitulate to the extent of sending an envoy to Moscow. The upshot in the case of Finland was not decided as these lines were written.

## 2. ITALIAN NEUTRALITY.

There is no riddle about Italy. Despite loss of face resulting from the Hitler *volte face* from an anti- to a pro-Komintern policy, Signor Mussolini remained the realistic watcher of events. When the war started, Italy remained neutral. But when, at the beginning of October, Count Ciano was summoned to Berlin, he dutifully obeyed the summons. Immediately after Germany began the invasion of Poland, Rome announced that she would "take no initiative in military operations." She did not declare her technical neutrality; but she certainly did not enter the war as an operative ally of Germany.

In the last few hours before war was declared, whether spontaneously or not, Italy made a last attempt to mediate. She proposed that the hostilities in Poland should cease and that an immediate conference be convened by the five interested parties: Britain, France, Germany, Poland and Italy (not Russia, be it noticed). Mr. Chamberlain's prompt answer (to the effect that no conference was possible while German armies were on Polish soil, but that if Germany withdrew, discussion could begin) was accompanied by a warm tribute to Signor Mussolini's peace efforts. When the short military campaign in Poland was followed by a general expectation of German peace proposals, the general speculation again centred on the possibility of Signor Mussolini's lending himself as mouthpiece. A man of intelligence as well as of realism, he knew that any such mediation now

would be hopeless. On September 23rd he addressed the Fascist leaders who had come from Bologna to Rome. On the one hand he talked of peace, from the old premise that the hope of reconstituting what he called "positions which history and the natural dynamism of the peoples have condemned" would be "a vain illusion." On the other hand he reaffirmed the policy, first announced on September 1st, whereby "Italy will not take any initiative in military operations." He still in short sat on the fence. His policy, as it was flippantly described, was neither offensive nor defensive, but on-the-fensive. But the new Ambassador to London, His Excellency Giuseppe Bastianini, whose appointment was now announced, was a young man whose past was known to have been concerned with questions of the Balkan bloc. He had served in Warsaw and in Athens. Moreover Count Grandi, who had relinquished the London Embassy in the summer on his appointment as Minister of Justice in Rome, now took the opportunity for a graceful gesture towards London. On September 26th he telegraphed to Lord Halifax to express his regrets that he could not now come to London personally to take leave. He paid a tribute to "the very gracious benevolence and the exquisite courtesies" he had received from the King and Queen. Such things are diplomatic straws in the wind.

It was on October 1st that Count Ciano arrived in Berlin in answer to the sudden summons. He was back on the following day, having spent several hours in conference with Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop. The silence that enshrouded the visit and its results perhaps best indicated their negative quality. Rome did not become the channel for Herr Hitler's peace proposal to the West. Moreover when Herr Hitler spoke to the Reichstag on October 6th he had as little to say about Signor Mussolini (who was dismissed in one short sentence) as he had much to say about "Herr Sthalin."

### 3. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY.

President Roosevelt on September 21st delivered his Message to the special session of the United States Congress, convened to consider the unfortunate problem of America's reaction to European barbarities. The problem was complicated by the internal struggle for and against Mr. Roosevelt's

running for a third term. In its external aspect the problem was : how could the United States on the one hand escape the direct havoc of war and on the other hand express, consistently with formal neutrality, her sympathy for Britain and France, and in addition ensure her due share of the commercial profits that might accrue from supplying the favoured belligerents (and the only belligerents who could be supplied) with munitions ? Without any doubt the majority of the people of the United States detested the purposes of Herr Hitler's designs as much as all decent people detested them. Their sympathy was unanimously with the Allied cause. Yet they detested still more the incidence of war (whatever the cause) and were determined, as a first principle of policy, to keep out of it. The isolationists, led by Senators Borah, Bennett Clark, La Follette, Vandenberg, Capper and Nye, representative of an opinion that cut across political parties, were as irreconcilably opposed to Hitlerism as were those who did not share their isolationism. The only real issue was to decide how far America should go in modifying her neutrality in its practice. In his Message President Roosevelt submitted this solution : that the arms embargo provided for in the Neutrality Statutes should be repealed on the ground that it was "most vitally dangerous to American neutrality, American security and American peace." He made a frank confession. "I regret," he said, referring to the Act of 1935, "that Congress passed that Act. I regret equally that I signed that Act." He now asked, as he had been asking since July, that it be amended so as to make possible the sale of aeroplanes, munitions, and weapons to Britain and France. "Destiny," he said, "has made the United States and the sister-nations of this hemisphere joint heirs of European culture. Fate now seems to compel us to assume the task of helping to maintain in the western world a citadel in which that civilisation may be kept alive."

It was a question wholly of America's own interests, as all political questions in every country tend to be (even though all countries flatly violate their own interests by thus thinking to serve them : a philosophic truth that has not yet sunk into political thought). On the one hand, as Senator Vandenberg (aspirant Republican candidate to next year's Presidency) once put it, to become the arsenal

for one belligerent is to become the target for the other. Yet, the German market being closed, could America, it was asked, simply sacrifice immense orders, when she knew that in the alternative those orders would be placed, and would be satisfied, in Canada? Commerce seemed to conspire with sentiment to suggest to the undoubted majority of the American people that the embargo should be lifted, on a "cash-and-carry" basis, to help Britain and France. As long ago as October 5th, 1937, Mr. Roosevelt had warned his countrymen: "Let no one expect that America will escape." This time the omens seemed to be favourable to President Roosevelt. On September 28th the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate approved the submission to the Senate of the amended Neutrality Bill. The voting showed a majority of sixteen, of whom three reserved the right to vote against part or the whole of the Bill on the floor of the House. There were only seven dissentients. If passed, the result would be that belligerents—in practice Britain and France—would be able to buy arms and munitions by "cash-and-carry." The buyer, that is to say, would have to take title before shipment, shipment would have to be in the buyer's ship, and credits of only ninety days, non-renewable, would be granted. When the Congress debate began on October 2nd, it became at once clear that President Roosevelt was winning support. In particular his old enemy, Mr. Al Smith, now supported him, as did Senator Norris, whose influence was the greater because in the last war he had voted against American participation.

Throughout American activity there was never any doubt that the general antipathy to Hitlerism, strong as it was, was subordinated to the general determination neither to enter the war nor to make war credits to nations (to wit, Great Britain) who had once defaulted. Mr. Herbert Hoover, for example, on October 3rd made public profession of his faith that defeat for France and Britain was "impossible"; yet he left no doubt that his argument was directed against the fear that America might have to intervene "to avoid a catastrophe to civilisation and to save themselves." Similarly American opinion at first supported a proposal of the Pan-American Conference, made at Panama on October 4th, that a safety zone be established, varying in depth from 300 to 600 miles from the American continent out to sea. By

that proposal belligerent ships would be requested not to operate in that zone, and a naval patrol would be maintained by the American nations. True, there were immediate second thoughts on the part of United States opinion against so absurd a proposal. Mr. Cordell Hull for example on October 5th, after discussing the matter with Lord Lothian, the new British Ambassador, declared that the project was rather an aspiration than a policy. The *New York Post* called it a "fantasy," the *Herald-Tribune* called it "just another of those woolly-headed notions." It was indeed obvious that the old problems of territorial waters could not thus lightly be set aside; that it would be impossible to demarcate a frontier on the sea; that there would be the necessary corollary of a guarantee on the part of the Americas that there should not intrude into the zone any ships which might be a legitimate object of attack by the Allied fleets commanding the high seas. And Britain wholly depended for her life in the prevailing circumstances on her control of those seas. Still, the mere fact that such a proposal was made at all showed the extent of American nervousness against becoming involved in the war.

#### 4. THE TURKISH PROBLEM.

While the Russians and the Germans were carving up Poland, and the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Finns were severally facing their sentences, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Sarajoglu, was prolonging his visit to Moscow to the intense concern of all parties alike. It was clear that Turkey held what might prove to be the key position in the whole war. The vital British interests which lay in the Near East were a main object of both German and Russian strategy. Not only was it the case that Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Iran—and Bulgaria too—constituted a front for Great Britain even more important than the Western front. There was the further psychological factor that the whole fate of the Balkans might be involved in Mr. Sarajoglu's decision. Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia had been given a sharp object lesson in what happens to States that decide to resist German aggression, when British and French promises of help could have none but a long-distance effect. They were all clearly terrified of Germany.

If Turkey were to join the German camp, the whole position in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and in the Near East would be lost. Hence it was that both German and Russian diplomacy was concentrated upon Turkey. The German lever for many months had been the lavish promise of territory, namely Iraq and Syria and possibly a part of Bulgaria, together with an equally lavish propaganda designed to prove the irresistible armed strength of Germany and the decadence of the Allies. Russia had the more difficult problem of seeking an alliance with Turkey, to the end that Britain and France might be excluded from the Black Sea, while encompassing her own annexationist ends at Turkey's expense: in particular the annexation of Constantinople. The pacific policy of Kemal Attatürk had always been based on friendship with Russia. Now that Russia had made a compact with Germany, Herr von Papen (the ominous precursor of mischief in so many former fields) thought that his task in Ankara was made easier.

It was on September 22nd that Mr. Sarajoglu left Istanbul for Moscow. Before leaving he declared that his object would be to discuss questions of mutual interest to the two countries and expressed the hope "on his return from Moscow to bring Turkey good news." He was supported by the Turkish Press, which developed the argument that as keeper of the Straits, Turkey had no alternative but to maintain the closest touch with the other Power most directly interested in the Black Sea and the Straits. Yet there was evidence that Turkish opinion was still loyal to the Pact of Mutual Assistance with Great Britain and France initialled on May 12th last. Indeed on the last day of September, after Mr. Sarajoglu had been in Moscow a week, it was announced from Ankara that the agreement with Britain and France was now complete and would be signed immediately on Mr. Sarajoglu's return from Moscow; and that a Turkish military mission was already on its way to London to elaborate the details.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

October 13th, 1939.

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## FROM MUNICH TO DANZIG.\*

Early in the present year Professor Seton-Watson published a little book entitled *Munich and the Dictators*, which described the September crisis from inside knowledge of Czechoslovakia, and sharply criticised Mr. Chamberlain's policy. Hitler's seizure of Austria and the Sudeten districts in 1938 was bad enough, but the enslavement of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was infinitely worse. It is of this unspeakable crime and of the revolution in British policy which it provoked that he writes in the new edition, which now bears the title *From Munich to Danzig*. Like all his publications on Central Europe, these supplementary chapters are full of information.

A year ago it was possible to believe as well as to hope that the Munich settlement might be the end of a dangerous epoch and that there was a real chance, as Mr. Chamberlain expressed it, of peace in our time. Even those who had few expectations from the policy of appeasement were ready to give it a full trial. The author, on the contrary, like the Parliamentary Oppositions, Mr. Churchill and many other leading men,

\* *From Munich to Danzig*. By R. W. Seton-Watson. Methuen. 6s.

never believed that Hitler would stop in the middle of his victorious advance towards the domination of the Continent. The payment of Danegeld, they argued, is futile as well as humiliating. He declared that he had no further territorial aims in Europe ; but did he mean it ? We were soon to learn, for in 1939 one breach of promise followed another in rapid succession. The Preface is dated August 27th, on the eve of the invasion of Poland, which supplies the latest evidence that we are confronted with Napoleonic ambitions. The Pan-German programme having been approximately fulfilled, the Dictator sets out on the familiar path of Imperialist aggression. Professor Seton-Watson would be more than human if he did not say : I told you so ! What he described in the earlier edition as an infamous betrayal dictated to a helpless nation, so far from satisfying Hitler's appetite, merely stirred him to fresh adventures. If England and France retreated in Czechoslovakia—and a retreat it was whether or not we approved of it—there seemed to him good reason to hope that they would do the same in other emergencies. It was a case of a man who believes in war as an instrument of national policy, to use the famous formula of the Kellogg Pact, exploiting the horror of war entertained by more civilised communities.

It is scarcely necessary to say that our author welcomes the conversion of the Prime Minister in March and the reorientation of our policy. After denouncing the champions of collective security for many months as war-mongers, Cabinet Ministers suddenly adopted their advice and attempted to build up a Peace Front. Promises of support were given to Poland, Roumania, Greece and Turkey, and we thereby parted with our cherished principle of deciding whether we would fight or not. Henceforth the decision rested with Hitler, who had merely to attack Poland to bring us in. Whether such far-reaching commitments, without the possibility of rendering direct military aid, were wise is a question likely to be discussed as anxiously as our abandonment of isolationism at the opening of the twentieth century. If a bridge is to be found between the old and the new policy, it is in the traditional principle of the Balance of Power, which means that when a European Power of the first rank combines formidable armed strength with undisguised hostility we oppose it by diplomacy or war. In fighting for Belgium in

1914 and Poland in 1939 we are fighting for our own security as we understand it. Whether it would have been possible to prevent the growth of the Nazi threat to the peace of Europe by wiser statesmanship after our victory in the world war and during the following years is a question which we should do well to consider even while the new conflict is raging. For if short-sighted statesmanship can be shown to have in part produced the Nazi revolution, it is of the utmost importance that similar mistakes should not be made a second time. Europe, observes Professor Seton-Watson, is a kaleidoscope, in perpetual movement, and it is impossible for the writer on contemporary affairs to keep abreast of events. That is true enough, but if we understand what has recently happened we are in a better position to interpret new developments. That is the value of this striking little book.

G. P. G.

### C. F. G. MASTERMAN.\*

The writer sat next to Charles Masterman when he made his first speech in the House of Commons. He was dealing with an Education Bill which was extremely controversial in character, and he took a strong line for the exclusion of all religious teaching from rate-aided schools. He regretted the differences between Provided and Non-Provided schools in the matter of religious education, and he pressed for the secular solution, leaving it to the Churches to do what was required. Joseph Chamberlain, who was present, congratulated him very warmly. It was an interesting and unusual maiden speech, ensuring a successful political career. In later days all his friends asked why, after his meteoric rise to fame, he should have failed to maintain his high position. He missed greatness by reason of certain faults which could hardly be overlooked. He was careless about appointments and letters, rather inclined to be arrogant in his treatment of those who differed from him, and his wit, which was undoubted, became caustic and mordant in his later years. He was distinctly a bad candidate, losing seat after seat.

He left Cambridge in a blaze of glory. He had been President of the Union and took a distinguished degree. He was uncertain as to his future work, but he had sympathy with the

\* *C. F. G. Masterman*. By Lucy Masterman. Nicholson & Watson. 18s.

working classes and real reforming ardour. So first of all he went to live in Camberwell, and it was life in Camberwell which induced him to write the little booklet called *From the Abyss*.

Mrs. Masterman's story is interesting, though somewhat diffuse and uneven. She rightly stresses his association with Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. He was the former's right-hand man in connection with the Health Insurance Bill, and there is an excellent account of the way in which he also assisted Mr. Lloyd George in connection with the Land Clauses of his Budget of 1909. There is one serious omission, however, and that is the name of Dr. Addison, now Lord Addison. It was he who broke down the resistance of the British Medical Association and the Northcliffe Press, but he gets no credit for it in the book.

Masterman was by nature, temperament and training a social reformer—a Liberal, it is true, but a Liberal of the Left and in high favour with the Labour Party. He owed his success in life to the fact that he was a brilliant speaker, dependent no doubt upon mood and feeling, but nearly always capable of conveying to his audience his own enthusiasm. In this sense he was a real personality and he made a host of friends amongst politicians, journalists, authors and social workers. It is to be regretted that he lost many of these friendships in later life, for when disillusioned or disappointed he could be almost brutal in his language and in his treatment of the very men who had befriended him.

Asquith, when he was Prime Minister, recognised his eloquence and his ability by appointment to office; but although in the Cabinet at the outbreak of the Great War, owing to the attacks made upon him he lost his seat and from that defeat he never fully recovered.

The book throws a good deal of light upon the history of those stirring times. For Masterman was always able and willing to state his own point of view and was in close touch with the protagonists. It is perhaps true to say that he had not really the making of a statesman. He might have been a leading Churchman. He was a first-rate journalist, if he could have endured the drudgery of newspaper offices. He had a keen sense of what was forceful and beautiful in language, and his criticisms of his wife's poems were always apt and to the point. His prevision and intuition with regard to the Peace Treaty justify the claim which may be made for him that in

great affairs he had sound judgment and a spirit of tolerance and justice. After the fall of Germany, which he compared with the fall of Carthage, he makes this remark : " There is much to be said for the view that after the armistice all the men of good will of all the combatants, friend and enemy alike, should have been called in to save the whole race in peril." He points out that, if justice could have been tempered with mercy and if the victors had exercised a wiser moderation, " such a policy might have made an end of the world of evil dreams which Europe found consummated in the catastrophe of the Great War." Mrs. Masterman has written a narrative which those of us who played even a small part in those great events have read with renewed interest.

PERCY ALDEN.

### SOCIAL IMPERIALISM.\*

This is the first of a series of monographs on world politics and world economics issued from a new research institute established in Bâle under the auspices of the Canton, with the assistance of the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations.

Dr. Grabowsky sets himself to interpret the present period of world history. He approaches his task from the Marxian angle ; but his analysis differs in important respects from that of other neo-Marxian writers. He has his own scheme of historical development, which he has outlined in previous works. He believes that we are nearing the conclusion of the age of Imperialism. This, he considers, has passed through three phases, to which he gives the names of Feudal Imperialism (Japan is the best instance of this), Commercial Imperialism and Social Imperialism. The distinguishing feature of this analysis, as against that of those who follow the pure Marxian tradition, is the stress laid on social forces as independent factors capable of retarding and even deflecting political and economic development ; this is illustrated in the case of Italy, where Fascism has had to contend with " the permanent underground resistance " of what is, sociologically speaking, a West European society, at least in Northern and North-Central Italy.

After analysing Social Imperialism in its full development,

\* *Der Sozialimperialismus als letzte Etappe des Imperialismus.* A. Grabowsky. Bâle : Weltpolitisches Archiv. 126 pp. 1939.

as manifested in the totalitarian States, Dr. Grabowsky concludes that "it cannot be carried any farther by peaceful means," and that its collapse is therefore imminent. He then proceeds to ask what will take its place. He rejects the logical Marxian answer—a world State, the signs of which he cannot descry on the horizon. He examines three other possibilities. The first is a period of Socialism, simply replacing Imperialism in the various governing centres. This he rejects on the ground that in the present phase of world history the masses are too weary to carry through a gigantic change of this character. Another possibility is that the peoples will react against the mechanical rigidity of the large-scale totalitarian State by relapsing into anarchism; in this connection he recalls the controversy between Marx and Proudhon, the advocate of small-scale social solutions. A third possibility is a patriarchal régime. For this a ruling class is needed. Where is it to be found? Dr. Grabowsky has a ready answer—in the military leaders. This, of course, would be no solution but merely a temporary palliative, to tide over a period of exhaustion. But then, as he boldly foretells (his preface is dated November 1938), "Whatever may be the outcome of this world-war, it will leave the peoples even more exhausted than they were before."

Thus far Dr. Grabowsky's argument. A British reviewer cannot refrain from adding a critical footnote. Mr. Wells has lately written of how he has watched "Marxian dogmatism wrapping like a mantle of fog round the minds of two crucial generations." One rises from the perusal of Dr. Grabowsky's suggestive but intricate generalisations with the feeling that he would have succeeded better in his task of interpreting the present period of world-history if he had never read a line of Marx or his disciples and had spent the time thus saved upon a study of the English-speaking peoples. Central Europe is not the best place in which to set up a watch-tower to view the present-day world.

A. Z.

### CHATEAUBRIAND.\*

It is a curious accident that two lives of Chateaubriand should have appeared within a short space of time. Last year

\* *Chateaubriand*. By Joan Evans. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

we had one of M. Maurois' brilliant biographical studies ; the authoress of the book under review had written her book, she tells us, before the French book was published. The two books to a large extent complement each other. M. Maurois traces with a sure hand the relations of Chateaubriand to the public events of his time. Miss Evans is mainly concerned with the character and personal adventures of her hero—if hero he can be called—and passes lightly and a little uncertainly over the history of the time. She seems to think that the Bastille fell on July 24th. The Congress of Verona where Chateaubriand came near to playing a really important part is passed over without any attempt to appreciate the issues at stake ; for a fuller treatment of the subject we must go to Maurois. On the other hand the character of the man has clearly fascinated her. The book is excellently written and has all the personal interest of a novel. There are passages in Chateaubriand's life that she does not explore with the thoroughness of the French writer ; but when the book is finished the reader feels that he has really made the acquaintance of an important personage.

The subject is not without its pitfalls and Miss Evans is well aware of them. The *Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe* are by no means a safe foundation to build upon. Miss Evans admits that Chateaubriand often exaggerates and " occasionally obscures the narrative." A more thorough-going examination of the value of the Memoirs would have been welcome. Many errors have been pointed out. He implies that he had seen the Mississippi, and it seems certain that he had not done so. There are incidents in his narrative of his first residence in England which are doubtful to say the least of it. There are a good many statements which simply cannot be accepted. I do not believe that Chateaubriand's cousin when on active service was so fat that when he fell he was unable to rise without help. But it is not inaccuracies in the statement of fact that are the greatest drawback to the *Mémoires* as a historical document. The whole work is coloured and distorted by a perpetual pose and affectation. He reminds us again and again of Byron, but though he has most of the faults of the English author he has little of his genius. He is the best representative of the romantic movement in its weakness rather than its strength. Miss Evans writes : " He always saw the object of his desire, whether woman or glory or power, in a light that never was on sea or land ; he was always

disillusioned when he had attained it; and after a time of empty boredom, that he dignified by the name of melancholy, he always found some other object to pursue." And again she writes, "he lived in a dream and had no wish for reality." There is no reason to wonder or to regret that his career in politics was not more successful. He lacked most of the qualities that make a successful statesman. He had no accurate objective knowledge of European conditions and he could not face unpopularity. He seems indeed to have had only one great gift. He had a great sense of style and a genius for finding a telling phrase. When Napoleon said of him "there are men who think themselves apt for anything because they have a single quality or gift; Chateaubriand is of their number," he touched the very heart of the matter. It is amazing that so empty a writer should hold an important place among those who contributed to the revival of Catholicism in France. Miss Evans devotes little space to his books. They are so completely fallen out of favour now that we should have been grateful for a little discussion of the qualities of *Le Génie du Christianisme* and *Les Martyrs*. There are pages in his letters and his books that are really noble in expression and thought, and it would have been well if Miss Evans, who knows them so well, had drawn our attention to what is best in his writings. But she has written a very interesting and stimulating book which provokes many thoughts and which will send many readers to study the period in which Chateaubriand's life was passed.

A. J. GRANT.

## THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND NAZI-ISM.

Dr. Nathaniel Micklem, the Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, has furnished an important and exhaustive account of the conflict between National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church.\* The book has been issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. It gives a careful survey of the position as it has arisen and been developed since the advent of Hitler in 1933. At every point the narrative is amply documented from strictly official sources. It is altogether fair, but overwhelmingly condemnatory. The Nazi record in regard to religion is marked by the

\* *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church*. Oxford Univ. Press. 8s. 6d.

same features as those of its international politics and diplomacy. Its method has been one of continuous equivocation and mendacity. Its dishonesty, however, has not succeeded in cloaking its paganism or in tempering its despotism and persecution. Dr. Micklem clearly shows that the conflict of Hitler, Rosenberg and their associates with the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches has not been confined to recurrent causes of controversy. More fundamental is the attempted imposition of the Nazi philosophy of life—the religion of “race, blood and soil.” The intolerance and cruelty of this philosophy has been tragically demonstrated in the persecution of the Jews and by the concentration camps. Nazi nationalism not only as a policy but as a philosophy is fundamentally opposed to the catholicity of the Christian Faith and to its humane sympathies. Those who desire to understand the causes which have brought about the present war should study Dr. Micklem’s book, and note the authoritative sources from which all his statements and deductions are carefully derived with conspicuous fairness and freedom from exaggeration.

J. S. L.

### THE DICTATOR.\*

We dislike hardly anything so much as the inevitability of an event. Those who peruse the pages of the past are well aware that a mere trifle may deflect the form of an event. It was, therefore, with a certain amount of reluctance that we read Mr. Cobban’s able volume, for in it he is prepared to maintain the inevitability of the dictator. He is far too well versed in history to hold such a thesis—if the proofs were not overwhelming. *Idées* and *idées-forces* jostle each other in his pages, and he has found it impossible to disentangle them. None the less, he demonstrates that the theory of dictatorship attests the fact of its permanence. The truth is that, to quote Burke, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, and what people is prepared to pay this price? Apart from this abiding circumstance, there is the desire of the multitude for the strong man Carlyle acclaimed. The strength of this volume lies in the pedigree the author has supplied for the dictator. He has three chapters on divine right monarchy and the idea of

\* *Dictatorship. Its History and Theory.* By A. Cobban. Cape. 12s. 6d.

sovereignty, the transference of sovereignty to the people, and Bonapartism, before he approaches his problem in the twentieth century. We very much appreciate this angle of approach, for it affords considerable assistance in understanding the Hitlers, the Mussolinis and the Stalins of our generation. The thinkers after 1500 scarcely allowed of a dictator of the Greek or Roman type, for whether they supported divine right or natural law they looked to an ultimate sanction. Hobbes created a veritable revolution when he successfully got rid of this sanction by founding absolutism on consent. When conscription arrived, the consenter found himself a soldier in uniform. In the judgment of Mr. Cobban the dictator wears the form of a military leader. Napoleon emerges as the all-round dictator. The rise of nationality at the end of the eighteenth century vastly augmented the Führer's power and prestige, for is he not the embodiment of the nation? Science has lent him illegitimate aid by its stress on the survival of the fittest. In order to win in this struggle there must be a national leader. Nor does Mr. Cobban shrink from regarding specialisation as a factor in the emergence of the Führer. He believes that the growing specialisation in education lends a freer hand to the men specialising in government. The scientist, the educationalist, but, above all, the nationalist have played their due parts in the evolution of the dictator.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

### A RANK REVOLUTIONARY.\*

Mr. F. MacDermot has written an able survey of the amazing career of Theobald Wolfe Tone. The great Duke of Wellington rightly regarded Tone's autobiography as an extraordinary work, and the author is plainly of the same opinion. He has taken into account recent research, and the result is an important book on one whose career is singular to a degree. The background of the United Irishmen and the Roman Catholic movement towards the close of the eighteenth century with the action and the interaction of the French Revolution is accurately portrayed, though the latter topic hardly receives that degree of attention to which it is

\* *Theobald Wolfe Tone*. By F. MacDermot. Macmillan. 15s.

entitled. What the French tried to do for Ireland is placed before us, but how their *idées-forces* affected North and South does not stand out quite so clearly. The potency of Paine's *Rights of Man* and the example of the United States are duly estimated. The part that Wolfe Tone had to play was enormously complicated by the differences between Ulster and Munster. The Protestants of the North, notably the Presbyterians, had chronic grievances. The Roman Catholics of the South had their agrarian grievances which the Ulster custom of tenant right gravely mitigated. The Liberalism of Grattan and Charlemont in Ireland was akin to that of C. J. Fox in England, but this Liberalism was removed by worlds from the revolutionary republicanism of the United Irish Society which its founder, Wolfe Tone, shared. The hard-headed Ulster Presbyterians had not the slightest idea of the plans that lay hidden in the mind of the founder. Mr. MacDermot sees all this with perfect clearness. Nor is he in the least doubt as to the real character of Wolfe Tone himself. He sees him as the man who was willing to serve the English Government—if that Government cared to employ his services. He sees him as the man who turned his back on this Government when his services were spurned. Nor is he in any doubt that the motive that moved Wolfe Tone thereafter was hatred. Curiously enough considering the estimation in which Eire now holds him, Wolfe Tone scarcely ranks himself as a patriot. In these pages we note the United Irish Society at work, and we also note the man who directed its far-reaching labours in France as well as in Ireland. He frankly came to hate England and to spend his efforts in the desire to secure the downfall of that Power. Hatred of England with him, as with Parnell, was the dominating motive in his life, and it is the tragedy of Irish life that so many of its patriots are much more moved by hatred than by love.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

## LEONARDO DA VINCI.\*

Sir Kenneth Clark's comprehensive account of the artistic development and psychology of perhaps the most enigmatic

\* *Leonardo da Vinci*. By Sir Kenneth Clark. Cambridge University Press. 1939. 218.

figure in Italian Renaissance art is a work of the first importance. Superbly produced, alike as to printing and plates, it incorporates the conclusions and discoveries of recent research, including his own; Sir Kenneth has made a special study of Leonardo in compiling the catalogue of his Windsor drawings and preparing courses of lectures given in England and America. The appearance of the book is timely, following as it does the recent edition of Leonardo's *Note Books* translated by Professor McCurdy. The list of the painter's authentic works may now be considered fairly determined by the latest criticism; one may perhaps regret that the exquisite *Annunciation* of the Uffizi, ascribed by Berenson and others to Verrocchio, must apparently be made over to his brilliant pupil. Sir Kenneth's account of the transformation wrought by Leonardo in the traditional art of Florence—the "strange, visionary world" he superimposed on its conventions; of his influence on the Lombard School and on Giorgione, especially as to *chiaroscuro*; and of the differences in the two versions of the *Madonna of the Rocks*, will be read with particular interest. Vasari's evidence is quoted to prove that the *Mona Lisa* was originally of a rosy colour; it is suggested that this might possibly emerge from expert cleaning. Among new features introduced by Leonardo in pictorial composition are shown to have been the *motif* of the little St. John with the Madonna and Child, to form a pyramidal design, and the grouping of the Apostles in the *Last Supper*. His pupils' drawings show that the restorer has ruined several heads in that fresco, and two plates in the book reveal how beautiful those of SS. Philip and James were designed to be.

Although Sir Kenneth is chiefly concerned with Leonardo as artist, it was, of course, impossible to exclude his other manifold activities, as e.g. military engineer and architect, or his preoccupation with theories and experiments which were too often detrimental to his painting. Our author claims that Leonardo's complex personality is best revealed in his drawings, where his romantic imagination expresses itself freely in representations of swift movement—flight, battles, waves, deluges, wind-blown grasses, in nightmare allegories and grotesques, and his scientific curiosity, in accurate studies of anatomy, mechanics or plant-forms.

E. G. S.

## SHORTER REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

*More Thoughts and Talks*,\* by Sir Arnold Wilson, is appropriately described as "The Diary and Scrap-book of a Member of Parliament from September 1937 to August 1939." It has all the characteristics of its three predecessors, setting out the views and outlook of ordinary people upon innumerable topics which affect them closely. Sir Arnold is an excellent "mixer" with all sorts and conditions of men, whether in his constituency or in his frequent travels up and down the country. As this volume clearly shows, he quickly gains the stranger's confidence and is rewarded with genuine, often strongly felt, expressions of opinion. While for the most part Sir Arnold records the views of others, he expresses his own on occasion. As is well known, he classes himself as a Tory Radical, in line with Disraeli, tending "in some measure to the Right abroad and to the Left at home." He is an ardent supporter of the Prime Minister, although he appears to have differed upon foreign policy last summer. In July Sir Arnold considered that Hitler would be satisfied with Danzig and a corridor through Pomorze with an international guarantee of existing Polish frontiers; he advocated a renewed attempt at a real peace by "appeasement," which in his view would have been successful. Doubtless Sir Arnold was partly influenced in this opinion by two visits to Germany this year, in April and July, which are recorded here. Looking back, however, few can agree now that an "appeasement" policy could have succeeded upon the basis of Poland retaining her then existing territory, assuming such a policy were just.

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Lord Sankey opens his preface to Mr. Fay's biography of Mr. Justice Swift† with the quotation: "Speak of me as I am: nothing extenuate Nor set down aught in malice," and suggests that these might have been the instructions given by Mr. Justice Swift to the person who was to write an account of his life. Mr. Fay's memoir, one of the best of its kind of recent times, clearly indicates that its author has followed these instructions. Mr. Justice Swift loved going circuit and he was a good circuit judge. Mr. Fay writes that "The secret of his success was his insight into the human soul." He was always at pains to see that prisoners, especially those with little means, received a fair trial. Mr. Fay properly recalls how if Swift saw a flaw in the case for the prosecution or a line of defence open to a prisoner he made sure that the prisoner had the advantage of it, and how, frequently, he would advise the accused to plead "Not Guilty," asking one of the counsel in court to undertake the defence. The problem of what to do with those convicted before him was always one

\* Longmans. 7s. 6d. net.

† *The Life of Mr. Justice Swift*. Methuen. 12s. 6d. net.

of difficulty to Swift, to which he gave very considerable thought and attention. Ordinarily he tempered justice with mercy. When, however, his indignation was roused, as by cases of robbery with violence, he could be severe. A believer in the deterrence of flogging, he once said: "A man who has once been flogged for robbery with violence very rarely repeats the offence." Mr. Fay has given a most useful selection of the cases in which Swift was engaged as an advocate and as a judge. He has given, too, an account of his relations with the Bar and recalled some of the "Swift stories" which for so long have been told and re-told wherever barristers and solicitors gather together. There is in this most readable book much to interest the layman as well as the lawyer.

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Miss D. M. Stuart is already known as an accomplished biographer and has made good use of the material, some of it taken from the Windsor Archives and hitherto unpublished, for the lives of six sister princesses of the House of Hanover.\* Apart from the current revival of interest in the Regency period and the immediate antecedents of Queen Victoria, one wonders whether they were of sufficient importance to deserve such elaborate resuscitation. The "Sisterhood" are shown as amiable and affectionate, charitable, attached to their retainers, and devoted to their eldest brother, who proved their unfailing champion, both before and after his becoming Regent and King. He secured for them separate establishments, when their beloved father's recurrent attacks of madness saddened their lives, and the repression of Queen Charlotte made them a burden. The Princesses were handsome as girls, though the adulation of Fanny Burney and other enthusiasts must be discounted. Elizabeth showed some taste for the fine arts, Mary ("dearest Miny") was the general confidante. Three of the sisters made uninspiring marriages, the other three had secret love-affairs, resulting, apparently, in two cases, in private marriages. All took a kindly interest in their young nieces, the ill-fated Charlotte, and, later, Victoria. Some of their confidential letters are sprightly and revealing, others are, frankly, trivial, or too full of details of ill-health. The frontispiece, showing the three youngest sisters as children, is charming; the portrait of the Princess Royal in later life brings out a resemblance to Queen Victoria.

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The part played by the City of Bristol and her sons in the history of British Imperial development is the central theme of Mr. C. M. MacInnes' learned and impressive work, *A Gateway of Empire*.† As his narrative so amply discloses, there have been "few aspects of British expansion overseas in which she has not shared"; and in some

\* *The Daughters of George III.* Macmillan. 1939. 15s.

† Arrowsmith. 15s. net.

she has played a pre-eminent part, as in the West Indies until the sugar trade collapsed in the nineteenth century. Even to-day Bristol remains the seventh largest city in England and has redeveloped much of her imperial commercial connections, but on a wider and securer foundation. This work is properly, and indeed necessarily, much more than a bare local history. The subject requires, and receives, treatment of many general questions of imperial history, such as the slave trade and slavery on the plantations, in which Bristol was particularly concerned. In approaching such issues and developments from the viewpoint of local interests and endeavour the historian imparts a more intimate consciousness of the past than is possible in the general history. As such, serious and erudite works on the lines of this admirable volume are particularly welcome, apart altogether from the fresh light they may throw upon great issues in our national and imperial history.

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In his recent work, *The Whig Party, 1807-1812*,\* Professor Michael Roberts reviews the Whig Opposition during the Tory ministries of Portland and Percival. It is a learned detailed piece of work based upon the available sources and while in general it does not substantially add to conclusions already drawn it will be welcomed and valued by students of these years. Professor Roberts discusses largely Whig policies in relation to Catholic Emancipation and Ireland, the Napoleonic War and reform, and analyses the reasons for the ineptitude and impotence of the Opposition at this time.

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*The Chinese Novel*† was Pearl Buck's Nobel Lecture delivered before the Swedish Academy at Stockholm last December. In it she traces the natural dramatic gift of the Chinese people for a story, which grew up alongside of and indeed in spite of the literary work of the scholars with their rules of art. The common people laughed at the scholars and developed a taste of their own. Mrs. Buck mentions especially the novel *Shin Hu Chuan*, which grew out of a handful of tales in the Sung dynasty about a band of robbers, and was written by no one man; *San Kuo*, "the guerillas who are to-day China's most effective fighting units against Japan, are peasants who know *San Kuo* by heart"; *Hung Lou Meng*, a story of a proud and powerful family in decline and "the absolute power of women in the home."

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Mr. Patrick B. Chalmers has produced a most engaging volume on *Racing England*‡ which should appeal both to racegoers and the general public. In the course of a light and vivid narrative Mr. Chalmers

\* Macmillan. 25s.

† Macmillan. 3s. 6d.

‡ Batsford. 12s. 6d. net.

touches upon most aspects of the sport, including an historical background, concise descriptions of the principal English racecourses, a chapter on the Jockey Club and sketches of great personalities among owners, trainers, jockeys, bookmakers and racegoers of the past and present. The author also discusses some famous horses. The whole book is enlivened by a wealth of anecdote and embellished by more than ninety illustrations from old prints and paintings and modern photographs.

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Mr. H. W. Horwill, whose *Dictionary of Modern American Usage* is widely known, has now compiled in *An Anglo-American Interpreter*,\* a vocabulary and phrase book of equivalent English and American terms. The collection is not in any sense exhaustive, though it does include a number of words and phrases which are limited in general use to particular areas of the United States. A large number of the American terms are, of course, familiar and widely spoken in this country, while others, though strange, are intelligible after a moment's thought, such as baggage for luggage and drugstore for chemist. On the other hand in a large number of matters of everyday intercourse Englishmen and Americans may be unintelligible to each other. When, for example, in London the American asks the way to the underpass the Londoner will hardly grasp at once that the subway is meant, and if in New York the Englishman asks for the latter he will be surprised to be shown the underground. There are also, of course, innumerable idioms, similes and metaphors which may defeat the uninitiated. The English writer, for example, will be excused for not appreciating that the matter is a mere trifle when informed that it doesn't amount to a hill of beans. This little volume, which incidentally has its humorous side, should certainly become a valuable help to English and American tourists and also to readers on both sides of the Atlantic. To the student, too, of the English language it should prove a significant and instructive collection.

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*The English Countryside*,† issued in the Pilgrim's Library, has an introduction by H. J. Massingham. The different scenery is described by various writers, in chapters on Hedges, Valleys, Orchards, the Downs, Moors, Fens, and so on, and the pictures are of wide views and distant scenes.

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*The Lowlands of Scotland*,‡ by George Scott-Moncrieff, has chapters on Galloway, a delightful county full of old stories and old buildings, the Border, Lothian, the Middle West, Fife, Angus, the Mearns, the North-East; an excellent book to have with one on a holiday jaunt.

\* Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 2s. 6d. net.

† Batsford. 6s.      ‡ Batsford. 8s. 6d.